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ABSTRACT 
Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification 
is a requirement for knowledge. This requirement is usually 
formulated in one of two ways: 
(JRI) S knows that p only if S is epis-
temically justified • - believing    
that p. 
(JR2) S knows that p only if S' s belief 
that p is epistemically justified. 
Surprisingly enough, (JRI) and (JR2) are generally regarded 
as synonymous, stylistic variants of the justification 
condition. In Chapter I, I argue that such a synonymy 
thesis is simply mistaken and that, in fact, (JRI) and (JR2) 
specify substantively different requirements. After all, 
(JRl) requires that the person (or would-be knower) be 
epistemically justified, whereas (JR2) requires that the 
belief in question be epistemically justified, and 
intuitively these constitute different requirements. Thus, 
it is concluded that (JRI) and (JR2) employ inherently 
different kinds of epistemic justification in their 
respective analysantia. I dub them "personal justification" 
and "doxastic justification", respectively. The remainder 
of the dissertation is devoted to demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the personal/doxastic justification 
distinction and to tracing out its ramifications for the 
ix 
x 
theory of knowledge. For example, in Chapter 2, we see that 
the personal/doxastic justification distinction accounts for 
the divergent intuitions that regularly arise regarding 
justificatory evaluations in demon world contexts. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I provide analyses for doxastic 
justification and personal justification, respectively. 
Chapter 2 spells out an externalist reliabilist account of 
doxastic justification which safely avoids demon world 
counterexamples. In Chapter 3, an internalist coherence 
account of personal justification is advanced. In defending 
this coherence theory, I argue that all foundation theories 
are false and that the regress argument on which they are 
predicated is unsound. With accounts of doxastic and 
personal justification in hand, I turn to the task of 
analyzing knowledge. 
In Chapter 4, I propose an analysis of ordinary 
knowledge which only requires doxastic justification. Even 
so, personal justification has a negative, undermining role 
to play in the analysis. I then demonstrate that this 
analysis of knowledge is immune to typical Gettier examples. 
It also remains unscathed by Harman's beefed-up Gettier 
cases. Finally, I consider a stronger analysis of knowledge 
which requires both doxastic and personal justifi.cation. 
Though the latter analysis proves too strong for ordinary 
knowledge, it remains interesting as an analysis of a more 
xi 
intellectualistic kind of knowledge. 
The final chapter examines the internalist/externalist 
controversy and demonstrates that this controve,rsy is a 
direct result of the failure to distinguish personal 
justification from doxastic justification. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
CLARIFYING "EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION" 
1. The Need for Such Clarification 
Many philosophers regard epistemic justification as the 
. ... 1 1 A 1 th most J.mportant notJ.on J.n epJ.stemo ogy. s a resu t, e 
current epistemological literature has been inundated with 
theories which purport to analyze the concept of epistemic 
justification. However, the interest in epistemic 
justification is hardly a contemporary phenomenon. It 
certainly dates back to Descartes, who sought to ground all 
his knowledge on the firmest justificatory foundation 
possible, and it may even date back to the query in Plato's 
Theaetetus of what must be added to true judgment in order 
to obtain knowledge. This widespread interest in epistemic 
justification can be accounted for primarily in two ways. 
First, epistemic justification is generally regarded as the 
necessary condition for knowledge which rules out lucky 
lE.g., Roderick Chisholm asserts, "It is certainly true 
that the concept of justification may be thought of as the 
central concept of the traditional theory of knowledge." 
[See his "The Place of Epistemic Justification", 
Philosophical         , Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), p. 85.]; John Polloe maintains that epistemic justification is 
the principal focus of epistemology. [See Chapter 1 of his 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (in manuscript).] Stewart 
Cohen suggests that the difference between epistemically 
justified and epistemically unjustified belief marks the 
central distinction in epistemology. [See his dissertatIOn 
Justification and Truth, p. 9.]. 
2 
guesses. So, those interested in providing an account of 
knowledge have ipso facto been interested in providing an 
account of epistemic justification suitable for such 
knowledge. Second, epistemic justification is intrinsically 
interesting in its own right, since many people want to know 
when believing a proposition is justified. 
Despite the widespread interest in epistemic 
justification and its analysis, surprisingly little work has 
been done to clarify just what concept it is that 
epistemologists have been trying to analyze. This singular 
hiatus in contemporary epistemology is probably best 
explained by the fact that most epistemologists have simply 
failed to see the need for such conceptual clarification. 
Instead, they have just taken it for granted that there is a 
common ordinary notion of epistemic justification and have 
offered various analyses intended to capture this ordinary 
notion. However, this "capture the ordinary notion" 
approach is best viewed as a reductio of the claim that 
there is such a unique notion of epistemic justification 
which all epistemologists share. The analyses proposed by 
those using this approach vary so wildly in the beliefs that 
they count as justified that they cannot plausibly be 
construed as analyses of the same concept. 
Plantinga puts it, 
As Alvin 
The differences among these views are 
enormous; this is by no means a case of 
variations on the same theme. Indeed, 
disagreement is so deep and radical it is 
sometimes hard to be sure the various 
            fre discussing approximately the 
same l.ssue. 
3 
Moreover, the intuitions used to bolster these divergent 
views are so disparate that they must inevitably be driven 
by competing conceptions of epistemic justification. 
Having recognized that most epistemological theorizing 
has had, as its starting point, these unspecified, competing 
conceptions of epistemic justification, a few philosophers, 
most notably Alvin Plantinga and William Alston, have sought 
to clarify the concept of epistemic justification in a 
theory neutral way. Their procedure for clarifying the 
concept has been, roughly, to point out those features of 
epistemic justification which seem to be shared by the 
various competing conceptions and then to regard these 
shared features as constitutive of the ordinary notion of 
epistemic justification. But, as we shall see, this 
procedure fares no better in providing a unitary concept of 
epistemic justification. 
Plantinga identifies three elements fundamental to the 
concept of epistemic justification. 3 First, 'justification' 
2Alvin 
manuscript) , 
3Ibid . , 
Plantinga, 
p. l. 
pp. 2-3. 
"Justification and Theism" (in 
4 
is a term of positive epistemic appraisal such that "to say 
that a proposition is justified for a person is to say that 
his believing or accepting it has positive epistemic status 
for him. ,,4 Second, epistemic justification admits of 
degrees. And third, epistemic justification (or something 
close to it) is what must be added to true belief to get 
knowledge. Plantinga sums up what he means by the term 
'epistemic justification' as follows: 
Initially, then, and to a first 
approximation, we can identify justification 
or positive epistemic status as a normative 
property that comes in degrees, and that 
lies in the near neighborhood of      
distinguishes true belief from knowledge. 
Alston offers an initial conception of epistemic 
justification slightly different from, but apparently 
compatible with, Plantinga's conception. Alston begins by 
distinguishing between "one's being justified in believing 
that p, and one's justifying one's belief that p, where the 
latter involves one's doing something to show that p, or to 
show that one's belief was justified,,,6 and he then asserts 
that he "will be concentrating on the 'be justified' side of 
4Ibid ., p. 2. 
5Ibid ., p. 3. 
6William Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification", 
The Monist, Vol. 68, No.1 (January, 1985), p. 58. 
5 
this distinction, since that is of more fundamental 
epistemological interest." 7 This is already a substantive 
claim on his part, which is not common to all conceptions of 
jus tification, e. g. in Knowledge, Keith Lehrer seems more 
interested in the "justifying" side of Alston's distinction, 
but for the sake of exegesis let us suppose, for the moment, 
that Alston has located the fundamental sense of epistemic 
justification. Alston identifies the following four 
features as the common ground of this "be justified" sense 
of epistemic justification: 
(1) It applies to beliefs, or alternatively 
to a            subject's having a 
belief. 
(2) It is an evaluative concept, in a broad 
sense in which this is contrasted with 
"factual." ... It is to accord S'§ 
believing a positive epistemic status. 
(3) It has to do with a specifically 
epistemic dimension of evaluation. 
. . . Epistemic evaluation is under-· 
taken from what we might call the 
"epistemic point of view." That point 
of view is defined by the aim at 
maximizing truth and minimitbng falsity 
in a large body of beliefs. And, 
7 Ibid. 
8Ibid . 
9Ibid . 
10Ibid ., p. 59. 
(4) 11 It is a matter of degree .. 
6 
He also suggests that epistemic justification so construed 
is a necessary condition of knowledge. 12 
In a recent article, Roderick Chisholm also attempts to 
clarify the concept of epistemic justification, which he 
takes to be the central concept of the traditional theory of 
knowledge. He maintains that "the sense of 'justify' that 
is central to the traditional theory of knowledge pertains 
to the question whether the belief may be said to be 
reasonable.,,13 For Chisholm, 'justified belief' and 
'reasonable belief' are synonymous expressions, and he 
specifies three ways of demarcating the sense of 
"reasonable" which is crucial to the epistemological 
enterprise. First, "It provides us with the materials by 
means of which we can answer the question of the Theaetetus: 
'What does one add to the concept of true belief to get the 
14 concept knowledge?'" Second, "The sense of 'reasonable' 
with which we are concerned is that which provides us with 
the means of defining the other fundamental concepts of the 
llIbid. 
l2Ibid ., p. 58. 
l3Roderick Chisholm, £E. cit., p. 86. 
l4 Ibid . 
7 
theory of knowledge. illS Thus, Chisholm takes 'reasona.ble' 
to be a primitive, unanalyzable epistemic term in terms of 
which all other epistemic terms are to be defined. And 
third, 
The relevant sense of reasonable belief is 
one which is such that a believer can 
ascertain by himself at any time which of 
his beliefs are reasonable for him at that 
time. ... Hence               is properly 
called an "internal" concept. 
Finally, Chisholm contends that there is no direct relation 
between a belief's being true and its being justified in 
this "reasonable belief" sense. 17 
Chisholm's last contention is directly at odds with one 
of the ingredients that Stewart Cohen takes to be essential 
to the concept of epistemic justification. Cohen locates 
two features constitutive of such justification: (1) 
epistemic justification is essentially a normative concept 
for guiding and evaluating reasoners,18 and (2) it is 
internally connected to truth, since this is what 
d · . . h . f 1 d .. ·f· t· 19            es     rom mora an                            
1SIbid . 
16 Ibid . 
17 Ibid , p. 90. 
18Stewart Cohen, £E. cit., pp. 8 and 13. 
19Ibid ., pp. iv and 2. 
8 
Thus, whereas Chisholm thinks that there is no internal 
connection between epistemic justification and truth, Cohen 
contends that an indispensable component of epistemic 
justification which distinguishes it from other senses of 
"justification" is its conceptual connection with truth. 
Interestingly enough, Cohen goes on to argue that those 
theories of epistemic justification that do provide such a 
connection to truth fail because they cannot accommodate the 
t · . t f' t' f' . 20 h' h k d' f norma     y 0 JUS              w     rna es one won er   
Cohen has isolated a coherent notion of epistemic 
justification. 
John Pollock, like Chisholm, eschews an internal 
connection between epistemic justification and truth. For 
Pollock, epistemic justification is essentially a 
permissibility notion. As he puts it, "A justified belief 
is one that it is 'epistemically permissible' to hold. 
Epistemic justification is a normative notion. It pertains 
to what you [epistemically] should or should not believe.,,21 
But unlike Chisholm, Pollock maintains that epistemic 
justification in this belief-guiding normative sense is not 
20 Ibid ., Chapters 1,2 and 5. 
21 John Pollock, £E. cit., p. 9. 
9 
all that must be added to true belief to get knowledge, not 
. G' • . 22 even    non-                    
Alvin Goldman, on the other hand, does think that 
justification is intimately connected with epistemic 
23 truth. In "What Is Justified Belief?" he attempts to 
provide an account of epistemic justification which results 
in epistemically justified beliefs being probably true. 24 
As Goldman conceives of it, epistemic justification is an 
evaluative concept, but, in contrast to Chisholm, it is 
primarily an "external" concept in Goldman's estimation, 
since he maintains that a belief can be justified for a 
person without that person being aware that it is justified 
and without that person "possessing" anything which could be 
called a "justification". 25 He also maintains that 
epistemic justification can be successfully reduced to the 
non-epistemic and that an appropriately deep or revelatory 
22 Ibid ., see Appendix, pp. 203-218. 
23 In               and Cognition Goldman contends that 
the            of Justification-rule rightness is a 
truth-linked criterion, to wit, a system of J-rules is right 
iff it results in a sufficiently high ratio of true beliefs 
to total beliefs. Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and 
Cognition (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1986). See Chapter 5, sections 5.5 - 5.9. 
24Alvin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?", 
Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979). 
25 Ibid ., pp. 1-2. 
10 
account of epistemic justification will evince such a 
d t · 26 re uc      
To my knowledge, this exhausts those philosophers who 
have actually attempted to clarify the concept of epistemic 
justification with which they are working. So, I will 
summarize the "findings" of this section by listing the 
things that these philosphers have said regarding the 
concept of epistemic justification. 
(1) Epistemic justification is a normative 
or evaluative concept. 
(2) It admits of degrees. 
(3) It is to be equated with positive 
epistemic status. 
(4) It is to be equated with epistemic 
reasonableness. 
(5) It is what must be added to true 
belie! to get knowledge. 
(6) It lies in the neighborhood of what it 
is that must be added to true belief to 
get knowledge. 
(7) It is not all that must be added to 
true beIIef to get knowledge. 
(8) It is an "internal" concept in the 
sense of being directly accessible to 
those who possess it. 
(9) It is an "external" concept in the 
sense that cognizers can, and often do, 
lack access to the justificational 
status of their beliefs, even when 
those beliefs are justified. 
26 Ibid . 
f 
(10) It has an internal, 
connection to truth. 
conceptual 
(11) It is not internally connected to truth. 
(12) It applies to beliefs, or alternatively 
to a subject's having a belief. 
(13) It is an irreducible, unanalyzable 
epistemic primitive. 
(14) It can be successfully reduced to the 
non-epistemic. 
(15) It is a permissibility notion. 
11 
Suffice it to say that the waters are quite muddied 
where the concept of epistemic justification is concerned. 
In light of the "findings" listed above, there appears to be 
no unitary concept of epistemic justification. About the 
only thing which does seem to be universally accepted is 
that epistemic justification is in some sense a normative 
notion which admits of degrees. I trust that the need for a 
conceptual clarification of "epistemic justification" is now 
patently evident, and in the remainder of this chapter, I 
will attempt to provide such clarification. But a comment 
is in order concerning the direction that this conceptual 
clarification should take. I regard the fundamental lesson 
of this section to be the realization that there is no 
unitary notion of epistemic justification. There simply is 
no single concept of epistemic justification which can do 
all of the things epistemologists have expected epistemic 
justification to do. So, I shall not attempt to isolate a 
12 
single sense of "epistemic justification", for any such 
attempt seems doomed at the outset. Instead, my tack will 
be to isolate a small family of epistemically evaluative 
concepts, concepts which have heretofore been batted around 
under the single heading "epistemic justification". 
2. A Traditional View 
Very frequently, epistemic justification is identified 
with that which must be added to true belief (at least in 
non-Gettier situations) in order to obtain knowledge. The 
motivation for this view stems from the recognition that 
true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. Mere true 
belief falls short of knowledge because a person can come to 
hold a belief for all sorts of ludicrous reasons or can be 
caused to have a belief by some epistemically illegitimate 
belief-forming cognitive process such as wishful thinking, 
and in such cases, when the belief happens to be true, 
it seems obvious that the person does not know that it is 
true. Moreover, since knowing a proposition just is knowing 
that that proposition is true, it seems clear that the 
person just described does not know that which she believes. 
An example will illustrate the point. Consider Sally the 
sports fan. Sally is a die-hard Chicago Cubs fan. Every 
year prior to the season Sally forms the belief that the 
Cubs will win the pennant that year, simply out of wishful 
thinking. Of course, as anyone who follows the Cubs knows, 
13 
her beliefs in this regard have always been false. But 
Sally's faith in the Cubs is unshakable, and so, purely out 
of wishful thinking, she forms the belief that the Cubs will 
win the pennant in 1988. Suppose that, as luck would have 
it, the Cubs do win the pennant in 1988. Stranger things 
have happened (though not many). Surely, in this situation 
despite her true belief, we would not want to say that Sally 
knew that the Cubs would win. 27 Our reluctance in ascribing 
knowledge to Sally in the case described derives from the 
fact that it is simply a matter of luck (and, given the 
Cubs' history, a great deal of luck) that her belief happens 
to be true this time. There is an overriding intuition that 
beliefs which only luckily turn out to be true fall short of 
knowledge. 
Since true belief is not enough for knowledge, 
something else is needed for a person to know a proposition. 
As we have seen, that something else is generally thought to 
27Sally's lack of knowledge becomes more obvious when 
we contrast Sally with Ina the informed sports fan. Ina, 
who has never had much hope for the Cubs before, has 
followed the Cubs extremely closely. On the basis of their 
latest recruits, as well as their gradual improvement over 
the years, Ina feels confident that the Cubs will win the 
pennant in 1988 and believes accordingly. Again, assuming 
that the Cubs do win, Ina has a true belief. Even so, given 
all the contingencies of professional baseball, we are 
reluctant to count Ina's well-founded belief as knowledge. 
Surely, if Ina's well-founded true belief does not 
constitute knowledge, Sally's wishful true belief falls far 
short of knowledge. 
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be epistemic justification, and a sufficiently high degree 
of epistemic justification at that. In the context of our 
Sally example, epistemic justification's role in an 
account of knowledge is quite clear. The epistemic 
justification requirement is intended to rule out lucky 
guesses as instances of knowledge. The intuition behind the 
justification requirement is basically that when a person's 
belief is (very well) justified, it is no mere matter of 
luck when that belief happens to be true. Put another way, 
a belief's epistemic justification is thought to be an 
indication of its truth, thus limiting luck's role in the 
belief's being true. On this view, the more justified a 
belief is epistemically, the more likely it is that that 
belief is true. 
It should be obvious, however, that only a certain 
conception of epistemic justification is properly suited to 
play the role of the justification requirement for 
knowledge. Recall that the role of the justification 
requirement is to rule out (or at least greatly limit) the 
role of luck in knowledge. In order to limit the element of 
luck in knowledge, a belief's epistemic justification must 
be an indication of that belief's truth. But for a belief's 
epistemic justification to be an indication of its truth, 
epistemic justification must be in some way conceptually 
connected with truth. For epistemic justification to be 
conceptually connected to truth, it must be the case 
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for every possible world W, if conditions C make person S's 
belief B epistemically justified in W, then conditions C 
make it probable that B is true in W. 28 Lehrer and Cohen 
call this sort 
• II 29 
            . 
straightforward. 
of conceptual connection a "truth 
The need for a truth connection is 
If there were no connection between 
epistemic justification and truth, then it would be just as 
much a matter of luck when a justified belief turned out to 
be true as when an unjustified belief turned out to be true. 
Furthermore, a better justified belief would be no more 
likely to be true than a much less well justified belief, 
for without a truth connection no amount of epistemic 
justification is an indication of truth. Thus, if epistemic 
justification is to be indicative of truth and thereby limit 
the element of luck in knowledge, it must be internally 
connected with truth. Laurence Bonjour explains the need 
for such a truth connection rather eloquently as follows: 
28This spells out the kind of connection required by 
fallibilist theories of epistemic justification. On an 
infallibilist theory, epistemic justification is 
conceptually connected to truth iff for every possible world 
W, if conditions C make S' s belief B justified in W, then 
conditions C logically entail that B is true in W. Since 
infa11ibi1ism leads directly to skepticism, the kind of 
justification needed for knowledge must have a fallibilist 
connection to truth, as specified in the text above. 
29Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, "Justification, 
Truth, and Coherence" Synthese, Vol. 55 (1983), p. 191. 
a satisfactory defense of a particular 
standard of epistemic justification must 
consist in showing it to be truth-conducive. 
. . . Without such a meta-justification, a 
proposed standard of epistemic justification 
lacks any underlying rationale. Why after 
all should an epistemically responsible 
inquirer prefer justified beliefs to 
unjustified ones, if not that the former are 
more likely to be true? To insist that a 
certain belief is epistemica1ly justified, 
while confessing in the same breath that 
this fact about it provides no good reason 
to think that it is true, would be to render 
              3Whole concept of epistemic 
               
16 
Accordingly, anyone wishing to analyze the "what must be 
added to true belief to get knowledge" conception (hereafter 
the "knowledge conception") of epistemic justification 
inevitably faces the onus of specifying the nature of such 
justification's connection with truth. 
What other features besides truth-connectedness are 
constitutive of the knowledge conception of epistemic 
justification? As we have already seen, it admits of 
degrees. Some beliefs are more justified than others. It 
is a notion of epistemic appraisal in that justified beliefs 
have positive epistemic status to the degree in which they 
are justified. Thus, it is broadly speaking a normative or 
evaluative notion since it characterizes some beliefs as 
30Laurence Bonj our, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a 
Foundation?", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, 
No.1 (January, 1978), p. 5. 
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being better than others for the purposes of gaining truth 
and avoiding error. We might summarize the knowledge 
conception of epistemic justification as follows: 
(KC) Epistemic justification is 
normative notion of positive 
appraisal that bears an 
internal connection with 
certain degree of which is 
for knowledge. 
a graded 
epistemic 
essential 
truth, a 
necessary 
It remains to be seen whether the knowledge conception 
of epistemic justification, to wit (KC) , can be successfully 
analyzed, for if Cohen is right, then any analysis of 
epistemic justification which affixes the needed truth 
connection will lack the required normativity, and hence, 
the kind of epistemic justification characterized in (KC) 
will not be satisfactorily analyzable. Analyzable or not, 
(KC) certainly isolates one conception of epistemic 
justification which is prevalent in the epistemological 
literature. I will eventually argue that the (KC) 
conception of epistemic justification is, in fact, 
analyzable and that in order to provide the required truth 
connection such an analysis must be externalist in nature. 
However, since the task at hand is that of clarifying the 
concept of epistemic justification, I will use the next 
section to distinguish two other viable conceptions of such 
justification. 
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3. Two Additional Conceptions of Epistemic Justification: 
Personal and Doxastic 
In this Section, I will identify two distinct 
conceptions of epistemic justification, two conceptions 
which to my knowledge have been conflated by every 
epistemologist that has considered the subj ect. The main 
contention of this dissertation is that most of the 
confusion which surrounds epistemic justification, 
especially that which surrounds the internalist/externalist 
controversy, is directly traceable to this conflation. In 
the chapters that follow, I will argue that both kinds of 
epistemic justification have crucial roles to play in 
epistemology. 
As has been mentioned previously, most epistemologists 
take epistemic justification to be an essential ingredient 
of knowledge, even those epistemologists who deny that it is 
all that must be added to true belief to get knowledge. The 
justification requirement for knowledge has been formulated 
in various ways. Two of the most common formulations are: 
(JRl) 
And, 
(JR2) 
S knows that p pnJY if S is 
epistemically           in oelieving 
that p. 
S knows that p onlt if S' s bel!rf that p is epistemica ly-rustified. 
31For the sake of simplicity, the required temporal 
indices have been suppressed in (JRl) and (JR2). 
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(JR1) and (JR2) have generally been regarded to be 
synonymous formulations of the justification requirement. 
Accordingly, which formulation is used is thought to be 
indicative of nothing more than stylistic preference. The 
synonymy of (JRl) and (JR2) entails what I call the 
"equivalency thesis". The equivalency thesis asserts: 
(ET) S is epistemically justified in 
believing that p iff SIS belief that 
p is epistemically justified. 
According to the equivalency thesis, there is no difference 
between S being justified in believing that p and SIS belief 
that p being justified. Most epistemologists tacitly 
embrace the equivalency thesis, since they jump back and 
forth between talking about S being justified and SIS belief 
being justified. However, some are more explicit in their 
commitment to the equivalency thesis. For example, William 
Alston says of epistemic justification: 
I contend that the equivalency thesis is false and that 
embracing it has led philosophers astray in their 
32William Alston, £E. cit., p. 58. 
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epistemological theorizing and criticism. However, before 
explaining why I think (ET) is false, I want to discuss its 
significance. 
I have suggested that most (all?) epistemologists 
endorse the equivalency thesis and its corollary the 
synonymy of (JRl) and (JR2). Nevertheless, which version of 
the justification condition they adopt varies, and it varies 
in a somewhat systematic way. Generally, internalists adopt 
the (JRl) formulation of the justification requirement. For 
example, in Knowledge, which spells out an internalist 
coherence theory of justification, Lehrer formulates the 
justification condition in the following way: 
If S knows that p, then S :if completely 
justified in believing that p. 
In Knowledge and Justification Pollock, also an internalist, 
speaks indifferently of beliefs being justified and of 
person's being justified in beliefs, but when he formally 
presents conditions p they are generally in the style of 
(JRl) , e.g. 
If P is a prima facie reason for S to 
believe that Q, and S justifiably believes-
that-P and believes-that-Q on the basis of 
his belief-that-P, then S is justified in 
33Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 13. 
be1ieving-that-Q iff he does not,believe     
defeaters for this prima        reason 
(emphasis added). 
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And in explaining what it is to have a reason, he states, 
"In order for a person to have a reason for believing 
something, it must be a good reason, and he must be 
justified in believing that it is true,,35 (emphasis added). 
In contrast, externalists seem to embrace the (JR2) 
formulation. The clearest example of this derives from 
Goldman's "What Is Justified Belief?", where he asserts, "A 
theory of justified belief will be a set of principles that 
specify truth-conditions for the schema Is's belief in p at 
time t is justified l ,,36 I am not claiming that every 
internalist uses (JR1) and every externalist uses (JR2) , 
since most epistemologists use (JR1) and (JR2) 
interchangeably. What I am suggesting is that (JR1) 
captures something central to internalism and (JR2) captures 
something central to externalism. Now, if, as I maintain, 
the equivalency thesis is false, then it follows that 
(JR1) and (JR2) are not synonymous. If (JR1) and (JR2) are 
not synonymous, it may be that, rather than disagreeing with 
NJ: 34John Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, Princeton            Press, 1974), p. 44. 
35 Ibid ., p. 35. 
36A1vin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?", £E. cit., 
p. 3. 
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each other, internalists and externalists have for the most 
part been arguing past each other, which is what I take to 
be the case. Of course, this latter contention rests on the 
falsity of the equivalency thesis. So, I shall now explain 
why I think (ET) is false. 
Recall that the equivalency thesis maintains: 
(ET) S is epistemically justified in 
believing that p iff SIS belief that 
p is epistemically-jUstified. 
When I look at both sides of this bi-conditional, they seem 
to be so remarkably different that it is surprising that 
anyone has taken them to be extensionally equivalent, much 
less synonymous. Since they have different domains of 
evaluation, 37 they do not even purport to be about the same 
thing. The left-hand side of the bi-conditional is 
evaluating S, the would-be knower, as being epistemically 
37 In Epistemology and Cognition Goldman, an 
externalist, suggests a variety of domains which are subject 
to epistemic evaluation. The epistemically evaluatable 
domains that he recognizes are: beliefs, methods, 
psychological processes, hypothesis-forming processes, 
concept-forming processes, search processes, second-order 
processes, speech acts, institutional arrangements, and 
social structures and processes. The one domain he 
overlooks is: persons. This supports my contention that 
externalists have been concerned with evaluating beliefs, 
not persons, while internalists have focused on evaluating 
persons, not beliefs, and that, thus, unbeknownst to them 
internalists and externalists have not been discussing the 
     subject. [See Epistemology and Cognition, £E. cit., p. 
justified, and hence, it has persons 
cognizers as its domain of evaluation. 
right-hand side of the bi-conditional 
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or, more broadly, 
In contrast, the 
is evaluating the 
justificatory status of S's belief, and consequently, it has 
beliefs for its domain of evaluation. 
Given that the two sides of the bi-conditional (ET) 
have different domains of evaluation, a natural question 
arises concerning why they have generally been taken to be 
extensionally equivalent. The only answer forthcoming seems 
to be that epistemologists must have contended that a 
believer, qua believer, cannot be evaluated apart from that 
which she believes and that a belief cannot be evaluated 
differently than the cognizer who holds the belief. It 
seems obvious to me that both contentions are mistaken. For 
one, if we consider standard epistemological practice, we 
find that people are frequently evaluated in terms of the 
reasoning which leads to their beliefs, rather than the 
beliefs on which they actually settle. For example, a 
person is often thought to be justified if she has reasoned 
well (or if she has done her best to reason well) regardless 
of what belief she adopts. Regarding the flipside of this 
epistemological coin, we hear such things as: "Though her 
belief is a reasonable one to hold, she came to hold it in 
an epistemically irresponsible way, and consequently, she is 
unjustified in believing what she does." An example may be 
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helpful here: Consider Nancy, another sports fan whose 
favorite basketball team is the Arizona Wildcats. Nidway 
through the 1987-88 season, Nancy formed the belief that 
Arizona's basketball team would win the PAC 10. This belief 
was eminently reasonable at that time, since by then Arizona 
had heaten every team in the conference, winning by an 
average of 29 points per game, and was itself undefeated in 
conference play. Moreover, Nancy bases this belief on 
Arizona's impressive record. However, Nancy also believes 
that astrology is a completely reliable science, and her 
horoscope on the day she formed her belief about Arizona, 
which she did read, said, "Your favorite basketball team 
will not win the PAC 10; so, do not bet on them." Here we 
have a case where Nancy's belief is based on reliable 
evidence and, hence, is justified, but Nancy is unjustified 
in believing it, because she has what she takes to be 
conclusive counterevidence for her belief, counterevidence 
which she simply chooses to ignore. In this case her belief 
is evaluated positively while she is evaluated negatively in 
direct contradiction to the claim that beliefs and believers 
cannot be evaluated independently. 
I can now summarize my argument for (ET)'s falsity as 
follows: First, the two sides of (ET) clearly have 
different domains of evaluation, and consequently, they 
don't even purport to be about the same thing. Therefore, 
intuitively, they seem to spell out different requirements. 
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Surely, we can agree that the burden of proof lies with the 
person who wants to butt heads with the intuitive by 
maintaining that (ET) is true. But the only proof (if you 
can call it that) that has been offered for (ET)'s truth is 
the contention that beliefs and believers are not subject to 
independent epistemic evaluations, and we have just seen 
with the Nancy example that this contention is false. In 
light of the intuitive evidence for (ET)'s falsity and the 
lack of any compelling evidence for its truth, I submit that 
(ET) is false and that therefore (JRl) and (JR2) embody 
inherently different conceptions of epistemic justification. 
Since (JRl) is concerned with evaluating persons, I will 
call the kind of epistemic justification associated with it 
"personal justification". And since (JR2) is evaluative of 
beliefs, I will call the kind of epistemic justification 
underlying it "doxastic justification". More precisely, the 
personal conception of epistemic justification is: 
(PJ) Personal justification is a normative 
notion in terms of which persons are 
evaluated from the epistemic point of 
view. 
A succinct statement of the doxastic conception of epistemic 
justification is: 
(DJ) Doxastic justification is a normative 
notion in terms of which beliefs are 
evaluated from the epistemic point of 
view. 
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I contend that both personal justification and doxastic 
justification are viable conceptions of epistemic 
justification with important roles in epistemology, though I 
will argue that doxastic justification is more fundamental 
to the traditional epistemological desideratum of analyzing 
knowledge. In the chapters that follow, I will attempt to 
analyze both kinds of epistemic justification and delineate 
their respective roles in the theory of knowledge. In 
addition, I will argue that internalists have been concerned 
primarily with personal justification, whereas externalists 
have focused on doxastic justification, and that this is 
what accounts for the radical divergence in their views. 
However, at this point, I fear that there are still some 
philosophers who will find my distinction between personal 
and doxastic justification a spurious one. So, in the next 
section I will offer further support for the legitimacy of 
the distinction. 
4. Bolstering the Personal/Doxastic Justification 
Distinction via an Ethical Analogy 
As mentioned above, I fear that some epistemologists 
entrenched in the equivalency thesis tradition will regard 
the distinction between personal and doxastic justification 
as nothing more than a false dichotomy. Such theoretical 
entrenchments aside, the crucial point at issue here seems 
to be whether or not cognizers and beliefs are subject to 
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independent and sometimes different epistemic evaluations. 
I take it to be noncontroversial that cognizers are agents, 
to wit epistemic agents, and that beliefs can be viewed as 
epistemic actions. Thus, the question at hand is whether or 
not epistemic agents and epistemic actions can be evaluated 
independently. Since one may lack clear intuitions on how 
this question should be answered, I suggest that we look for 
guidance to an analogous question in normative ethics, 
namely, "Are agents and actions subject to independent moral 
evaluations?" 
The answer to 
uncontrovertable "Yes". 
this latter question is an 
Ethicists have readily recognized 
that agents and actions are open to independent and 
sometimes discrepant moral evaluations. For example, it is 
generally acknowledged that an agent may be morally virtuous 
in performing some action A even though A is morally wrong 
and, conversely, that an agent may be morally wicked in 
performing a morally right action. Moreover, in the moral 
domain we frequently find the criteria for evaluating agents 
and actions to be entirely distinct. Kant, for example, is 
plausibly interpreted as offering such distinct criteria of 
ethical evaluation. For Kant, an agent has moral worth iff 
she performs her action out of respect for the moral law 
(i.e. she acts out of a sense of duty), whereas an action is 
right iff it satisfies the universalizability criterion (or 
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some other supposedly equivalent formulation of the 
categorical imperative). Thus, on the Kantian view just 
described, an agent S who performs action A is to be deemed 
morally virtuous provided that S does A out of a sense of 
duty, even if, as misfortune would have it, A is morally 
wrong; and, conversely, an agent S who performs action A is 
to be deemed morally vicious if S does A for wicked motives, 
even if A accords with duty.38 
Unfortunately, recognizing that agents and actions can 
in this way be evaluated independently does not resolve our 
earlier query. All we have shown is that the following two 
moral theses are false: 
(MT1) 
(MT2) 
Agent S is morally virtuous in doing 
action A iff A is morally right. 
Agent S is morally wicked in doing 
action A iff A is morally wrong. 
38The arguments in this section do not depend on Kant's 
having actually held the view that I am attributing to him. 
Though I suspect that Kant did indeed hold a view very 
similar to the one that I have labelled "the Kantian view", 
I have admittedly oversimplified the view somewhat. 
For example, regarding attributions of moral virtuosity, 
the following probably comes closer to Kant's view: 
S is morally virtuous in doing A iff (1) S 
does A out of a sense of duty and ('21 S has 
done her best to assess that A is her duty. 
Such subtleties aside, the point is not whether this is 
Kant's view, but whether it is legitimate to evaluate agents 
and actions independently, and I think that "the Kantian 
view" as I have presented it shows that it is legitimate. 
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Of course, neither (MTl) nor (MT2) is analogous to the 
equivalency thesis. (MTl) and (MT2) are analogous to the 
following two epistemological theses: 
(ETl) 
(ET2) 
Cognizer S is epistemically virtuous 
in believing that p iff the belief 
that p is epistemicalry-right. 
Cognizer S is epistemically 
reprehensible for believing that p 
iff the belief that p is 
epistemically wrong. 
The only plausible way to cash out epistemic rightness and 
wrongness in the above context is as truth and falsity, 
respectively, and so we can rephrase (ETl) and (ET2) as: 
(ETl') Cognizer S is epistemically virtuous 
in believing that p iff the belief 
that p is true. 
(ET2') Cognizer S is epistemically 
reprehensible for believing that p 
iff the belief that p is false. 
It takes little reflection to see that neither (ETl') nor 
(ET2') has anything going for it. Moreover, one can 
consistently maintain that the equivalency thesis (ET) is 
true while denying the truth of (ETl') and (ET2'). 
One thing the foregoing considerations show is that the 
legitimacy of the personal/doxastic justification cannot be 
established simply by showing that agents and actions are 
subject to independent moral evaluations. Nevertheless, the 
above considerations have been fruitful in another way. 
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They have shown that the analogy between normative ethics 
and normative epistemology is quite exact. Just as we can 
evaluate agents as morally virtuous and morally 
reprehensible, so too can we evaluate cognizers as 
epistemically virtuous and epistemically reprehensible. 
Just as some actions are morally right and others morally 
wrong, some beliefs are epistemically right and others 
epistemically wrong. Given the exactness of the analogy 
between ethics and epistemology, we may be able to shed some 
light on the equivalency thesis by looking at its moral 
analogue. 
The exact moral analogue of the equivalency thesis 
asserts: 
(MA) Agent S is morally justified in 
doing action A iff action A is 
morally justified. 
This baldly stated, most ethicists would no doubt maintain 
that (MA) is false, probably on the grounds that (MA) 
conflates subj ecti ve and obj ecti ve notions of moral 
justification. For example, they might well claim that S is 
morally justified in doing A iff S is subjectively justified 
in thinking that A is right (or, at least, permissible) and 
that A is morally justified iff A is justified in some 
objective sense. Actually, I think that the 
subjective/objective justification distinction, at least as 
it is characteristically drawn, is not what is needed to 
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demonstrate the falsity of (MA) , as I will argue 
momentarily; but what is interesting for our purposes is 
that in the moral domain (MA) [i.e. the exact moral analogue 
of the equivalency thesis] is extremely suspect, and 
accordingly, analogical reasoning suggests that we should be 
suspicious of (ET), as well. But if the problem with (MA) 
is not that it conflates subjective and objective 
justification, then what is wrong with (MA)? To answer this 
question, I will begin by explaining why I think that the 
appeal to the subjective/objective justification distinction 
is inappropriate. 
The subj ective/ obj ective justification distinction in 
ethics is normally drawn in such a way that "subj ective 
justification" and "obj ective justification" have the same 
domain of evaluation, to wit, actions. For example, Richard 
Feldman asserts, 
It is widely held that there is a 
distinction in ethics between those actions 
that are objectively justified and those 
that are subjectively justified. Roughly, 
an action is objectively justified when it 
is in fact the morally best action open to 
the agent, while an action is subj ectively 
justified when, in some sense,     seems best 
from the agent's perspective (emphasis 
added) . 
39Richard 
Justification in 
p. 1. 
Feldman, "Subjective 
Ethics and Epistemology" 
and Objective 
(in manuscript), 
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But if subjective justification has actions for its domain 
of evaluation, then it cannot be the kind of justification 
which is being employed in the left-hand side of (MA), since 
what is being evaluated as morally justified in the 
left-hand side of (MA) is the agent S and not some action. 
In my opinion, what has gone amiss with (MA) is exactly 
analogous to the earlier objection which I raised to (ET), 
namely, the left-hand and right-hand sides of (MA) are 
evaluating different domains. Whereas the left-hand side of 
(MA) is evaluating agents, the right-hand side is evaluating 
actions. It is this fact about (MA) which makes it suspect. 
Since S may be extremely well justified, in terms of the 
things she believes, in doing A, even though A itself is 
unjustified, (MA) is false. Of course, one might want to 
define 'subjective justification' in such a way that it 
attaches to agents and not actions, and then claim that (MA) 
is conflating obj ective justification with subj ective 
justification in this newly defined sense. I would welcome 
such a move on the part of an ethicist, for then 
subjective moral justification would be exactly analogous 
to personal justification and objective moral justification 
would be the moral analogue of doxastic justification. 
I realize, of course, that those who found my appeal to 
different domains of evaluation to show the falsity of (ET) 
unconvincing may also be unconvinced by my appealing to 
different domains of evaluation to explain the falsity of 
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(MA) . However, even prior to such an appeal, (MA) seems 
intuitively suspect. If my "different domains of 
evaluation" diagnosis of (HA) is mistaken, then we are still 
in need of an explanation of what is wrong with (MA). We 
have already seen that the appeal to the 
subjective/objective justification distinction fails to 
explain what is wrong with (MA), and I can think of no 
viable explanation other than the one I have given. 
Whatever explanation one settles on, (MA) intuitively seems 
false, and so, given its analogousness to (ET), we have 
reason to think that (ET) is likewise false, which is one of 
the things that I have been attempting to establish. 
Nevertheless, I am not only committed to the falsity of 
(ET), but to the correctness of the "different domains of 
evaluation" diagnosis of that falsity, as well. I contend 
that the findings of this section make such a diagnosis 
eminently plausible. We have seen that agents and actions, 
as well as cognizers and beliefs, are subject to independent 
evaluations, for this is entailed by the falsity of (MTl) , 
(MT2) , (ETl') and (ET2'). Now since justification is itself 
an evaluative concept, by parity of reasoning it seems that 
we should be able to evaluate the justificatory status of 
agents and actions and of cognizers and beliefs 
independently, and in the epistemic realm, the 
personal/doxastic justification distinction provides us with 
the tools to do just that. 
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This exhausts the intuitive considerations that I have 
to offer in support of the distinction between personal and 
doxastic justification. I urge the reader who does not 
find the distinction an intuitive one simply to regard it as 
a stipulative one for the time being. After all, the surest 
test of a distinction's genuineness is not its 
intuitiveness, but rather the work that it does. The 
remaining chapters of this dissertation will demonstrate 
that the personal/doxastic justification distinction scores 
especially well on this latter test. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELIABILISl-l AS DOXASTIC JUSTIFICATION 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I introduced three distinct 
conceptions of epistemic justification, to wit, the 
knowledge conception, the doxastic conception, and the 
personal conception. In this chapter, I will argue that a 
version of process reliabilism provides the correct account 
of doxastic justification. Certain needed refinements 
aside, I will defend the view that a belief is doxastically 
justified iff it results from one or more reliable 
belief-forming cognitive processes [BCP's]. As a point of 
departure for this defense, I devote section 2 to 
explicating Goldman's historical reliabilism as formulated 
in his "What Is Justified Belief?", since I think that his 
formulation therein comes quite close to being the correct 
analysis of doxastic justification. In section 3, I will 
present several objections to Goldman's theory which 
purportedly show that a belief's being produced by a 
reliable BCP is neither necessary nor sufficient for that 
belief's being justified. In section 4, I will argue that 
these objections, which arise out of the failure to 
distinguish personal justification from doxastic 
justification, simply do not apply if Goldman's reliability 
theory is construed as an analysis of doxastic 
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justification. Finally, in section 5, I will raise my own 
objection to Goldman's theory which will show where it falls 
short as an analysis of doxastic justification. This 
shortcoming will provide the backdrop for the correct 
account of doxastic justification, which will also be given 
in section 5. 
One caveat is in order regarding sections 2 and 3. 
Taking themselves to be discussing the same concept, both 
Goldman and his antagonists present their views using the 
unclarified, ambiguous term 'epistemic justification'. So, 
when delineating their positions in sections 2 and 3, I too 
will employ the ambiguous locution 'epistemic 
justification' . 
'justification' 
abbreviation 
justification' . 
Also, unless otherwise noted, when the term 
is used in sections 2 and 3, it is just an 
of the more cumbersome 'epistemic 
The same applies when other forms of the 
word, e.g. 'justified', are used. 
2. Reliabilism as Epistemic Justification 
In "What Is Justified Belief?" Goldman attempts to 
provide a reductive analysis of the epistemic justification 
of beliefs in terms of the reliability of the cognitive 
processes and mechanisms which give rise to those beliefs. 
In his more recent works, most notably Epistemology and 
Cognition, Goldman's views concerning justification appear 
to have changed considerably, largely in response to 
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objections to his earlier reliability theory. His current 
approach accounts for justification in terms of a rule 
framework, where a belief is justified only if it is 
permitted by a right system of justification rules 
[J-rules]. Reliability still looms large in Goldman's 
present theory, but it enters in at a new level, viz. the 
level of the criterion of rightness for a system of J-rules. 
Accordingly, a system of J-rules is right iff the ratio of 
true beliefs to total beliefs, sanctioned by the system as a 
whole, is sufficiently high. Things are complicated further 
by the fact that J -rules per se do not sanction beliefs 
directly at all. Instead, J-rules sanction cognitive 
processes (and methods). 80, a system 8 of J-rules is right 
iff the cognitive processes (and methods) which 8 sanctions 
have a sufficiently high truth-ratio in terms of the beliefs 
which they produce, and now the new theory begins to look 
suspiciously similar to the earlier theory it is intended to 
replace. By my lights, the major difference between the two 
theories is that the more recent and supposedly superior 
theory is rife with excess baggage, making it much more 
difficult to evaluate, especially since, lacking any J-rules 
with content, we are not in a position to assess their 
adequacy as such. My concern here, however, is not to raise 
detailed criticisms and/or objections to Goldman's 
"rule-framework reliabilism". Instead, as mentioned at the 
outset, my overriding concern in this chapter is to provide 
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an account of doxas tic justification, and since I believe 
that Goldman's earlier theory comes close to doing just 
that, I shall focus the remainder of this section on his 
earlier view. 
Goldman's stated desideratum in "What Is Justified 
Belief?" is to determine "a set of substantive conditions 
that specify when a belief is justified. ,,1 The conditions 
sought are to be reductive conditions, i.e. conditions which 
1A1vin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?", 
Justification and Knowledge, ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: 
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 1. Actually, a 
close examination of "What Is Justified Belief?" reveals two 
distinct desiderata. The first desideratum, as mentioned 
above, is to provide conditions which specify when a belief 
is actually justified. The second desideratum is to explain 
why we count certain beliefs as justified, or as Goldman 
puts it: 
What we really want is an explanation of why 
we count, or would count, certain beliefs as 
justified and others as unjustified. Such 
an explanation must refer to our beliefs 
about reliability, not to the actual facts. 
The reason we count beliefs as justified is 
that they are formed by what we believe to 
be reliable belief-forming processes. Our 
beliefs about which belief-forming processes 
are reliable may be erroneous, but that does 
not affect the adequacy of the explanation. 
Since we believe that wishful thinking is an 
unreliable belief-forming process, we regard 
beliefs formed by wishful thinking as 
unjustified. What matters, then, is what we 
believe about wishful thinking, not what is 
true (in the long run) about wishful 
thinking. [po 18] 
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ultimately reduce the epistemic to the non-epistemic, and 
they are to be couched in a recursive format with one or 
more base clauses, a set of recursive clauses (if 
necessary), and a closure clause. The goal of providing 
reductive conditions for justified belief necessitates the 
following admissibility constraint on base clauses: 
(AC) A base clause B is admissible only if 
it is the case that no epistemic 
predicates appear in the antecedent 
of B. 
It is also important to note that the criteria of 
justifiedness with which Goldman is concerned are semantic 
rather than epistemic in nature, i.e. they consist of 
truth-conditions for the schema I SIS belief in p at time t 
In my opLnLon, Goldman wavers between these two 
desiderata, because, not recognizing the distinction between 
personal and doxastic justification, he feels some intuitive 
pull in the direction of each of these kinds of 
justification. After all, we could hardly fault a cognizer 
for forming a belief using a process which, despite actually 
being unreliable, everyone herself included believes to be 
perfectly reliable. In fact, such a cognizer has formed her 
belief in an epistemically impeccable fashion. The 
intuition that such a cognizer is epistemically justified in 
so-forming a belief makes one feel that "counted 
justification" rather than "actual justification" is what 
matters in the epistemic realm. 
Nevertheless, Goldman I s overriding concern throughout 
the article is to provide an account of actually justified 
belief, the one passage above to the contrary 
notwithstanding, for he tells us at the outset that "On the 
account of justified belief suggested here, it is necessary 
for knowing, and closely related to it" [po 1.] ,-and surely 
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is justified I , not of conditions which let us know when 
these truth-conditions are met. 2 
Before putting forth his own base clause, Goldman 
examines various candidate base clauses, all of which prove 
unsuccessful. Goldman attributes this lack of success to 
their failure to provide requirements concerning how the 
belief is caused. The lesson to be learned is that an 
adequate base clause must stipulate causal requirements, 
"where 'cause' is construed broadly to include sustainers as 
what is needed for knowledge is actual, and not merely 
counted, justification. For this reason, Goldman's "second 
desideratum"     best regarded as an unintentional and 
uncharacteristic slip into the personalist/internalist camp, 
which runs counter to everything else that he is trying to 
do in the article. Accordingly, I will interpret Goldman's 
reliabilist account as an attempt to satisfy his first and 
(pardon the pun) actual desideratum and will make no mention 
of the somewhat confused "second desideratum" in the body of 
section 2. 
2Ibid " p. 3. What motivates this interest in semantic 
criteria is Goldman's commitment to the view that cognizers 
may lack "privileged access" to the justificational status 
of their beliefs, e.g. he maintains that young children [I 
would go further and include most adults] have justified 
beliefs without realizing that those beliefs are justified. 
[pp. 15 and 19] An adequate theory of justifiedness, 
contends Goldman, must account for such "nonpossessed" 
justification. If a cognizer can have justified beliefs 
without "possessing" a statable (or thinkable) justification 
for those beliefs, then their justification must be 
accounted for in some non-intellectualist fashion. Goldman 
accounts for the justifiedness of such beliefs in terms of 
justification-conferring processes, i.e. processes which, in 
giving rise to such beliefs, confer justification on them 
independent of the cognizer's efforts. 
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well as initiators of belief.,,3 Of course, since all 
beliefs are produced by some sort of causal process or 
other, but not all beliefs are justified, it follows that 
only certain belief-forming causal processes confer 
justification on the beliefs which they produce. The 
question which arises immediately is, "What kinds of 
belief-forming causal processes do confer justifiedness on 
the beliefs to which they give rise?" To answer this 
question, it is useful to examine the sorts of beliefs which 
we generally regard as justified, some of which include 
ordinary perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, sound 
inferential beliefs, and introspective beliefs. What 
feature do all these kinds of beliefs share in virtue of 
which we regard them as justified? They all share the 
feature of having been produced by belief-forming cognitive 
processes [BCP' s] that are reliable, i. e. by BCP' s which 
generally produce true beliefs. The answer to our question 
concerning what kinds of BCP's are justification-conferring 
is now straightforward. Reliable and only reliable BCP's 
are justification-conferring, for it is in virtue of their 
reliability that they possess their justification-conferring 
status. Goldman makes the point as follows: 
3Ibid , p. 9. 
The justificational status of a belief is a 
function of the reliability of the process 
or processes that cause it, where (as a 
first approximation) reliability consists in 
the tendency of a process to         beliefs 
that are true rather than false. 
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This finding meshes well with the graded notion of 
justification, since the more reliable a BCP, the more 
justification that BCP confers on the beliefs which it 
produces. At the other end of the justificational spectrum, 
since unreliable BCP's (i.e. BCP's which tend to produce 
false beliefs) fail to confer justification on the beliefs 
that they produce, when beliefs are produced by unreliable 
BCP's like wishful thinking and confused reasoning, those 
beliefs are not justified. 
Taking himself to have established that reliability is 
the defining feature of justification-conferring BCP's, 
Goldman returns to the task of specifying an adequate base 
clause. To set the stage for his first attempt at offering 
such a base clause, he draws two related distinctions. 
First, he distinguishes between two different kinds of 
reliability, viz. conditional reliability and unconditional 
reliability. The notion of unconditional reliability is 
that notion captured by his earlier provisional definition 
of reliability per se, to wit, a BCP is (unconditionally) 
4Ibid ., p. 10. 
43 
reliable if it tends to produce beliefs which are true 
rather than false. Concerning conditional reliability, he 
states, "A process is conditionally reliable when a 
sufficient proportion of its output-beliefs are true given 
that its input-beliefs are true."S Reasoning, say in 
accordance wi th modus ponens, is an example of a 
conditionally reliable BCP, for reasoning in accordance with 
modus ponens is a reliable guide to truth only if the 
premises (i. e. input-beliefs) from which one reasons are 
true. 
This distinction between conditional and unconditional 
reliability leads Goldman to make a second distinction 
the distinction between belief-dependent and 
belief-independent BCP's. Belief-dependent BCP's are 
"processes some of whose inputs are be1ief-states.,,6 
Belief-independent BCP's are "processes none of whose inputs 
are be1ief-states.,,7 These two kinds of BCP's correspond to 
and are interrelated with the two kinds of reliability that 
Goldman distinguishes, since conditional reliability is the 
kind of reliability applicable to belief-dependent BCP's and 
SIbid., p. 13. 
6Ibid . 
7Ibid . 
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unconditional reliability is the kind of reliability that 
attaches to belief-independent BCP's. 
With these distinctions in hand Goldman makes his first 
attempt at offering a unified reductive theory of 
justifiedness. He begins by proffering the following base 
clause: 
(BCl) If S's belief in p at t results 
('immediately') from a 
belief-independent process that is 
(unconditionally) reliable, tgen S's 
belief in p at t is justified. 
He couples (BCl) with the following recursive clause: 
(RCl) If S's belief in p at t results 
(' immediately') from a 
belief-dependent process that is (at 
least) conditionally reliable, and if 
the beliefs (if any) on which this 
process operates in producing 
S's belief in p at t are themselves 
justified,      S's belief in p at t 
is justified. 
Finally, by adding a standard closure clause to (BCl) and 
(RCl), Goldman completes his first approximation of a 
reductive theory of justified belief. Goldman summarizes 
8 Ibid . 
9Ibid , p. 14. NOTE: (RCI) is admissible as a 
recursive clause, for it is permisSIble for epistemic 
predicates to appear in the antecedent of recursive clauses. 
The only place that epistemic predicates are not allowed to 
appear is in the antecedent of base clauses. 
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the gist of this theory as follows: "The theory says, in 
effect, that a belief is justified if and only if it is 
'well-formed', i.e., it has an ancestry of reliable and/or 
conditionally reliable cognitive operations."lO 
The theory just sketched makes the justificational 
status of a belief exclusively a function of the reliability 
of the BCP's that produce it. Goldman notes, however, that 
such a theory is flawed since it will occasionally count as 
justified some beliefs which intuitively are not justified. 
To illustrate the point, he has us consider the following 
counterexample: 
Suppose that Jones is told on fully reliable 
authority that a certain class of his memory 
beliefs are almost all mistaken. His 
parents fabricate a wholly false story that 
Jones suffered from amnesia when he was 
seven but later developed pseudo-memories of 
that period. Though Jones listens to what 
his parents say and has excellent reason to 
trust them, he persists in believing the 
ostensible memories from his seven-year-old 
past. Are these memory beliefs justified? 
Intuitively, they are not justified. But 
since these beliefs result from genuine 
memory and original perceptions, which are 
adequately reliable processes, our r£eory 
says that these beliefs are justified. 
In reo this counterexample Goldman offers the following 
diagnosis: 
lOIbid. 
IlIbid., p. 18. 
Jones has strong evidence against certain 
propositions concerning his past. He 
doesn't use this evidence, but if he were to 
use it properly, he would stop believing 
these propositions. Now the proper use of 
evidence would be an ins tance of a 
(conditionally) reliable process. So what 
we can say about Jones is that he fails to 
use a certain (conditionally) reliable 
         that he could and should have 
used. 
And he concludes: 
This diagnosis suggests a fundamental change 
in our theory. The justificational status 
of a belief is not only a function of the 
cognitive processes actually employed in 
producing it; it is also a function of 
processes13 that could and should be employed. 
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To accommodate this change in his theory, Goldman proposes 
the following base clause: 
(Bel') If S's belief in p at t results from 
a reliable cognitive process, and 
there is no reliable or conditionally 
reliable process available to S 
which, had it been used by S in 
addition to the process actually 
used, would have resulted in S's not 
believing p at t,     S's belief in 
p at t is justified. 
l2Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
13Ibid ., p. 20. 
l4 Ibid . 
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Though Goldman does not explicitly revise recursive clause 
(RCI) , his new theory, according to which the 
justificational status of a belief is partly a function of 
cognitive processes which could and (epistemically) should 
be used, seems to require the following revised recursive 
clause: 
(RCI') If S's belief in p at t results from 
a conditionally reliable BCP, if the 
beliefs on which this BCP operates in 
producing S' s belief in p at tare 
themselves justified, and if there is 
no reliable or conditionally reliable 
BCP available to S which, had it been 
used. by S in addition to the BCP 
actually used, would have resulted in 
S's not believing p at t, then S' s 
belief in p at t is justified. 
Finally, by adding a standard closure clause to (BCI') and 
(RCI'), we get 
belief. 15 
Goldman's complete theory of justified 
Before considering some of the many objections to 
Goldman's theory, I want to conclude this section by 
examining three (potential) virtues of the theory. First, 
if Goldman's reliabilism (or a slight modification thereof) 
15Whether or not Goldman actually held the theory I am 
attributing to him [to wit, (BCI'), (RCI'), and a closure 
clause] is somewhat beside the point, since he no longer 
espouses this theory. Nevertheless, for lack of a better 
term, I will refer to this theory as "Goldman's theory" and 
as "Goldman's reliabilism". 
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is correct, it has the virtue of evincing a successful 
reduction of the epistemic to the non-epistemic. This 
feature alone makes his theory worthy of careful 
consideration and scrutiny. A second virtue of Goldman's 
reliabilism is the apparent ease with which it avoids 
skeptical objections. Skeptical hypotheses, e.g. Descartes' 
evil demon hypothesis or the more contemporary malevolent 
neurophysiologist hypothesis, which seem devastating to 
purely internalist epistemologies, are readily handled by 
Goldman's reliabilism. After all, such hypotheses only 
serve to show that it is logically possible that our 
cognitive processes are unreliable, but if our cognitive 
processes are in fact reliable, then, skeptical hypotheses 
or no, on a reliabilist account the beliefs resulting from 
h . . f· d 16 suc processes are           . The third and perhaps most 
seductive feature of Goldman's reliabilism is the promise it 
holds for providing the sought after connection between a 
belief's truth and its justification in the following way: 
By definition, a BCP is reliable iff it generally produces 
true beliefs. But this is just to say that a BCP is 
reliable iff the indefinite probability of beliefs produced 
by it being true is high (at the very minimum, greater than 
l6A .. 1 b .. d b L h d C h      ar 0                rna eye rer an 0 en. 
See their "Justification, Truth, and Coherence", Synthese, 
Vol. 55 (1983), p. 192. 
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.5). Since Goldman's theory basically asserts that a belief 
is justified iff it is produced by a reliable BCP, and 
since, by definition, beliefs produced by reliable BCP's 
have a high indefinite probability of being true, it follows 
that justified beliefs have a high indefinite probability of 
being true. It should be clear from the context that 
indefinite probabilities are dyadic relations relating 
classes or properties by specifying the probability of a 
member of one class being a member of another class. 
Consequently, by proving that Goldman's reliabilism entails 
that justified beliefs have a high indefinite probability of 
being true, we have ipso facto proved that Goldman's 
reliabilism entails that beliefs belonging to the class of 
justified belief have a high probability of belonging to the 
class of true belief. Thus, Goldman's reliabilism affixes a 
probabilistic connection between justification and truth, 
and in light of this probabilistic truth connection, it 
potentially constitutes a correct analysis of the knowledge 
conception of epistemic justification. 
Since these virtues are, of course, contingent on the 
correctness of Goldman's reliabilism, we need to determine 
whether it really does provide an accurate analysis of 
epistemic justification. In order to make such a 
determination, we need to assess whether and to what extent 
reliabilism can stand up to the obj ections and purported 
counterexamples vied against it. Naturally, the first step 
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in making this assessment is to look at the obj ections 
themselves. Accordingly, the task of the next section is to 
present several of these objections. 
3. Counterexamples to Goldman's Theory 
Goldman's brand of reliabilism has incurred objections 
from numerous epistemologists, to wit, Bonj our, Chisholm, 
Cohen, Feldman, Lehrer, and Pollock, to name a few. 17 In 
this section, however, I shall focus exclusively on the 
objections raised by Lehrer, Cohen, and Bonjour. My doing 
so should not be taken to suggest that the other objections 
are of little or no importance. To the contrary, some of 
them pose extremely difficult problems for reliabilism, but 
since they have no direct bearing on the goal of this 
chapter, which is to provide an account of doxastic 
justification, I have elected to save their discussion for 
future papers, where I will be able to deal with them in the 
detail they deserve. 
17Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical 
Knowledge", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed. French, 
Vehling, and Wettstein (University of Minnesota: 1980); 
Roderick Chisholm, "The Place of Epistemic Justification", 
Philosophical Topics, Vol. 14, No.1, (Spring, 1986); 
Stewart Cohen, in his dissertation Justification and Truth, 
Chapter 1, and in his "Justification and Truth" , 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 46 (1984); Richard Feldman, 
"Reliability and Justification", The Monist, Vol. 68, No.2 
(April, 1985); and John Pollock, in his Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge (in manuscript) , and in his 
"Reliability and Justified Belief", Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. XIV, No.1 (March, 1984). 
Lehrer, Cohen, and Bonjour 
objections to Goldman's theory. 
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raise a host of astute 
Some of these objections 
are rooted in purely intuitive considerations, while others 
are based on logical grounds. My concern here is to present 
the intuitive objections that they have raised against 
reliabilism to the effect that a belief's being produced by 
a reliable BCP is neither necessary nor sufficient for that 
belief's being epistemically justified. I will begin with 
their attacks on reliabilism's necessity. 
In order to provide a counterexample to the necessity 
of Goldman's reliabilism, one needs to present a case where 
intuitively a belief is justified even though that belief 
was produced by an unreliable BCP. The standard 
counterexample to reliabilism's necessity runs as follows: 
Consider a possible world W where unbeknownst to us the evil 
demon hypothesis is true. In such a world virtually all of 
our beliefs turn out to be false owing, of course, to the 
malevolent machinations of the demon. Moreover, the BCP's 
(e.g. perception, memory, and inference) which produced 
these beliefs are unreliable in W, since they tend to 
produce false beliefs in W. Lehrer and Cohen rightly note, 
"It would follow on reliabilist views that under such 
conditions the beliefs generated by those processes 
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not be 0 tOfO d ,,18 JUS        • However, they maintain that this 
result is unacceptable, since 
The truth of the demon hypothesis also 
entails that our experiences and our 
reasonings are just what they would be if 
our cognitive processes were reliable, and, 
therefore, that we would be just as well 
justified in believing what we do if the 
demon             were true as if it were 
false. 
Their point is worth belaboring. Our experiences and 
reasonings in Ware, by hypothesis, phenomenologically 
indistinguishable from the experiences and reasonings we 
would have in a verific world W* where we would indeed be 
justified in holding the beliefs we do. But since our 
justification for our beliefs, viz. our experiences and 
reasonings, is exactly the same in both worlds, intuitively 
we are just as justified in holding the beliefs we do in W 
as we are in W*. Of course, since intuitively we are 
justified in holding our beliefs in W despite the fact that 
they have all been produced by unreliable BCP's (the demon 
has seen to that), it follows that being produced by a 
reliable BCP is not necessary for a belief to be 
epistemically justified. 
18Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, "Justification, 
Truth, and Coherence", Synthese, Vol. 55 (1983), p. 192. 
19 Ibid . 
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In his dissertation Justification and Truth, Cohen 
offers an even more compelling argument against 
reliabilism's necessity. Once again we are to cons ider a 
demon-manipulated world, say W'. 
imagine two inhabitants of W': 
We are then asked to 
A who is a good reasoner, i.e., reasons in 
accordance with the canons of inductive 
inference, and B who engages in confused 
reasoning, wishful thinking, relianZU on emotional attachments, guesswork, etc. 
As is the case in worlds such as W', unbeknownst to our two 
hapless inhabitants, the demon sees to it that BCP I s like 
reasoning in accordance with the canons of inductive 
inference are just as unreliable as BCP I s like wishful 
thinking and confused reasoning. Now as we know from 
section 2, Goldman 'maintains that reliability is the 
defining feature of justification-conferring BCP's, from 
which it follows that in W'the unreliable BCP of reasoning 
according to the laws of inductive logic is just as 
                           as the equally unreliable BCP's 
of wishful thinking and confused reasoning. 
Cohen rightfully notes: 
Accordingly, 
Since the beliefs of A & B are both produced 
by unreliable processes (the evil demon 
sees to this), a reliabilist theory of 
20Stewart Cohen, Justification and Truth, .Q.E.. cit., 
p. 10. 
justification must 
epistemiZ1 appraisals beliefs. 
render 
of both 
identical 
sets of 
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To wit, a reliabilist theory must maintain that neither A's 
beliefs nor B' s beliefs are justified in W'. But, Cohen 
asserts, 
Plainly, This cannot be correct. A's 
beliefs are conditioned by the evidence 
whereas B' s beliefs are not. A is a good 
reasoner whereas B is not. A's beliefs are 
reasonable whereas B's beliefs are not. 
There is a fundamental epistemic difference 
between the beliefs of A and the beliefs of 
B. But the Reliabilist does not have the 
theoretica122 means to display this difference. 
Cohen maintains that the fundamental epistemic difference 
between A's beliefs and B's beliefs is that A's beliefs are 
justified whereas B' s beliefs are not, for in his 
estimation, "Beliefs produced by good reasoning are paradigm 
cases of justified belief and beliefs arrived at through 
fallacious or arbitrary reasoning are paradigm cases of 
unjustified belief.,,23 Again, since A's unreliably produced 
beliefs are intuitively justified, reliability is not 
necessary for epistemic justification. 
21 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
22 Ib i d., p. 11. 
23 Ibid . 
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Now bordering on overkill, Cohen offers yet another 
counterexample to reliability as a necessary condition for 
justification. The counterexample proceeds by again 
contrasting A and B in W'. This time the belief in question 
is the non-discursive perceptual belief, which both A and B 
have, that there is something    before them. Both A and B 
hold this belief on the basis of being appeared to       
but the epistemically relevant difference between them is 
that "While A has no evidence to the contrary, B is 
presented with strong evidence that owing to a clever 
deception there is nothing    before him.,,24 Again, Cohen 
contends that there is a clear epistemic difference between 
A's perceptual belief and B's perceptual belief, because, as 
he puts it, 
from an epistemic point of view, B ought not 
to have proceeded in the way he did. We 
might say that contrary to A, B has been 
epistemically irresponsible in accepting 
that there is something before him. As a 
result, while A is.           in his   
perceptual belief, B 1S not. 
Of course, since in W', A's perceptual belief is intuitively 
justified even though his perceptual faculties are just as 
unreliable as B's, it follows that being reliably produced 
24 Ibid ., p. 13. 
25 Ibid ., p. 14. 
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is not a necessary condition for a belief's being 
epistemically justified. 
Fairly confident that necessity has fallen by the 
wayside, Cohen sets his sights on demonstrating that 
reliabilism fails as a sufficient condition for epistemic 
justification, as well. He begins by reminding us that 
The recipe for finding a counter-example to 
reliability as a sufficient condition for 
justification is to take an intuitively 
unjustified process (that is a process that 
intuitively does not produce justified 
beliefs) 26and suppose that it were 
reliable. 
The case he discusses is one which Goldman himself raises in 
"What Is Justified Belief?". We are to imagine a possible 
world W+ where a benevolent demon arranges things such that 
the vast majority of beliefs arrived at by wishful thinking 
are true in W+. As a result, wishful thinking is a reliable 
BCP in W+. "Thus," Cohen notes, "on Goldman's view, it 
turns out that such beliefs are justified. ,,27 To fill out 
the example, we are to assume that the inhabitants of W+ are 
unaware that wishful thinking is reliable in their world. 
Since they are unaware that wishful thinking is a reliable 
BCP, Cohen maintains that their wishfully formed, completely 
26 Ibid . 
27 Ibid. 
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reliably formed, beliefs are not justified, re1iabi1ism to 
the contrary notwithstanding. As he puts it, 
The crucial factor, what by my lights makes 
the beliefs unjustified in these cases, is 
the fact that the reliability of the belief 
forming process is due to facts that are 
completely outside the ken of the subj ect. 
If as far as the subject knows, the state of 
affairs expressed by P is merely something 
he wishes for, then he is being 
               irresponsible in accepting 
that P. 
Thus, these wishfully formed beliefs are intuitively 
unjustified despite being reliably produced, and 
consequently, re1iabi1ism is not sufficient for epistemic 
justification. 
To bolster this conclusion, Cohen has us consider our 
earlier subj ects A and B who this time fortunately find 
themselves in benevolent world W+. Again, A is a good 
reasoner who reasons in accordance with the laws of 
induction, whereas B acquires his beliefs via wishful 
thinking. Thanks to the benevolent demon, both A's BCP and 
B's BCP are extremely reliable. But, Cohen attests, "If one 
adheres to the position that reliability is a sufficient 
condition of justification, then one must give the same 
epistemic appraisal to the beliefs of A and B.,,29 Namely, 
28 Ibid., p. 16. 
29 Ibid., p. 20. 
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on the reliabilist account, both their sets of beliefs turn 
out to be justified, but since intuitively B' s beliefs, 
unlike A's beliefs, are not justified, reliable production 
is not a sufficient condition for epistemic justification. 
And Cohen is not alone in his doubts about reliabilism' s 
ff .. 30 su          
In "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge", 
Bonjour presents several cases which purportedly demonstrate 
reliabilism's insufficiency for epistemic justification. In 
one particularly compelling counterexample, we are asked to 
consider the following case: 
Suppose that Norman, under certain 
conditions that usually obtain, is a 
completely reliable clairvoyant with respect 
to certain kinds of subject matter. He 
possesses no evidence or reasons of any 
kind for or against the general possibility 
of such a cognitive power, or for or against 
the thesis that he possesses it. One day 
Norman comes to believe that the President 
is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. 
In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clairvoyant power, under               
in which it is completely reliable. 
30 In addition to the Bonjour article which I am about 
to discuss, see Alvin Plantinga' s "Justification and 
Theism" (in manuscript), pp. 52-53. 
31Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical 
Knowledge", £E. cit., p. 62. 
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Bonjour maintains that reliabilism entails that Norman's 
completely reliably produced belief about the President's 
h b .. . f· d 32 w erea outs               . Hoping to convince us that such 
a result is intuitively unacceptable, he asks us: 
Is Norman epistemically justified in 
believing that the President is in New York 
City, so that his belief is an instance of 
knowledge? According to the modified 
externalist position, we must apparently say 
that he is. But is this the right result? 
Are there not still sufficient grounds for a 
charge of subjective irrationality to 
prevent           being epistemically 
justified? 
Surely, the intuitive answer to this last question is "Yes", 
and so, once again, we are presented with a case where a 
completely reliably produced belief is intuitively 
unjustified, thereby demonstrating that reliable production 
is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Fortunately 
for reliabilism, the next section will show that these 
32 In point of fact, there appear to be other reliable 
BCP's available to Norman which, had he used them, would 
have prevented him from forming the belief that the 
President is in New York City. Hence, the counterfactual 
clause in Goldman's (BCl') is unsatisfied, and so, on 
Goldman's view, Norman's belief is not justified. Since I 
shall argue in section 5 that it is a mistake on Goldman's 
part to include the counterfactual clause in (BCl'), I am 
going to ignore the counterfactual wrinkle of Goldman's 
theory and simply assume with Bonjour that reliabilism 
entails that Norman's clairvoyant belief is justified. 
33Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical 
Knowledge", £E. cit., p. 62. 
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seemingly decisive counterexamples are not as devastating as 
they prima facie appear. 
4. Sorting Things Out 
a. Goldman Replies 
Goldman has offered two different responses to the 
b·· . . 34 Th f· f d . o J                               e        oun    
Epis temology and Cognition, is an attempt to accommodate 
within a reliabilist framework the overriding intuition that 
our demon-world-inhabitant's beliefs are in fact justified, 
despite being produced by BCP's which are unreliable in that 
world. The second and more recent reply consists of 
distinguishing two types of justification, strong and weak, 
and arguing that our demon-world-inhabitant' s beliefs are 
jus tified only in the latter sense. In the remainder of 
this subsection, I will present these two responses in 
detail. In section 5, I will argue that neither response is 
satisfactory. 
In Epistemology and Cognition Goldman responds to the 
obj ections against necessity by first embracing the 
intuition that the well-reasoned beliefs of 
demon-manipulated cognizers are in fact justified and then 
34To my knowledge, Goldman has not responded to the 
objections against reliabilism's sufficiency. 
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arguing that the brand of reliabilism which he espouses 
what I will call "normal worlds reliabilism" 
accommodates this intuition. To fully understand the nature 
of this response, some background into normal worlds 
reliabilism is needed. Recall from section 2 that 
reliabilism maintains that a belief is justified only if it 
results from a justification-conferring BCP, where a BCP has 
the property of being justification-conferring just in case 
it is reliable, i.e. it tends to produce true beliefs. 
Expanding on this view, normal worlds reliabilism maintains 
that the property of being justification-conferring is a 
necessary property of those BCP's which possess it; which is 
to say, if a BCP is justification-conferring, then it is 
. I . . f .. f· 35 Ad· I           Y                            ccor     y, if 
the BCP good reasoning is justification-conferring, then 
good reasoning is justification-conferring in every possible 
world in which good reasoning occurs. But good reasoning is 
not reliable in every possible world in which it occurs 
the evil demon world is a case in point. So, how are we to 
understand the reliabilist claim that the justification-
conferring status of a BCP is a function of that BCP's 
35x is necessarily cp iff x is cp in every possible 
world in       x exists. Accordingly, a BCP is necessarily 
justification-conferring just     case it is justi-
fication-conferring in every possible world in which it 
exists. 
62 
reliability? According to normal worlds reliabilism, a 
BCP's justification-conferring status in world W is not 
determined by its reliability in W. Instead, a BCP's 
justification-conferring status in world W is a function of 
its reliability in normal worlds. Goldman uses 'normal 
worlds' in a technical sense which he explains as follows: 
We have a large set of common beliefs about 
the actual world: general beliefs about the 
sorts of objects, events, and changes that 
occur in it. We have beliefs about the 
kinds of things that, realistically, do and 
can happen. Our beliefs on this score 
generat36what I shall call the set of normal worlds. 
Simply put, a normal world is one where things are as we 
think them to be in the actual world. 
Since we think that perception, memory, and good 
reasoning are reliable in the actual world, they are, by 
definition, reliable in normal worlds (for, as we have just 
seen, normal worlds are defined by what we think is true in 
the actual world). Since perception, memory, and good 
reasoning are reliable in normal worlds, it follows, on the 
normal worlds reliabilism view, that perception, memory, 
and good reasoning are justification-conferring in all 
36Alvin Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard            Press, 1986), p. 107. 
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possible worlds where they occur, and that, of course, 
includes evil demon worlds. 
Now Goldman's reply to the necessity counterexamples is 
straightforward: 
The justificational status of a W-world 
belief does not depend on the reliability of 
the causing processes in W. Rather, it 
depends on the reliability of the processes 
in normal worlds. Now an evil demon world 
is a paradigm case of a non-normal world. 
So it does not matter that the processes in 
question are highly unreliable in that 
world. It only matters whether they are 
reliable in normal 3forlds, and that 
apparently is the case. 
Thus, according to normal worlds reliabilism, since in the 
first counterexample to necessity we use perception, memory, 
and inference in forming our beliefs in evil demon world W, 
our beliefs are justified -- just as Lehrer and Cohen 
contend -- because perception, memory, and inference are 
reliable in normal worlds. Normal worlds reliabilism 
handles the other objections against necessity, as well. 
For according to normal worlds reliabilism, A's beliefs are 
justified in W' while B's beliefs are not -- just as Cohen 
maintains because the BCP I s which A uses to form his 
beliefs in W' are reliable in normal worlds, where as the 
BCP's which B uses to form his beliefs in W' are unreliable 
37 Ibid ., p. 113. 
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in normal worlds. Thus, reliabilism in the form of normal 
worlds reliabilism does possess the theoretical means 
necessary for displaying the different justificatory 
statuses had by A's and B's beliefs, Cohen's claims to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
Despite its initial attractiveness in handling evil 
demon cases, normal worlds reliabilism has been the brunt of 
so many telling criticisms that Goldman has since decided to 
abandon the view. In its stead, he introduces a duplex 
theory of justification which supposedly accords with and 
accounts for the divergent intuitions that arise when 
evaluating the justificatory statuses of the beliefs of evil 
demon world inhabitants. As the name suggests, the duplex 
theory introduces two conceptions of epistemic 
justification, one strong, the other weak. To motivate this 
distinction between strong and weak justification, Goldman 
presents us with the following case: 
Consider a scientifically benighted culture, 
of ancient or medieval vintage. This 
culture employs certain highly unreliable 
methods for forming beliefs about the future 
and the unobserved. Their methods appeal to 
the doctrine of signatures, to astrology, 
and to oracles. Members of the culture have 
never thought of probability theory or 
statistics, never dreamt of anything that 
could be classed as 'experimental method'. 
Now suppose that on a particular occasion a 
member of this culture forms a belief about 
the outcome of an impending battle by using 
one of the aforementioned methods, say, by 
consul ting zodiacal signs in a culturally 
approved fashion. Call this method M. Is 
this        
warranted? 
belief justified, 
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or 
Goldman maintains that in attempting to answer this question 
we are naturally drawn in two different directions. On the 
one hand, consulting zodiacal signs is highly unreliable and 
is, consequently, a very poor way to form beliefs. 
Moreover, it is natural to regard beliefs formed by poor or 
inadequate methods as unjustified, which suggests that the 
belief of our scientifically benighted cognizer, S* , is 
unjustified. On the other hand, given the plight of living 
in a wholly unscientific culture, S* has done the best he 
could in forming his belief. He has used a method which is 
highly regarded by the members of his community, a method 
for which he can find no reason to doubt. Given his 
epistemic situation, we cannot fault him for using method M 
nor for forming the belief he does. Since his belief is 
epistemically blameless, we are inclined to say that it is 
justified, after all. 
Which of these two views is correct? The duplex theory 
acknowledges the legitimacy of each of these epistemic 
evaluations, claiming that they simply embody different 
conceptions of justification. On the first conception, 
Goldman tells us, "a justified belief is (roughly) a 
38Alvin Goldman, "Strong and Weak Justification" (in 
manuscript), pp. 1-2. 
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well-formed belief, a belief formed (or sustained) by 
proper, suitable, or adequate methods, procedures, or 
processes. ,,39 On the second, he observes, "a justified 
belief is a faultless, blameless, or non-culpable be1ief.,,40 
Goldman refers to these two conceptions of justification as 
"strong" and "weak", respectively. 
Having thus provided an intuitive case for the 
strong/weak justification distinction, Goldman attempts to 
delineate the conditions for strong and weak justification, 
respective1y.41 Certain subtleties aside (see footnote 41), 
Goldman maintains that: 
(SJ) A belief of person S is strongly 
justified iff 
39Ibid ., p. 3. 
40 Ibid . 
41Actua11y, Goldman distinguishes between two levels of 
justifiedness: primary justifiedness which is justifiedness 
at the level of cognitive processes and secondary 
justifiedness which is justifiedness at the level of 
methods; and he suggests that the strong/weak distinction 
enters in at each level. [see his "Strong and Weak 
Justification", .92. cit., pp. 3-4.] For a belief to be 
fully justified,     must be strongly justified at both the 
primary and secondary levels. So, to simplify his account 
somewhat, I will combine both levels and provide composite 
conditions for strong justification (at both levels 
simultaneously) and for weak justification (at both levels 
simultaneously) . This simplified account remains true to 
the spirit of Goldman's more complicated theory, and it does 
not alter, in any essential way, his most recent reply to 
the counterexamples against necessity. 
(1) it is produced (or sustained) by 
proper methods and/or processes, 
where a method or process is 
proper just in case it is 
reliable, 
(2) the methods (if any) used in 
producing S's belief have been 
aC$uired in a suitable way, where 
          method acquisition 
requires being acquired by other 
methods or processes that are 
reliable or metareliable, and 
(3) S' s cognitive state at the time 
the belief is formed does not 
undermine the propernes s of the 
methods and/or processes employed, 
where the properness of a method 
or process is undermined just in 
case either --
(a) S (mistakenly) believes the 
method or process to be 
unreliable, or 
(b) S is justified in regarding 
the method42 or process as unreliable. 
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Accordingly, the core idea of strong justification can be 
captured as follows: S's belief that p is strongly 
justified just in case (1) it is produced by processes 
and/or suitably acquired methods that are reliable, and (2) 
S's cognitive state when the belief that p is formed does 
not undermine these processes' and/or methods' reliability. 
Goldman notes that beliefs which satisfy these 
conditions for strong justification will (presumably) also 
be blameless and, hence, would appear to be weakly 
42Alvin Goldman, "Strong and Weak Justification", ..2.E,. 
cit., pp. 4-7 and 11. 
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justified, as well. But he wants strong and weak 
justification to be mutually exclusive, opposing notions. 
So, he modifies the notion of weak justification in such a 
way that it only attaches to merely blameless beliefs, i.e. 
ill-formed (strongly unjustified) but blameless beliefs, 
rather than to beliefs that are blameless per see To 
capture this i11-formed-but-b1ame1ess sense of weak 
justification, Goldman provides us with the following set of 
jointly sufficient (though non-necessary) conditions for 
such justification: 
(WJ) SIS belief in p is weakly justified if 
(1) the method M (or cognitive 
process C) by which the belief 
is produced is unreliable, but 
(2) S does not believe that M (or C) 
is unreliable, and 
(3) S neither possesses, nor has 
available to him/her, a reliable 
way of         that M (or C) is 
unreliable. 
Goldman goes on to suggest that we might need to supplement 
these three conditions with a fourth condition, to wit, (4) 
there is no process or method S believes to be reliable 
which, if used, would lead S to believe that M (or C) is 
unre1iab1e. 44 
43 Ibid . ,. pp. 8 and 11. Again, this is an 
oversimpIl.fication of Goldman I s view in that it does not 
distinguish between weak justification at the level of 
primary justifiedness and weak justification at the level of 
secondary justifiedness. 
44 Ibid . 
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With the conditions for strong and weak justification 
before us, let us return to the case of the scientifically 
benighted cognizer S*. S*'s belief about the outcome of the 
impending battle is strongly unjustified because it does not 
satisfy condition (1) of (SJ), since the method S* uses 
that of consulting zodiacal signs being quite 
unreliable, is not a proper method. Nevertheless, S*'s 
belief about the battle outcome is weakly justified because, 
al though consulting zodiacal signs is unreliable, S* does 
not believe that is it unreliable, nor does he possess a 
reliable method or process which would lead him to think 
that it is unreliab Ie. Thus, S*' s belief satisfies the 
three conditions of (WJ). Moreover, there is no method or 
process, which S* believes to be reliable, that would lead 
him to think that consulting zodiacal signs is unreliable; 
so, supplementary condition (4) is satisfied, as well. 
We are now in a position to see how the duplex theory 
of justification handles evil demon world counterexamples. 
It should be fairly obvious that cognizers in a 
demon-manipulated world are in a situation not unlike S*'s. 
We demon-manipulated cognizers of the first counterexample 
form our beliefs using perception, memory, and inference, 
all of which the demon has rendered unreliable in W. 
Consequently, our beliefs are strongly unjustified since 
they fail to satisfy condition (1) of (SJ). Even so, there 
is a sense in which our beliefs are justified --- as Lehrer 
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and Cohen maintain. Our demon-manipulated beliefs are 
weakly justified because, even though they are produced by 
unreliable processes, we do not believe that perception, 
memory and inference are unreliable, we do not possess a 
reliable method or process which would lead us to think that 
they are unreliable, and there is no method or process that 
we believe to be reliable which, if used, would lead us to 
believe that they are unreliable. Thus, on the duplex view, 
Lehrer and Cohen are right in maintaining that our 
demon-manipulated beliefs are justified, though the only 
kind of justification they possess is weak justification. 
Finally, Goldman's duplex theory of justification is 
also capable of handling the other objections against 
necessity. Regarding strong justification, the duplex 
theory renders identical assessments of A's beliefs and B's 
beliefs. Both A's beliefs and B' s beliefs are strongly 
unjustified since they are produced by demon-rendered 
unreliable processes. Nevertheless, on the duplex view, 
there remains a marked epistemic difference between the 
beliefs of A and the beliefs of B. The beliefs of A, 
although ill-formed, are weakly justified, whereas the 
beliefs of B, also ill-formed, are not even weakly 
justified. Accordingly, while A's beliefs are blameless, we 
can fault B for his beliefs. Thus, Goldman's duplex theory 
provides the means for rendering the different epistemic 
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assessments of A's beliefs and B' s beliefs, which Cohen's 
counterexamples require. 
b. Personal and Doxastic Justification Revisited 
As mentioned at the outset of the previous subsection, 
I find both of Goldman's responses to the necessity 
counterexamples unsatisfactory. In section 5, I will 
explain why I take them to be unsatisfactory. But first, in 
subsection c, I will offer what is by my lights the proper 
diagnosis of why the objections presented in section 3 are 
unsuccessful in refuting reliabilism. Since both the 
explanation and the diagnosis depend on and are rooted in 
the personal/doxastic justification distinction, some 
additional clarificatory remarks concerning these two kinds 
of justification are in order. The burden of the present 
subsection is to provide these clarificatory remarks. 
Recall from Chapter 1 that according to (DJ), "Doxastic 
justification is a normative notion in terms of which 
beliefs are evaluated from the epistemic point of view." So 
stated, (DJ) does no more than identify doxastic 
justification as the kind of justification which attaches to 
beliefs. Not wanting to beg any questions, I formulated 
(DJ) in such a way that it remains an open question as to 
when a belief is doxastically justified. Of course, for 
doxastic justification to be a usable notion, we need at 
least some idea of when a belief possesses it, that is to 
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say, we need an answer to the question, "When is a belief 
doxastically justified?" A trivial, though not wholly 
uninformative, answer is: A belief is doxastically 
justified just in case it has positive epistemic status. 
This suggests that to get a less trivial answer to our 
question, we need to recast it in a new light, viz. "When, 
from the epistemic point of view, should a belief be 
evaluated positively?" Since the epistemic point of view is 
defined by the goal of maximizing truth and minimizing 
falsity in a large body of beliefs, one might think that the 
answer to this latter question simply is: 
(AI) A belief has positive epistemic 
status iff it is true. 
After all, from the epistemic viewpoint, true beliefs are 
better than false ones. But an answer like (AI) is 
essentially nothing more than a restatement of the epistemic 
goal itself. What we want is a way of evaluating beliefs 
apart from their actual truth-value that will help us to 
attain our dual-pronged goal of gaining truth and avoiding 
error. 
Probability provides us with such a means of evaluating 
beliefs. From the epistemic viewpoint, beliefs that are 
probably true are better than beliefs that are probably 
false. Accordingly, a natural answer to our question 
concerning when a belief has positive epistemic status is: 
(A2) A belief has positive epistemic 
status iff it has a sufficiently high 
probability of being true. 
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(A2), together with our earlier trivial observation that a 
belief is doxastically justified just in case it has 
positive epistemic status, entails the following nontrivial 
result: 
(DJ') A belief is doxastically justified 
iff it has a sufficiently high 
probability of being true. 
Intuitively, (DJ') seems right to me. It captures 
what, in my opinion, is the central idea behind doxastic 
justification by correctly describing which beliefs we would 
want to count as justified from the epistemic standpoint. 
That it does so can be seen as follows: When we say a 
belief is justified, we are appraising that belief 
positively as being one that is good to hold for the purpose 
of gaining truth and avoiding error. Now according to 
(DJ' ), highly probable beliefs are doxastically justified, 
which is to say highly probable beliefs are good ones to 
hold for the purposes of gaining truth and avoiding error. 
This seems correct, since highly probable beliefs are, 
intuitively, the sorts of beliefs best suited for maximizing 
truth and minimizing falsity within our doxastic corpus. It 
is important to note that (DJ') only provides us with a 
semantic criterion of doxastic justifiedness, i.e. it does 
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no more than describe which beliefs are doxastically 
justified, i.e. are good ones to hold. It offers no 
epistemic criterion by which we 3!!!. tell which beliefs 
satisfy this semantic criterion. That is to say, (DJ') does 
not provide us with a means for telling which beliefs are 
probably true and, hence, good ones to hold. The reason 
being, a belief can be a good one to hold without our 
knowing that it is a good one to hold. More to the point, a 
belief can be doxastically justified without our knowing (or 
even being able to tell) that it is doxastically justified. 
Admittedly, these last remarks have an externalist 
flavor which those of internalist tastes may find 
obj ectionable. They may, for example, obj ect that I have 
formulated (DJ') in an ad hoc fashion. After all, I have 
suggested that a form of reliabilism not unlike Goldman's 
reliabilism provides the correct account of doxastic 
justification. And I have now just given a wholly 
externalistic definition of doxastic justification. So, it 
is hardly surprising that reliabilism, an externalist 
theory, can account for doxastic justification so-defined. 
But, surely, defining a notion in such a way that one's 
chosen theory can account for it is as ad hoc as one can 
get. 
Despite such circumstantial evidence, I plead innocent 
to this ad hoc-ness charge. In my defense, recall that in 
Chapter 1 I argued that there are several different senses 
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of justification in the epistemic realm, all of which 
currently are batted around under the single heading 
"epistemic justification". Rather than being seen as 
offering some esoteric, ad hoc conception of justification, 
(DJ') should be viewed as distilling out one of the various 
senses of epistemic justification currently in use. After 
all, the idea that probability and justification are 
intimately connected is hardly novel. Moreover, an entire 
school of epistemology, viz. probabilism, can be seen as an 
attempt to capture this idea by providing a probabilistic 
theory of justification. In its simplest form, probabilism 
maintains that a belief is justified iff it is highly 
probable. Pollock points out that this contention, which 
he calls "the simple rule", has been endorsed by the likes 
of Chisholm, Hempel, Kyburg, Jeffery, Carnap, et. al. 45 
(DJ') virtually restates the simple rule. However, (DJ') 
and the simple rule do differ in that the simple rule 
employs the unclarified, ambiguous term 'justified', whereas 
(DJ') is concerned with a specific sense of justification, 
to wit, doxastic justification. What (DJ') does, in effect, 
is capture the sense of justification indigenous to 
probabilism while acknowledging that it is only one of 
several senses of epistemic justification. Thus, far from 
45John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. 
cit., p. 116 in             
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being an ad hoc contrivance, (DJ') isolates one conception 
of epistemic justification already extant in the 
epistemological literature. 
Before turning to personal justification, a digression 
into the motivation behind doxastic justification is in 
order. To set the stage 'for this digression, recall from 
Chapter 1 that the knowledge conception of epistemic 
justification requires that justification be conceptually 
connected with truth. To be adequate, an account of the 
knowledge conception of justification must specify the 
nature of this conceptual connection. Infallibilist 
theories of justification embody the strongest connection 
possible between justification and truth. They maintain 
that there is a necessary connection between justification 
and truth such that justification logically entails truth. 
The problem with such theories is that they not only lead to 
skepticism, they entail it, since they make human knowledge 
logically impossible. 46 Given this untenable result, most 
46Infallibilist theories make human knowledge logically 
impossible because they make justified belief, a necessary 
condition for knowledge, logically impossible. That they 
make justified belief logically impossible can be seen as 
follows: Infallibilist theories require that the conditions 
which make a belief justified entail that belief's truth. 
But the evil demon hypothesis demonstrates that no matter 
what conditions for justified belief one settles on, it is 
always logically possible for the conditions to obtain and 
that the belief be false. What this shows is that there are 
no conditions for justified belief which entail truth. 
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epistemologists have found infallibilist theories, as well 
as their assumption that justification and truth are 
necessarily connected, to be unacceptable. 
The demise of infallibilism has led most 
epistemologists to adopt fallibilist theories of 
justification. Fallibilist theories admit and maintain that 
no matter how well a belief is justified, it is still 
logically possible for that belief to be false (assuming the 
proposition believed is not a necessary truth). The task 
facing fallibilists is to make sense of the connection 
between justification and truth, given this possibility of 
justified-but-false belief. It seems that the most 
promising way to do so is probabilistically, for if 
justification and truth are probabilistically connected, 
then justified beliefs, though possibly false, have the 
virtue of being more probable than unjustified beliefs. The 
probabilists were driven to the simple rule in an attempt 
Consequently, it is logically impossible for beliefs to 
possess the kind of truth-entailing justification that 
infallibilist theories require. 
My discussion so far has ignored necessary truths and 
the co*ito, since whether or not these beliefs are 
           justified remains to be decided and since, even 
if they turn out to be infallibly justified and hence 
capable of being known, all other human knowledge of 
con.tingent propositions remains logically impossible on an 
infallibilist theory. Consequently, the possibility of 
cogito knowledge and/or knowledge of necessary truths does 
little, if anything, to make infallibilist theories more 
tenable. 
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to provide such a probabilistic connection between 
justification and truth. Moreover, they regarded the simple 
rule as an analysis of the concept "justified belief". It 
is on this last point that I part company with the 
probabilists. 
I am not offering (DJ') as an analysis of the concept 
"doxastic justification", since one cannot analyze a concept 
before one knows what that concept is. Rather than 
analyzing doxastic justification, (DJ') is specifying what I 
take the concept "doxastic justification" to be, for this is 
the concept which I feel is in need of analysis. With the 
doxastic conception of justification provided via (DJ') 
before us, we are in a position to see the motivation behind 
such a conception. Simply put, it is to have a working 
conception of justification that is internally connected 
with truth. Digression ended. 
Having provided a working 
justification, I now turn to 
conception 
the topic 
of 
of 
doxastic 
personal 
justification. Since my discussion of personal 
justification may seem overly brief and incomplete, let me 
preface it with an explanation for its brevity and 
incompleteness. Chapter 3 is devoted entirely to a 
discussion of the personal conception of justification. 
There, expanding upon the comments made below, I will 
clarify the concept of personal justification fully 
and will also offer a detailed analysis of this kind of 
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justification. Not wanting Chapter 3 to be an exercise in 
repetition, I am purposefully limiting the discussion 
offered here to that which is most essential for 
understanding the personal conception of justification. 
Accordingly, my present goal is simply to give the reader 
some idea of in what the notion of personal justification 
consists -- or, if you will, to give the reader a feel for 
the notion of personal justification. Now, on to the 
discussion, lest my explanation for its brevity exceed it in 
length. 
The expression I Person S is personally justified in 
believing that p' is ambiguous. On one reading, it implies 
that S does, in fact, believe that p and is personally 
justified in doing so. On a second reading, it asserts that 
S does not believe that p, but that (given her present 
cognitive state) she would (or at least could) be personally 
justified in believing that p, were she to do so.47 For 
47 Both Goldman and Pollock have noted roughly this same 
sort of ambiguity, though not in the context of personal 
justification .E.er see Goldman distinguishes between two 
uses of the term-rjustified', an ex post use and an ex ante 
use, which correspond respecti very to the two readings I 
distinguish above. [See his "What is Justified Belief?", 
.2.E. • cit. , p. 21. ] . Pollock distinguishes between 
justi:ITea belief and justifiable belief. "A justifiable 
belief-;-rr- he tells us, "is one tne believer could become 
justified in believing if he just put together what he 
already believes in the right way." [from his Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge,     cit., p. 90.]. 
Accordingly, ' justifiable belief applies only when either 
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example, we might want to say that S is personally justified 
in believing that p -- in the latter sense -- when S has 
adequate evidence for the belief that p, but has not yet 
come to believe that p. In order the keep these two senses 
of S's being personally justified in believing that p 
separate, one might want to adopt the following stipulative 
terminology: Let the locution'S is personally justified in 
believing that p' be used exclusively for the former sense 
that gives existential import to the belief in question, and 
let the locution'S is ex ante personally justified in 
believing that p' be used to capture the second sense where 
S does not yet hold the belief that p. Throughout the 
course of this dissertation when discussing the 
justificatory status of persons, I will confine myself to 
the topic of personal justification, since, unlike ex ante 
personal justification, it has a role to play in the theory 
of knowledge. 48 
(1) S does not yet hold the belief or (2) the belief, which 
S does hold, is unjustified, because of the way she came to 
hold it. 'Justified belief' applies only when S does hold 
the belief. Thus, "justified belief" is like my first 
reading in that it entails the belief's existence. However, 
"justifiable belief" differs slifihtlY from my second reading 
in that "justifiable belief' does not entail the 
nonexistence of the belief in question. 
48E t 1·· f·· 1 1·   an e persona                cannot p ay a ro e    
an account of knowledge because it entails nonbelief. In 
entailing nonbelief, it ipso facto entails that a necessary 
condition for knowledge, viz. belief, is not satisfied. 
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According to our initial characterization (PJ) , 
personal justification is a normative notion in terms of 
which persons are evaluated from the epistemic viewpoint. 
In order to flesh out (PJ) and thereby get a hold on the 
concept of personal justification, we need to reflect on 
just what it is we are doing when we make personal 
justification evaluations. Let us, therefore, start with 
the obvious. When we evaluate a person S as being personally 
justified in believing that p, we are evaluating S 
positively from the epistemic viewpoint, and when we 
evaluate S as being personally unjustified in believing that 
p, we are evaluating S negatively from that same viewpoint. 
Of course, in evaluating S positively from the epistemic 
viewpoint, we are, in effect, praising S epistemically. 
Similarly, in making the negative evaluation that S is 
personally unjustified in believing that p, we are blaming S 
epistemically for believing that p. Consequently, at least 
as a first approximation, we can define personal 
justification in terms of epistemic praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness as follows: 
(PJ ) u 
S is personally justified in 
believing that p iff S is worthy of 
epistemic praise-- for believing 
that p. 
S is personally unjustified in 
believing that p iff S is deserving 
of epistemic blame for believing 
that p. 
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How, then, do we decide whether a person merits 
epistemic praise (or blame) for believing a given propo-
sition? We do so on the basis of whether or not she has 
been epistemically responsible in coming to believe that 
proposition. If a person comes to believe that p in an 
epistemically responsible manner (e.g. checking her work, 
considering defeaters, weighing the evidence), she is worthy 
of epistemic praise and is, therefore, personally justified 
in believing that p. If, on the other hand, a person comes 
to believe that p in an epistemically irresponsible manner 
(e.g. wrecklessly adopting beliefs, ignoring counter-
evidence, trusting Evan Mecham), she is epistemically 
blameworthy and is, therefore, personally unjustified in 
believing that p. Thus, a person's personal justificatory 
status is a function of whether or not she has proceeded in 
an epistemically responsible way in coming to hold a given 
belief. Accordingly, we can revise our first approximations 
(PJ.) and (PJ ) as follows: J U 
S is personally justified in 
believing that p iff S has come to 
believe that p in-an epistemically 
responsible fashion. 
S is personally 
believing that p 
unjustified in 
iff S has been 
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epistemically                in 
coming to believe that p. 
While there may be other conceptions of personal 
justification, they are of no interest to me here. The type 
of personal justification with which I am concerned in the 
present dissertation is that cashed out by (PJj') and 
(PJu '), since personal justification so-conceived --- that 
brand of justification intimately connected with our notions 
of epistemic praise, blame, responsibility, and irrespon-
sibility -- is, as we shall see, the kind of justification 
which has served as the impetus for internalism. 
Now that we have working conceptions of both personal 
justification 
justification 
[ (PJ . ' ) J 
[ (DJ' ) ] , 
and 
progress 
(PJ ')] and u doxastic 
in epistemology readily 
awaits us. For example, in the next subsection I will use 
these two kinds of justification to demonstrate that all of 
the counterexamples to reliabilism presented in section 3 
are ultimately unsuccessful. As a result, reliabilism will 
reemerge as a viable theory, albeit a theory of doxastic 
justification, and the personal/ doxastic justification 
distinction will be further legitimated. 
49(PJ.') and (PJ ') are not being offered as an 
analysis of the concep¥ "personal justification". Rather, 
they are intended to point out what the concept of personal 
justification is. It is this conception of personal 
justification which I will attempt to analyze in Chapter 3. 
    
c. The Right Reliabilist Reply 
The onus of this subsection is to prove that all of the 
section 3 obj ections to reliabilism fail. My argument to 
this effect proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that the 
most plausible way to interpret reliabilism is as an account 
of doxastic justification. Then, I reexamine the objections 
to reliabilism in order to show that they all conflate 
personal and doxastic justification, sometimes blatantly. 
Once they are deconflated, the objections at best only serve 
to show that reliabilism fails as a theory of personal 
justification. However, since reliabilism is intended as a 
theory of doxastic, not personal, justification, it becomes 
obvious that the objections are fundamentally misguided and 
simply do not apply to reliabilism properly construed. I 
now turn to step one, to wit, eliciting the proper construal 
of reliabilism. 
Although Goldman does not definitively distinguish 
doxastic justification from personal justification, numerous 
passages in his "What Is Justified Belief?" strongly suggest 
that he offered his theory with something very much like 
d .. . f· . . . d 50                                  . The opening sentence of 
this article states, "The aim of this paper is to sketch a 
SONOTE: Even the title of Goldman's article, to wit, 
"What Is Justified Belief?" (my emphasis), suggests that he 
is concerned with doxastic justification, the kind of 
epistemic justification which attaches to beliefs. 
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theory of justified belief,,51 (my emphasis). He tells us 
explicitly what a theory of justified belief will consist 
of. It will consist of "a set of principles that specify 
truth-conditions for the schema Is's belief in p at time t 
is justified l ,,52 (my emphasis). Moreover, if we recall the 
base and recursive clauses that are constitutive of his 
theory, which were presented in section 2, viz. (Bel), 
(ReI), and (Bel'), we see that in each case his analysandum 
is indeed "S' s belief in p at t is justified,,53 (my 
emphasis) . These passages clearly suggest that Goldman 
intends his theory to be a theory for epistemically 
evaluating beliefs, not persons. 
That he offers his theory as a theory of justified 
beliefs, not justified persons, becomes even more obvious 
when we consider the following passage: 
Suppose S has a set B of beliefs at time t , 
and some of these beliefs are unjustifie9. 
Between to and t l , he reasonS- from the entire set B to tne conclusion p, which he 
then accepts at t 1 . The reasoning procedure he uses is a very sound one, i.e., one that 
is conditionally reliable. There is a sense 
or respect in which we are tempted to say 
that SIS belief in p at t is 'justified'. 
At any rate, it is           to say that the 
person [his emphasis] is justified in 
51Alvin Goldman, "What is Justified Belief?", £E. cit., 
p. 1. 
52 Ibid ., p. 3. 
53 Ibid ., pp. 13, 14 and 20. 
believing p at t r11 • Relative to his antecedent            state, he did as well 
as could be expected: the transition from 
his cognitive state at to to his cognitive 
state at t was entirely sound. Although we 
may acknowledge this brand of justifiedness 
it might be called 'Terminal-Phase 
Reliabilism' it is not a kind of 
               so closely related to 
knowl.ng. 
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Since Goldman thinks that the justifiedness of persons has 
little to do with knowledge and since he contends that "On 
the account of justified belief suggested here, it is 
necessary for knowing, and closely related to it", 55 it is 
clear that he regards his theory as a theory of the 
justifiedness of beliefs, i.e. as a theory of what I have 
been calling "doxastic justification". Thus, one extremely 
compelling reason for interpreting reliabilism as a theory 
of doxastic justification is that Goldman himself clearly 
seems to have intended it as such. There is, however, an 
additional reason, independent of Goldman's intentions, for 
viewing reliabilism as a theory of doxastic justification. 
Recall from subsection b that according to (DJ') a 
belief is doxastically justified iff it has a high 
probability of being true. It is quite reasonable to regard 
54 Ibid ., pp. 15-16. Here Goldman appears to be on the 
verge of aiscovering the personal/doxastic justification 
distinction, but he fails to pursue the distinction any 
further. 
55Ibid , p.l. 
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reliabilism as an account of doxastic justification 
so-conceived, since the beliefs which reliabilism deems 
justified do have a high probability of being true 
beliefs. That reliabilistically justified beliefs do have a 
high probability of being true beliefs can be demonstrated 
as follows. In its simplest form, process reliabilism 
asserts that a belief is justified iff it results from a 
reliable BCP, where a BCP is reliable just in case it tends 
to produce true beliefs, i.e. just in case the indefinite 
probability of beliefs produced by it being true beliefs 
is high (at least greater than .5).56 Since, by definition, 
beliefs produced by reliable BCP' s have a high indefinite 
probability of being true beliefs, it follows on a 
reliabilist account that justified beliefs have a high 
indefinite probability of being true beliefs, since 
reliabilism identifies justified beliefs with reliably 
produced beliefs. As you may recall from section 2, 
indefinite probabilities are dyadic relations which relate 
classes (or properties) by specifying the probability of a 
56 If the indefinite probability of beliefs produced by 
a given BCP being true beliefs is high, then that BCP will 
tend to produce true beliefs. If, on the other hand, the 
indefinite probability of beliefs produced by a given BCP 
being true beliefs is low, then that BCP will tend to 
produce false beliefs. Thus, a BCP will tend to produce 
true beliefs iff it is the case that the indefinite 
probability of-oeliefs produced by that BCP being true 
beliefs is high. 
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member of one class being a member of a second class. 
Consequently, in demonstrating that reliabilism entails 
that justified beliefs have a high indefinite probability of 
being true beliefs, we have ipso facto demonstrated that 
reliabilism entails that beliefs belonging to the class of 
justified belief have a high probability of belonging to the 
class of true beliefs. The former demonstration entails the 
latter since, by the very definition of indefinite 
probability, for any two classes A and B, the indefinite 
probability of A's being B' s is high just in case x' s 
belonging to class A have a high probability of belonging to 
class B. Since reliabilism entails that justified beliefs 
(members of the class justified belief) have a high 
probability of being true beliefs (members of the class true 
belief), reliabilism entails that justified beliefs have a 
high probability of being true (since true beliefs are 
true). But notice, this is precisely the sort of 
probabilistic truth connection which a theory of doxastic 
justification must affix, since a belief is doxastically 
justified iff it has a high probability of being true. It 
should by now be obvious that reliabilism provides exactly 
the kind of analysis which a theory of doxastic 
justification must provide, and for this reason, it ought to 
be interpreted as just such a theory. 
Let me conclude step one with a brief summary. We have 
seen that reliabilism takes beliefs as its domain of 
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evaluation. We have also seen that Goldman clearly seems to 
have intended his theory as a theory of doxastic (not 
personal) justification. And finally, we have just seen 
that reliabilism provides the sort of probabilistic 
connection between justified belief and truth that is 
definitive of doxastic justification. For these reasons, I 
contend that the only plausible way to construe reliabilism 
is as a theor.y of doxastic justification. 
We are now in a position to see why none of the section 
3 objections apply to reliabilism so-construed. Recall that 
in the first counterexample to necessity we are to suppose 
that unbeknownst to us the evil demon hypothesis is true and 
that consequently all our beliefs have been produced by 
BCP's which the demon has rendered unreliable. According to 
reliabilism, none of our beliefs would be justified in such 
a world. Lehrer and Cohen contend that this result is 
untenable. I, on the other hand, maintain that, in 
evaluating our beliefs in such a world as unjustified, 
reliabilism provides precisely the right result. After all, 
in an evil demon world where all of our beliefs are produced 
by highly unreliable BCP's, all of our beliefs are extremely 
improbable, i. e. to say, all of our beliefs are probably 
false. 57 It strikes me as antithetical to the entire 
570f course, it follows by definition (see (DJ'» that 
such probably false beliefs are not doxastically justified. 
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epistemological enterprise to regard beliefs which are 
probably false as having positive epistemic status, i.e. as 
being epistemically justified. After all, probably false 
beliefs obviously run counter to the epistemic goal of 
maximizing truth and minimizing error, since they virtually 
ensure error, and surely, there is nothing epistemically 
positive about beliefs which virtually ensure error. 
Consequently, reliabilism, in evaluating such 
demon-manipulated, probably false beliefs negatively as 
being epistemically unjustified, yields exactly the right 
result, Lehrer and Cohen's intuitions to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that their objection 
is prima facie intuitively quite appealing, so much so that 
Goldman felt compelled to modify his theory accordingly. 
This initial appeal derives from their correct observation 
that were we to reason in the evil demon world exactly like 
we reason in the actual world, we would be reasoning as well 
as could be expected given our unfortunate circumstances. 
In light of this observation, it is both natural and 
correct to claim that we would be just as well justified in 
But such a stipulative truth, if that is all it were, would 
be neither interesting nor illuminating. What I now hope to 
show in the body of the text is that the view that such 
beliefs are not (doxastically) justified is intuitively 
correct. 
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believing what we do in the demon world as we are in 
believing what we do in the actual world. On the basis of 
this correct claim, Lehrer and Cohen conclude that our 
beliefs are just as well justified in the evil demon world 
as they are in the actual world, but in drawing this 
inference they are clearly conflating doxastic justification 
with personal justification. This inference amounts to 
thinking that our beliefs must be epistemically good (i.e. 
doxastically justified), because we have reasoned well. 
However, thinking that our beliefs must be epistemically 
good because we have reasoned well is just as fallacious as 
thinking that our beliefs must be true because we have 
reasoned well. That we have reasoned well does, indeed, 
confer positive epistemic status on us, i.e. makes us 
justified, but it does not of itself confer positive 
epistemic status on our beliefs, because our beliefs can 
still be extremely improbable, despite our having reasoned 
well. It is precisely this failure on the part of their 
readers to keep personal and doxastic justification separate 
that gives their counterexample its initial plausibility. 
As we shall now see, the other counterexamples manifest this 
conflation even more clearly. 
In the second counterexample Cohen contrasts two 
inhabitants of evil demon world W', A who is a good reasoner 
and B who is a confused reasoner, a wishful thinker, etc. 
Of course, the demon has seen to it that good reasoning is 
92 
as unreliable in W' as confused reasoning and wishful 
thinking are in W'. Cohen rightfully observes that: 
Since the beliefs of A & B are both produced 
by unreliable processes (the evil demon sees 
to this), a reliabilist theory of 
justification must render identical 
epistemiS8 appraisals of both sets of beliefs. 
Cohen finds this result to be unacceptable. Since, in his 
opinion, "There is a fundamental epistemic difference 
between the beliefs of A and the beliefs of B" 59 , 
reliabilism, which fails to take this difference into 
account, must be mistaken. His argument for there being 
such an epistemic difference between A I S beliefs and B IS 
beliefs is roughly that since A is a good reasoner and B is 
not, the beliefs of A are justified while the beliefs of B 
are not. In so arguing, Cohen clearly makes the mistake of 
conflating personal and doxastic justification. His example 
is instructive, not because it is an objection to 
reliabilism, but because it demonstrates the importance of 
keeping these two kinds of justification separate. 
Cohen's example does uncover an epistemic difference, 
but not the one he thinks it does. Since A is a good 
58Stewart Cohen, Justification and Truth, QE. cit., pp. 
10-11. 
59 Ibid ., p. 11. 
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reasoner and B is a wishful thinker, there is a definite 
epistemic difference between person A and person B. By 
reasoning in accordance with the canons of inductive logic, 
A is presumably adopting his beliefs in an epistemically 
responsible fashion. B, on the other hand, in forming 
wishful beliefs, is presumably being epistemically 
. 'bl 60             e. Hence, A is personally justified in his 
beliefs in W', whereas B is personally unjustified in his 
beliefs in W'. It is crucial to realize, however, that A's 
being being personally justified in his beliefs does not 
entail that his beliefs are themselves doxastically 
justified. This will become obvious once we see that in the 
case under discussion A's beliefs are doxastically 
unjustified. 
Due to demon influence, both A's beliefs and B's 
beliefs have been produced by equally unreliable BCP's, and 
because of this, A's beliefs are just as improbable as B's 
beliefs. Accordingly, A's beliefs are no better from the 
epistemic standpoint than B's beliefs, since they are just 
as likely to result in error as are B's beliefs. According 
to (DJ'), since both A's beliefs and B's beliefs are 
probably false, both A's beliefs and B's beliefs are 
601 ' am          
is an unreliable way 
be more complicated, 
be reliable. 
that B believes that wishful thinking 
to form beliefs. The situation would 
were B to believe wishful thinking to 
94 
doxastically unjustified. Since reliabilism entails that 
A's and B's unreliably produced beliefs are unjustified, as 
a theory of doxastic justification it yields exactly the 
right result. 
Cohen's next purported counterexample to necessity can 
be handled in a similar fashion. Recall that this example 
has us consider a case where, owing to the demon, both A and 
B have the unreliably-produced, non-discursive perceptual 
belief that    , but where B, unlike A, has strong counter 
evidence which he simply ignores. Here is what Cohen has to 
say about this case: 
I think it's clear that there is a 
fundamental epistemic difference between A's 
perceptual belief and B's perceptual belief 
-- a difference which again underscores the 
normative character of epistemic 
justification. Notice that we need not 
assume that B disregards the evidence as a 
result of any discursive process. He may 
just arbitrarily ignore it. But from an 
epistemic point of view, B ought not to have 
proceeded in the way he aid. We might say 
that contrary to A, B has been epistemically 
irresponsible in accepting that there is 
something before him. As a result, while A 
is            in his    perceptual         
B is not (emphasis added). 
Let me first say that I essentially agree with Cohen's 
conclusion that "while A is justified in his    perceptual 
61Stewart Cohen, Justification and Truth, £E. cit., pp. 
13-14. 
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belief, B is not.,,62 But it should be noted that Cohen is 
making a personal evaluation here, not a doxastic one, since 
the subjects being evaluated are cognizers A and B. While 
this personal evaluation is correct, neither it nor anything 
else in the passage supports his initial contention that 
"there is a fundamental epistemic difference between A's 
perceptual belief and B' s perceptual belief". That he 
apparently takes the personalist conclusion above to support 
his initial contention is yet another manifestation of the 
personal/ doxastic justification conflation, which pervades 
and also undermines all of his purported counterexamples to 
reliabilism. While there is a fundamental epistemic 
difference between person A and person B, this does not 
demonstrate that there is a similar epistemic difference 
between A's cP belief and B' s cP belief, Cohen's thoughts to 
the contrary notwithstanding. Since A's perceptual belief 
is just as improbable as B's perceptual belief, A's 
62My assertion that I essentially agree with Cohen's 
conclusion needs to be qualified. For reasons which will 
become clear in Chapter 3, I think that Cohen should have 
concluded that while B is personally unjustified in his 
belief, A is not personally unjustified in his. This 
conclusion is               tolCohen's, because it allows 
for the possibility that A is personally ajustified in his 
belief, a possibility which I take to be actual in the case 
at hand. Thus, while strictly speaking I do not agree 
entirely with Cohen's conclusion as it is stated, I come so 
close to agreeing with it that feigning such agreement to 
facilitate the present discussion is warranted. 
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perceptual belief is just as doxastically unjustified as B's 
perceptual belief. So, once again, reliabilism yields the 
right doxastic evaluation. 
Cohen's counterexamples to sufficiency rest on the same 
conflation that his counterexamples to necessity do. To see 
that this is so, let us consider his example in which, 
unbeknownst to the inhabitants of W+, wishful thinking 
happens to be completely reliable there. It is a 
consequence of reliabilism that in such a world wishfully-
formed beliefs are justified. Cohen, on the other hand, 
contends that such wishfully-formed beliefs are unjustified, 
no matter how reliable wishful thinking turns out to be, 
for, as he explains: 
The crucial factor, what by my lights makes 
the beliefs unjustified in these cases, is 
the fact that the reliability of the belief 
forming process is due to facts that are 
completely outside the ken of the subj ect. 
If as far as the subject knows, the state of 
affairs expressed by P is merely something 
he wishes for, then he is being 
               irresponsible in accepting 
that P. 
If the subject in question believes that wishful thinking is 
unreliable, then I agree with Cohen that the subj ect is 
being epistemically irresponsible in accepting that p on the 
63Stewart Cohen, Justification and Truth, .2.E.. cit., 
p. 16. 
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basis of wishful thinking, and as a result, he is personally 
unjustified in his belief that p [recall (PJu ')]. But it 
does not' follow. from this that his belief that p is 
doxastica11y unjustified. To the contrary, since wishful 
thinking is completely reliable in W+, our subject's belief 
that p is extremely probable, and so, according to (DJ'), 
his belief that p is, in fact, doxastica11y justified, which 
is just what re1iabi1ism maintains. 64 
Although Cohen is wrong to regard our subject's belief 
that p as unjustified, his explanation for it supposed 
unjustifiedness merits further consideration. He contends 
that it is unjustified because "the reliability of the 
belief forming process [in this case wishful thinking] is 
due to facts that are completely outside the ken of the 
subject." This could mean one of two things. It might mean 
that the belief is unjustified because the subject is 
unaware of the actual reliability of the BCP which produced 
64Cohen's second counterexample to sufficiency (see pp. 
51-52) collapses for similar reasons. Even though there is 
a clear epistemic difference between person A the good 
reasoner and person B the wishful thinker, A's oe1iefs and 
B's beliefs remain on equal epistemic footing. After all, 
since good reasoning and wishful thinking are equally 
reliable in W+ (the good demon has seen to this), both the 
beliefs of A and the beliefs of B, being highly probable, 
are doxastica11y justified. Accordingly, it is B, and not 
his beliefs, that is unjustified. Since re1iabi1ism is only 
concerned with doxastic evaluations, it remains unscathed by 
this purported counterexample, as well. 
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it. On this construal, it would turn out that virtually all 
of our beliefs are unjustified because we are, in a very 
real sense, unaware of the actual reliability of all our 
BCP's.65 Although I think that this is the construal that 
Cohen most likely intended, given its untoward consequences, 
the principle of charity dictates that we consider the 
second thing Cohen's claim might mean. It might mean that 
the belief is unjustified, not because the subject is 
unaware of the actual reliability of the BCP which produced 
it, but because he is unaware of the facts in virtue of 
which the BCP is reliable; e.g. since he is unaware of the 
fact that a benevolent demon is making his wishful beliefs 
turn out to be true, his wishful belief that p is 
unjustified. Such a view is reminiscent of causal theories 
which require that the cognizer properly reconstruct the 
causal chain that led from the fact that p to his belief 
that p, only the reconstruction required here is much more 
complex than the reconstruction required by causal theories, 
since the cognizer is required to reconstruct how the BCP 
650ne might contend that sophisticated cognizers are 
aware of the actual reliability of their BCP' s. Such a 
contention is open to doubt, but even if it is correct, it 
would turn out that all of the beliefs of young children 
(and, perhaps, of children who are not all that young) are 
unjustified, because young children are unaware that they 
have BCP's and a fortiori they are unaware of their BCP's 
actual reliability. 
99 
works in virtue of which it is reliable. This construal of 
Cohen's claim is no more plausible than the first, since 
it too entails that virtually all of our beliefs are 
unjustified. After all, the most sophisticated cognitive 
scientists and neurophysicists still are unaware of how most 
of our BCP's work and in virtue of which they are reliable. 
So, obviously, the man in the street is unaware of these 
things. Consequently, on either construal, Cohen's 
purported explanation of why our subj ect' s wishful belief 
that p is unjustified entails that virtually all of our 
beliefs are unjustified. But such an explanation is no 
explanation at all, since what was to be explained is how 
this wishful belief differs from ordinary perceptual and 
inductive beliefs and in virtue of which the wishful belief 
is unjustified. 
contention that 
Since no such difference is forthcoming, my 
the reliably-produced wishful belief is 
(doxastically) justified is further vindicated. 
Finally, let us turn to Bonj our's counterexample to 
reliabilism's sufficiency and give it the scrutiny it 
deserves. The case he has us consider centers around 
Norman, a perfectly reliable clairvoyant who is entirely 
unaware of his own clairvoyant power. As you may recall, 
Norman has absolutely no evidence as to the President's 
whereabouts, but his completely reliable faculty of 
clairvoyance, nevertheless, causes him to believe that the 
President is in New York City. Since his belief results 
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from a completely reliable BCP, reliabilism yields the 
result that Norman's belief about the President is 
justified. Bonjour questions this result: 
Is Norman epistemically justified in 
believing that the President is in New York 
City, so that his belief is an instance of 
knowledge? According to the modified 
externalist position, we must apparently say 
that he is. But is this the right result? 
Are there not still sufficient grounds for a 
charge of subjective irrationality to 
prevent            being epistemically 
justified? 
By now you can probably anticipate my response. I most 
certainly agree with Bonjour that there are sufficient 
grounds for a charge of subjective irrationality to prevent 
Norman from being epistemically justified. After all, 
Norman has no evidence as to the President's whereabouts. 
Moreover, he is completely unaware that he has reliable 
clairvoyant power. So, from his       internal standpoint, it 
must surely seem as if his belief about the President's 
present location simply popped into his head out of thin 
air. And, obviously, it is epistemically irresponsible of 
Norman to continue to hold such a spontaneously occurring 
ungrounded belief. All that this shows, however, is that 
Norman is personally unjustified in believing that the 
66Laurence Bonjour, "Externalist Theories of Empirical 
Knowledge", ,2,E. cit., p. 62. 
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President is in New York City, and by now we know that 
Norman's personal unjustifiedness is irrelevant to the 
doxastic justificational status of his belief. His belief 
is the result of a highly reliable BCP, to wit, completely 
reliable clairvoyance. As such, his belief is highly 
probable and is, therefore, a good one to hold from the 
epistemic viewpoint. Notice: Norman's situation with 
respect to his faculty of clairvoyance is not unlike a young 
child's situation with respect to her perceptual faculties. 
What's more, it is usually agreed that the young child's 
perceptual beliefs are justified even though she lacks any 
rationale for them. So, by parity of reason, we should 
agree that Norman's belief about the President's whereabouts 
is justified, while nevertheless maintaining that, relative 
to the other things he believes, he is being epistemically 
irresponsible in holding the belief and is, therefore, 
personally unjustified in doing so. Simply put, the fault 
lies with Norman, not with his belief, and our respective 
justificatory evaluations should reflect this fact. 
Therefore, I submit that if reliabilism is viewed as an 
account of doxastic justification, i.e. as a theory of 
justified belief, it remains unscathed by Bonj our's 
purported counterexample, as well. 
In short, we have seen that none of the section 3 
counterexamples to reliabilism hold up once the 
personal/ doxastic justification distinction is brought to 
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bear on them. These counterexamples were designed to show 
that a belief's being reliably produced is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for that belief's being justified. However, 
instead of showing this, all that they succeed in showing is 
that a belief's being reliably produced is neither necessary 
nor sufficient for a person to be justified in holding that 
belief. 67 Of course, this success does not serve to refute 
reliabilism, since reliabilism properly construed is a 
theory of doxastic evaluation, not a theory of personal 
evaluation. In fact, rather than refuting reliabilism, 
these counterexamples actually serve to confirm reliabilism 
as an account of doxastic justification, since for each case 
reliabilism provides the correct doxas tic evaluation. 
Nevertheless, in the next section we shall see that 
reliabilism as delineated in section 2 does not always 
result in the right doxastic evaluations, and therefore, it 
must be revised. 
5. A Theory of Doxastic 
Reliabilism Revised 
Justification: Goldman's 
The goal of the present section is to arrive at the 
correct theory of doxastic justification. Consequently, the 
67 That reliab Ie production is neither neces sary nor 
sufficient for personal justification should come as no 
surprise, since personal evaluations proceed in terms of 
whether or not a person has been epistemically responsible 
in coming to hold her beliefs. 
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present section is truly a pivotal one, since much of the 
dissertation hangs on the satisfactory attainment of this 
goal. In particular, the theory of knowledge which I sketch 
in Chapter 4 depends on the correctness of the theory of 
doxastic justification that is presented here. I shall 
ultimately argue that a revised version of Goldman's 
reliabilism provides the sought after theory. To demonstrate 
both the need for this revision and the sort of revision 
needed, I shall present cases where Goldman's theory results 
in the wrong doxastic evaluations. However, before doing 
so, I will first explain why both of Goldman's own 
revisions, viz. normal worlds reliabilism and the duplex 
theory, are unsatisfactory, since doing so reinforces the 
importance of the personal/doxastic justification 
distinction. 
Since its inception, normal worlds reliabilism has been 
under the steady fire of counterexamplers. I will not 
reiterate their counterexamples here. In fact, my 
obj ections to normal worlds reliabilism are not, properly 
speaking, counterexamples at all. They are, instead, what 
might be called "theoretical obj ections", since they point 
out theoretical shortcomings of the normal worlds approach. 
My first obj ection centers around the much sought after 
truth connection. As we saw in section 2, one of the most 
seductive and theoretically attractive features of Goldman's 
reliabilism is that it affixes probabilistic truth 
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connection such that beliefs that are justified in Ware 
probably true beliefs in W. However, unlike Goldman's 
reliabilism, normal worlds reliabilism provides no such 
connection. To see why, recall that according to normal 
worlds reliabilism a belief is justified in W just in case 
the BCP which produced it in W is reliable in normal worlds. 
On this view, justification does not entail probable truth, 
since a belief can be justified in W even though that belief 
is probably false in W. For example, suppose that belief B 
is produced in W by a BCP which is highly reliable in normal 
worlds, but terribly unreliable in W. On.the normal worlds 
view, B is justified in W since it has been produced by a 
BCP that is reliable in normal worlds, but because this BCP 
is unreliable in W, B is probably a false belief in ,,1. 
Hence, normal worlds reliabilism fails to provide the sort 
of probabilistic truth connection which its predecessor, 
Goldman's reliabilism, succeeds in providing. Consequently, 
normal worlds reliabilism lacks the theoretical 
attractiveness of its predecessor. This is an especially 
unhappy consequence for an externalist theory like normal 
worlds reliabilism, since the primary motivation behind 
externalist theories lies in their unique ability to provide 
the required truth connection. 
There remains another more devastating obj ection to 
normal worlds reliabilism, namely, it is an unnecessary 
modification of Goldman's reliabilism that results in the 
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wrong justificatory evaluation of demon-manipulated beliefs. 
According to normal worlds reliabilism, the beliefs of 
unsuspecting demon-world-inhabitants are justified, since 
the demon-rendered unreliable BCP' s which produced these 
beliefs are reliable BCP' s in normal worlds. But, as we 
have already seen, to regard such beliefs as justified is a 
theoretical mistake. 68 Since such demon-manipulated, 
unreliably-produced beliefs are probably false, they lack 
positive epistemic status and are, therefore, unjustified. 
This, of course, is exactly the justificatory evaluation 
rendered by Goldman's reliabilism without the normal worlds 
codicil. Consequently, normal worlds reliabilism is both 
unnecessary and theoretically unfounded. 69 
Goldman has since corne to be of the opinion that the 
beliefs of a demon-manipulated cognizer are, in a very 
important sense, unjustified. I think that this realization 
on his part is primarily what led him to abandon the normal 
worlds approach in favor of the duplex account. Although I 
do not find the duplex theory to be entirely satisfactory, I 
am nevertheless quite sympathetic with its underlying 
motivation. The duplex theory is motivated by a desire to 
explain a certain epistemological datum in a non-ad hoc way. 
68The conflation 
doxastic justification 
mistake. 
of personal 
is, no doubt, 
justification with 
the source of this 
69For further objections to Goldman's normal worlds 
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That datum is the fact that unbiased epistemologists 
genuinely disagree about the justificatory status of 
demon-manipulated beliefs. Some epistemologists genuinely 
aver that such beliefs are clearly unjustified, while others 
maintain with equal sincerity that such beliefs are entirely 
justified. Rather than throwing his hands up in the air and 
saying, "Well, this is just a case of competing intuitions, 
and if you don't share my intuitions, then we simply cannot 
discuss the matter any further.", Goldman attempts to 
isolate the different perspectives or conceptions of 
justification that lead to these divergent intuitions, which 
is surely a more appropriate and less painful way of dealing 
with competing intuitions than the standard philosophical 
practice of butting heads. Here is roughly what Goldman 
observes: If we look at demon-manipulated beliefs as the 
unreliably-produced and, hence, probably false beliefs that 
they are, it is quite natural to regard them as unjustified, 
since probably false beliefs do not promote the epistemic 
goal of gaining truth and avoiding error. However, if we 
look at demon-manipulated beliefs from the perspective of 
the hapless demon-world-inhabitant who has exactly the same 
evidence for his beliefs that he would have were he in a 
verific non-manipulated world, it is quite natural to regard 
reliabilism, see my "Coherentism Reliabilized" , 
Analytica, No.2 (1986). 
Acta 
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him as justified in holding those beliefs, since, given what 
he has to go on, he has done the best he could in forming 
his beliefs and, therefore, cannot be blamed epistemically 
for holding the beliefs he does. 
Goldman contends that these two perspectives employ 
inherently different conceptions of justification, 
conceptions which are captured by his notions of strong and 
weak justification, respectively. With this contention I 
disagree. In particular, I think that Goldman's account of 
weak justification fails to capture the "epistemically 
blameless" conception of justification. In what is to 
follow, I shall demonstrate via three objections the 
inadequacy of Goldman's account of weak justification, which 
a fortiori will demonstrate the falsity of the duplex 
theory. 70 
First, when we say a belief is justified, we attribute 
positive epistemic status to that belief. By parity of 
reason, when we say a belief is weakly justified, we 
70It is, of course, conceivable for the duplex theory 
as a whole to be false, and it nevertheless be the case that 
its account of strong justification is correct. However, I 
contend that its account of strong justification is also 
mistaken, albeit only in a relatively minor way. It seems 
straightforward that Goldman's account of strong 
justification is a theory of doxastic justification, i.e. is 
a theory of justified belief. The undermining clause has no 
business being in such a theory, since it in no way affects 
the indefinite probabilities of the beliefs produced. I do 
not deny that the undermining clause is important, but its 
importance lies in the realm of personal justification. If 
S (mistakenly) believes a method or process to be 
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attribute a weak degree of positive epistemic status to that 
belief, but positive epistemic status nonetheless. Since 
weakly justified beliefs are ill-formed-but-blameless 
beliefs, the question which arises is, "Do ill-formed-but-
blameless beliefs have any degree of positive epistemic 
status? I contend that they do not. Ill-formed-but-
blameless beliefs are ipso facto ill-formed beliefs. A 
belief is ill-formed in Goldman's terminology just in case 
it is produced by an unreliable cognitive process or method. 
Consequently, all ill-formed beliefs have a high indefinite 
probability of being false beliefs, and that, of course, 
includes ill-formed-but-blameless beliefs. I contend that 
probably false beliefs have no positive epistemic status 
whatsoever, not even weak positive epistemic status. After 
all, as we saw in section 4 subsection c, probably false 
beliefs run counter to the epistemic goal of maximizing 
truth and minimizing error, and so, from the epistemic point 
of view there is nothing positive about them. Since 
ill-formed-but-blameless beliefs, being probably false, have 
no positive epistemic status, they are not even weakly 
justified. 71 
unreliable, but uses it anyway, then S is being 
epistemically irresponsible, and it is -S that is 
unjustified, not S's belief. 
71G ld .. o man may         that as he is using the locution 
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Second, taken literally, the notion "blameless belief" 
does not make sense, since beliefs are not the kinds of 
things to which blame can be properly ascribed. Beliefs do 
not do anything in the agency sense of 'do,.72 Only agents, 
e.g. persons, do things in this sense. Moreover, when 
speaking literally, agents are the only kinds of things to 
h " h " f bl b "b d 73 w LC any normatLve sense 0 arne can e ascrL e . 
Admittedly, "blameless beliefs" may be some sort of metaphor 
or abbreviation for saying that the person cannot be blamed 
for holding the belief. Goldman may even intend it as such 
an abbreviation, but if so, then notice that it is the 
person, not the belief, which is free from blame, and this 
is surely a personal evaluation. 
Finally, wanting strong and weak justification to be 
mutually exclusive, opposing notions, Goldman narrows the 
notion of weak justification to that of mere epistemic 
blamelessness. If my second objection is right, then the 
'weakly justified belief', it does not imply that the belief 
has weak positive epistemic status. If so, then he owes us 
an account of just what is being attributed to a belief when 
it is said to be weakly justified. 
720f course, beliefs have causal effects and so can be 
said to cause certain things, but this kind of causation is 
not agency. 
73We can blame a hurricane for the massive destruction 
left in its wake, but this is a causal use of 'blame', not a 
normative one. 
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only way we can make sense out of the "epistemically 
blameless" conception of justification is to regard it as a 
kind of personal evaluation. 80, on the narrower conception 
of weak justification, a person is weakly justified in 
holding a belief just in case he is merely free from blame 
for holding that belief. But if weak justification is 
modified in this way, it is far from clear that weak 
justification captures the kind of justification possessed 
by the scientifically benighted cognizer and the demon-
world-inhabitant. Consider, for example, the case of the 
'k scientifically benighted cognizer 8 . If you recall, 8 ,,;'< 
uses method M, the method of consulting zodiacal signs in a 
cuI turally approved fashion, to form a belief about the 
outcome of an impending battle. In order to motivate the 
* intuition that 8 is indeed weakly justified in his belief, 
Goldman tells us: 
* He [8] is situated in a certain spati?-
historical environment. Everyone else Ln 
this environment uses      trusts method M. 
Moreover, our believer [8 ] has good reasons 
to trust his cultural peers on many matters, 
and lacks decisive reasons for distrusting 
their confidence in astrology. While it is 
true that a scientifically trained person, 
set down in this same culture, could easily 
find ways     cast doubt on method M, our 
believer [8 ] is not so trained, and has no 
opportunity to acquire such training. It is 
beyond his intellectual scope to find flaws 
in M. Thus, we can hardly fault him for 
using M, nor fault him therefore for 
believing what he does. The belief in 
question is blameless, and that seems to 
explain why we are tempted to call it 
. t·f· d74 JUS       
added) . 
III 
(brackets and their contents 
* Now I ask you, is it the case that S is merely 
epistemically blameless for holding the belief he does on 
the basis of method M? I contend that it is not. Given 
-J( S 's cultural plight, as Goldman has so aptly described it, 
* S has formed his belief exactly as he epistemically should 
* have. Consequently, S is not merely epistemically 
blameless. He is worthy of epistemic praise for having 
proceeded in such a culturally approved epistemic fashion. 
In fact, it would have been epistemically irresponsible of 
* S to reject M and thereby not form the belief, given that 
he has no reason to doubt M and every reason culturally 
available to accept and employ M. It is simply false that 
* S is only weakly justified, i.e. only merely blameless, in 
holding his belief, for he is as fully justified in holding 
his belief as anyone in his unfortunate situation could be. 
Therefore, weak justification in the sense of mere epistemic 
blamelessness fails to capture the kind of justification had 
-J( by S . 
Once we acknowledge that weak justification is not the 
* sort of justification that S possesses, it becomes clear 
74Alvin Goldman, "Strong and Weak Justification", £E. 
cit., pp. 2-3. It should be noted that in the last two 
sentences of this passage Goldman shifts from a personal 
evaluation to a doxastic one. 
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that Goldman's strong/weak justification distinction does 
not account for the two opposing justificatory evaluations 
* which the S case entices us to make. What does account for 
the pull we feel toward each of these opposing justificatory 
evaluations is, I submit, the personal/doxastic 
justification distinction. On the one hand, we are inclined 
* to evaluate S as being epistemically justified in holding 
his battle belief, because he has done his epistemic best in 
forming the belief. On the other hand, there is an 
* inclination to evaluate S 's belief as being epistemically 
unjustified, since, having been formed by what is in fact an 
unreliable method, the belief is probably false, and 
probably false beliefs have negative epistemic status. 
Quite clearly, the former constitutes a personal evaluation, 
while the latter constitutes a doxastic one. Consequently, 
rather than supporting the strong/weak justification 
* distinction, the S case reinforces the need for and the 
legitimacy of the personal/doxastic justification 
distinction. I t is wi th this need in mind tha't I now 
attempt to provide an account of doxastic justification. 
I began this chapter by claiming that a modified 
version of Goldman's reliabilism provides the correct 
account of doxastic justification. The time has come for me 
to defend this claim. To do so, I shall begin by 
demonstrating that such modification is in fact needed. I 
shall then modify the theory accordingly. 
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Most of the philosophers who have objected to Goldman's 
theory have done so by attacking the final base clause that 
he puts forward. As a result, relatively little attention 
and/or criticism has been directed toward the recursive 
clause that he adopts, though, as I shall now argue, such 
criticism is certainly warranted. Recall how Goldman has 
formulated the recursive clause: 
(RCl) If SIS belief in p at t results 
('immediately') from a belief-
dependent process that is (at least) 
conditionally reliable, and if the 
beliefs (if any) on which this 
process operates in producing SIS 
belief in p at t are themselves 
justified, t9sn SIS belief in p at t 
is justified (emphasis added). 
Also recall how Goldman characterizes a conditionally 
reliable BCP: "A . process     conditionally reliable when 
a sufficient proportion of its output-beliefs are true 
given that its input-beliefs are true." This rendering of 
conditional reliability strongly suggests that the following 
corollary regarding conditional reliability is also true: 
(CCR) A conditionally reliable BCP is 
unreliable when its input-beliefs are 
false. 
75For the sake of simplicity, I have elected to use 
(RCl) rather than the more complicated (RCl'). 
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Admittedly, (CCR) does not follow from Goldman's 
characterization of conditional reliability. After all, a 
cognitive process P might satisfy Goldman's criterion for 
conditional reliability, i. e. might be reliable when its 
input-beliefs, are true, while also being reliable when its 
input-beliefs are false. Nevertheless, I submit that the 
context in which Goldman introduces the notion of 
conditional reliability indicates that (CCR) is true of 
conditionally reliable BCP's. Recall that Goldman contrasts 
conditionally reliable BCP' s with unconditionally reliable 
BCP's. But if we take a belief-dependent cognitive process 
P and assume that it is reliable when its input-beliefs are 
true and also assume that it is reliable when its 
input-beliefs are false, then P will turn out to be 
unconditionally reliable rather than merely conditionally 
reliable, since it will be reliable no matter what input-
beliefs are used. Thus, if P is to be merely conditionally 
reliable, then it must be reliable when its input-beliefs 
are true and unreliable when its input-beliefs   false, 
and this shows that (CCR) is a necessary condition for a BCP 
to be conditionally reliable. 
Having established (CCR) , I will use it to show that 
(RCI) is false, but first a few preliminaries are needed. 
As we have already observed, when a belief is produced by a 
reliable BCP, that belief, by definition, has a high 
indefinite probability of being a true belief, and so it is 
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doxastically justified. On the other hand, when a belief is 
produced by an unreliable BCP, that belief, by definition, 
has a high indefinite probability of being a false belief, 
and so it is doxastically unjustified. In my opinion, this 
shows that reliability is the underlying ingredient of 
doxastic justification. With this in mind let us examine 
(RCI). According to (RCI), a belief is (doxastically) 
justified if it results from a conditionally reliable BCP 
which only has justified beliefs as inputs. It is easy to 
see that (RCI) does not provide a sufficient condition for 
doxastic justification. After all, on any plausible theory 
of (doxastic) justification, it will always be possible to 
have justified-but-false beliefs. It is, of course, this 
possibility which leads to the demise of (RCI). For suppose 
that a belief results from a conditionally reliable BCP 
which has as its only input a justified-but-false belief. 
In such a case the analysans of (RCI) is satisfied, but the 
belief in question is not doxastically justified. The 
belief is not doxastically justified because it is probably 
false. The reason that the belief is probably false is 
because it was unreliably produced. After all, it was 
produced by a conditionally reliable BCP which has a false 
belief as its only input, and according to (CCR) such a BCP 
is unreliable when its input-beliefs are false. 
In light of the previous objection, it is obvious where 
(RCI) goes wrong. (RCI) requires that the input-beliefs to 
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the conditionally reliable BCP be justified, when it should 
have required that these input-beliefs be true. I propose 
that we modify (RCl) in just this way to get: 
(BC2) If SIS belief that p at t is produced 
by a conditionally reliable BCP and 
if the beliefs on which this BCP 
operates in producing said belief are 
true, then SIS belief that p at t is 
doxastically justified. 
It should be noted that the resulting sufficient condition 
for doxastic justifiedness is no longer a recursive clause, 
but rather an additional base clause. 
Before examining Goldman's base clause (BCl'), I want 
to consider one objection which might be raised to (BC2). 
The objection goes as follows: In requiring that the 
input-beliefs be true rather than merely justified, you are 
making the theory of doxastic justification even more 
externalistic than it already was, and such rampant 
externalism cannot be tolerated. Two responses are in 
order. First, while I admit that the correct theory of 
personal justification must be internalistic in nature, I 
aver that only an externalist theory can provide the correct 
account of doxastic justification, since only an 
externalistic theory can provide the kind of probabilistic 
truth connection which doxastic justification conceptually 
requires. Hence, that a theory of doxastic justification is 
rampantly externalistic does not constitute an objection to 
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such a theory. Second, it is simply a mistake to maintain 
that (BC2) is more externalistic than (RCI). After all, the 
kind of justification appealed to in (RCI) is Goldman's 
brand of externalistic justification. Consequently, S no 
more knows whether his input-beliefs are justified than 
whether they are true. That is to say, the justificatory 
status of S' s input-beliefs are as external to S as their 
truth values are. Therefore, I am not guilty of offering a 
more externalistic condition of doxastic justification, but 
even if I were, this would not constitute an obj ection to 
the base clause presented. 
Speaking of base clauses, let us now turn to Goldman's 
base clause, which in my opinion is also in need of 
amendment. As we saw in section 2, the base clause which 
Goldman settles on is: 
(BCI') If SIS belief in p at t results from 
a reliable cognitive process, and 
there is no reliable or conditionally 
reliable process available to S 
which, had it been used by S in 
addition to the process actually 
used, would have resulted in S's not 
believing p at t, then SIS belief in 
p at t is justified. 
Goldman adds the counterfactual element to handle the case 
of Jones, who persists in believing his reliably-produced 
memory beliefs, despite having strong evidence that his 
memory is unreliable. In so doing, Goldman makes the 
justificational status of a belief a function not only of 
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the BCP' s actually used in producing it, but also of the 
BCP's which could and should have been used. I contend that 
making the justificational status of a belief partly a 
function of the BCP's which could and should have been used 
is a mistake. After all, the existence of BCP's which could 
and should have been used in no way affects the indefinite 
probability of being a true belief which the belief has in 
virtue of having been produced by the BCP which in fact 
produced it. For example, in the case of Jones, although 
there are BCP' s which Jones could and should have used, 
since his memory beliefs are the result of highly reliable 
memory, they have a high indefinite probability of being 
true beliefs (in virtue of having been so-produced). Since, 
according to (DJ'), a belief is doxastically justified just 
in case it is probably true, I submit that Jones' memory 
beliefs are in fact doxastically justified, Goldman's 
intuitions to the contrary notwithstanding. Nevertheless, I 
agree with Goldman that in light of the evidence Jones ought 
not continue to believe his memory beliefs. But the point 
which must be stressed is that the fault lies with Jones, 
not his beliefs. Since Jones has excellent evidence that 
his memory is unreliable, but persists in holding his memory 
beliefs despite this evidence, Jones is being epistemically 
irresponsible. As a result, according to (PJu ') Jones is 
personally unjustified in holding his memory beliefs. ,. Of 
course, as I have been emphasizing all along, Jones' 
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personal unjustifiedness is perfectly compatible with his 
memory beliefs being highly probable and therefore 
doxastically justified. In fact, the Jones example provides 
a wonderful illustration of such compatibility. For these 
reasons, I contend that, rather than demonstrating the need 
for a counterfactual element in doxastic justification, the 
Jones example demonstrates the need for the 
personal/doxastic justification distinction. 
If (BC1') with its counterfactual element is mistaken, 
then what is the correct base clause? I contend that 
Goldman had it right to begin with when he formulated (BC1). 
However, in order to make it clear that the analysandum is 
doxastic justification I will rewrite it as: 
* (BC1 ) If SIS belief that p at t is produced 
by an unconditionally reliable BCP, 
then SIS belief that p at t is 
doxastically justified. 
Since no recursive clause is needed, we can get a complete 
theory of doxastic justification by adding a standard 
* closure clause to the two base clauses (BC1 ) and (BC2). It 
would be nice for the purposes of theoretical neatness and 
conciseness, however, if we could formulate the theory in 
terms of a single base clause with a standard closure 
clause. This is what I propose ·to do, but I must first 
introduce as a technical notion the notion of "actual 
reliability". 
(AR) A BCP is actually reliable iff either 
(1) it is an unconditionally reliable 
BCP or (2) it is a conditionally 
reliable BCP whose input-beliefs are 
all true. 
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Given the notion of actual reliability, we can easily 
formulate the ultimate base clause of doxastic justification 
as follows: 
(UBC) If S's belief that p at t is produced 
by an actually reliable BCP, then SIS 
belief that p at t is doxastically 
justified. 
Combining (UBC) with a standard closure clause gives us, I 
submit, the correct theory of doxastic justification, a 
theory which we might call "doxastic reliabilism". That 
doxastic reliabilism is correct is evidenced by the fact 
that any belief which is produced by an actually reliable 
BCP will probably be a true belief in virtue of such 
production, and probable truth is what is required by (DJ') 
for doxastic justification. 76 In addition to being correct, 
the theory also has the virtue of straightforwardly 
revealing its commitment to the view that actual reliability 
is the underlying ingredient of doxastic justification. 
76Similarly, if a belief is produced by an actually 
unreliable BCP, then it probably is a false belief and, 
hence, is doxastically unjustified. 
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I will have more to say about doxastic reliabilism in 
Chapter 4, where I will argue that doxastic justification, 
as analyzed by doxastic reliabilism, is a necessary 
condition for knowledge. But first, Chapter 3 is devoted 
to a discussion of personal justification, since whether or 
not a person is personally justified in holding a belief is 
also relevant to whether or not she knows that which she 
believes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A COHERENCE THEORY OF PERSONAL JUSTIFICATION 
1. Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to provide an account of 
personal justification, where "personal justification" is 
understood in terms of (PJ.') and (PJ '). J u As the title 
suggests, the account to be advanced is a coherence theory, 
but it is a nonstandard coherence theory, since I 
incorporate into the theory elements from foundation 
theories, as well as coherence theories. For example, like 
some foundationalists, I maintain that personal 
justification "proceeds in terms of reasons"l where, by 
definition, "A belief P is a reason for a person S to 
believe Q iff it is logically possible for S to become 
justified in believing Q by believing it on the basis of 
p.,,2 Like some coherence theorists, I contend that "There 
is no exit from the circle of one's beliefs",3 and 
consequently, I hold that beliefs are the only mental states 
which can serve as reasons for holding other beliefs. 
lJohn Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 33. 
2 John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (in 
manuscript), p. 41. 
3Kei th Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: 
Press, 1974), p. 188. 
Oxford University 
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Even with such similarities, my account of personal 
justification will prove to be substantially different from 
every version of foundationalism and coherentism currently 
offered. For example, my account rests on a linear picture 
of reasoning rather than on a holistic one and, thus, parts 
company with current coherence theories. While most 
philosophers who have embraced a linear view of reasoning 
have felt compelled to adopt foundation theories (largely as 
a last ditch attempt to stay the impending regress), I 
am not among those philosophers, since I take issue with 
the central feature of foundationalism. This feature 
the heart of foundationalism can be specified as 
follows: For any theory T, T is a foundation theory only if 
T requires that a person's justification for any given 
belief ultimately rests on an epistemically privileged 
subclass of foundational beliefs. Put another way, for any 
theory T, T is a foundation theory only if T entails that a 
person S is justified in believing that p only if the chain 
of reasoning which leads S to believe that p ultimately 
derives from a belief (or set of beliefs) which S is 
immediately justified in believing. Such foundational 
beliefs are usually called "basic beliefs". I contend that 
basic beliefs are nothing more than a philosopher's fiction, 
conjured up to end what is thought to be a potentially 
vicious regress of reasons. As we shall see momentarily, my 
account entails that there are no basic beliefs, and thus, 
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it has the virtue of not being saddled with these unmoved 
epistemic movers. On my view, personal justification always 
proceeds in terms of reasons, which is just to say that a 
person S is personally justified in believing that p only if 
S has a reason R (some other belief) for believing that p. 
Consequently, basic beliefs are logically impossible on my 
view. It may seem that a regress of reasons is inevitable 
given such a view, but in section 6 I will prove otherwise. 
The foregoing remarks make it obvious that I am not a 
foundationalist, since I reject the existence of basic 
beliefs. But I also reject the holistic view of reasoning 
indigenous to coherence theories. So, how can I claim to be 
offering a coherence theory of personal justification? The 
answer is quite simple. While it is true that holistic 
reasoning is a trademark of coherence theories, it need not 
be. In the next section, where will I classify the 
different kinds of justification theories available, we 
shall see that the defining feature of a coherence theory is 
its being a doxastic theory which denies the existence of 
basic beliefs, not its being a theory which employs holistic 
reasoning. 
2. Partitioning Theories of Justification into Logical 
Space 
If there is one thing which contemporary epistemology 
is not lacking, it is categories for classifying different 
kinds of epistemic theories. We have already been exposed 
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to some of these categories in the present dissertation, 
e.g. "Internalism", "Externalism", "Foundationalism" , 
"Coherentism", etc. The purpose of such a taxonomy is not 
simply to increase one's vocabulary, but rather to 
facilitate epistemological discussion by grouping similar 
theories together. Unfortunately, these categories are used 
so loosely and with so little precision that rather 
than aiding discussion, they often impede it. As a result, 
it is not uncommon for philosophers to discover, after 
arguing at length, that they actually have no substantive 
disagreement, only a terminological one. The best way of 
avoiding such pseudodisagreements is to give these epistemic 
categories stipulative definitions and use them accordingly. 
Pollock has provided these desperately needed stipulative 
definitions in his Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. 4 
Since his epistemological taxonomy is by far the clearest 
offered to date, I have elected to reiterate it in the 
present section. It should be noted that he cashes out all 
of these categories in terms of the unclarified, ambiguous 
notion "epistemic justification". However, such ambiguity 
is beneficial in the present context, for it allows us to 
map out the logical geography of theories of epistemic 
justification in general. Once we know the kinds of 
4See Chapter One, Section 4, of his Contemporary 
Theories of Knowledge, £E. cit. 
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theories of epistemic justification that are available to 
us, we will be in a position to decide which kind of theory 
is best suited to serve as a theory of personal 
jus tification. My strategy for clarifying these epistemic 
categories will be to identify and define the broadest 
categories first. Then, when I define each of the narrower 
subcategories, I will be able to indicate under which broad 
category it falls. S 
Every theory of epistemic justification falls into one 
of two camps --- internalism or externalism. An internalist 
theory of epistemic justification is any theory which 
maintains that epistemic justifiedness is exclusively a 
function of the cognizer's internal states (e.g. belief 
states, memory states, perceptual states, etc.). An 
             theory of epistemic justification is any 
non-internalist theory of epistemic justification. Hence, 
an externalist theory maintains that epistemic justifiedness 
is (at least) partly a function of external features 
(e.g. the actual reliability of the producing process), 
features to which the cognizer lacks cognitive access. 
SSince all of the stipulative terminology to follow is 
borrowed from Chapter One, Section 4, of Pollock's 
Contemporar?l Theories of Knowledge, 2..Q. cit., I will not 
distract t e reader with footnotes      each definition 
borrowed. Instead, I simply refer the reader to the 
aforementioned reference for the original presentation of 
the stipulative definitions presented in this section. 
Thus, by 
mutually 
stipulation, internalism and externalism 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories 
epistemic justification theories. 
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are 
of 
Similarly, every theory of epistemic justification is 
either a doxastic theory or a nondoxastic theory. Doxastic 
theories of epistemic justification embrace the doxastic 
assumption, viz. the assumption that epistemic justifiedness 
is exclusively a function of one's set of beliefs, i. e. 
one's doxastic corpus. Any theory of epistemic 
justification which denies the doxastic assumption is a 
nondoxastic theory. Accordingly, a nondoxastic theory of 
justification makes epistemic justifiedness (at least) 
partly a function of nondoxastic states, where nondoxastic 
states include nondoxastic internal states (e.g. perceptual 
states) and all external states (e.g. the producing BCP's 
actual reliability). Thus, the categories doxastic theory 
and nondoxastic theory provide us with another pair of 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories of 
epistemic justification theories. 
From the preceding definitions, it follows that every 
doxastic theory is an internalist theory. It also follows 
that every externalist theory is a nondoxastic theory. This 
leaves us with only one other possibility, viz. that of a 
nondoxastic internalist theory. Consequently, every theory 
of epistemic justification must either be a doxastic theory, 
a nondoxastic internalist theory, or an externalist theory. 
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The class of doxastic theories is exhausted by two 
mutually exclusive theory-types, to wit, foundation theories 
and coherence theories. Foundation theories are doxastic 
theories which maintain that there is an epistemically 
privileged subclass of basic beliefs which serves as the 
foundation for all other epistemic justifiedness. More 
precisely, for any theory T, T is a foundation theory iff 
(1) T is a doxastic theory, i.e. a theory which makes 
justifiedness exclusively a function of the beliefs one 
holds, and (2) T asserts that there exists an epistemically 
privileged subclass of basic beliefs on the basis of which 
all other epistemic justification proceeds. Coherence 
theories, on the other hand, deny the existence of a 
privileged class of basic beliefs. They maintain that all 
beliefs are capable of conferring epistemic justifiedness, 
not just the privileged few. Metaphorically, we can regard 
coherence theories as 
foundational plutocracy. 
favoring doxastic democracy over 
The metaphor is appropriate since 
it belies coherence theories' commitment to the view that 
all beliefs are on equal epistemic footing. We can capture 
this egalitarian commitment as follows: For any theory T, T 
is a coherence theory iff (1) T is a doxastic theory, and 
(2) T denies the existence of an epistemically privileged 
subclass of basic beliefs. Having exhausted the class of 
doxastic theories, let us turn our attention to nondoxastic 
theories. 
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The class of nondoxastic theories is comprised of 
externalist theories and nondoxastic internalist theories. 
A nondoxastic internalist theory is any internalist theory 
which denies the doxastic assumption, the assumption that 
epistemic justifiedness is exclusively a function of one's 
doxastic corpus. Direct realism is one such theory. It 
maintains that epistemic justifiedness is partly a function 
of the beliefs one holds, but also partly a function of 
certain other internal states. Thus, on the direct realist 
view, while beliefs are capable of conferring justification, 
they are not the only internal states which can confer 
epistemic justifiedness, since perceptual states (which are 
themselves neither justified nor unjustified) are also 
capable of conferring such justifiedness. To date, direct 
realism is the only nondoxastic internalist theory to have 
been worked out in any detail. Let us, therefore, consider 
the remaining class of epistemic theories, namely, 
externalist theories. 
The class of externalist theories is comprised of all 
those theories which make epistemic justifiedness (at least) 
partly a function of features outside the scope of the 
cognizer's awareness. Pollock identifies two such theories 
--- process reliabilism and probabilism. Goldman's process 
reliabilism is an externalist theory, since, as we know from 
Chapter 2, it makes epistemic justifiedness partly a 
function of the reliability of the producing BCP and partly 
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a function of alternative BCP's which could and should be 
used. Probabilism represents another kind of externalis t 
theory. According to probabilism, epistemic justifiedness 
is a function of the definite probabilities of the 
cognizer's beliefs, regardless whether the cognizer can 
assess these probabilities. Although Pollock only considers 
these two externalist theories, various other externalist 
theories are possible. For example, Lehrer's most recent 
theory, which he calls the "Honster Theory", is an 
externalist theory. The monster theory maintains that 
epistemic justifiedness is a function of coherence with the 
given cognizer's ultrasystem, where a proposition p coheres 
with person S's ultrasystem iff p beats or neutralizes every 
proposition q, with which p competes, on the basis of every 
member system of S's indefinitely large ultrasystem. 6 
Obviously, human cognizers have no way of determining 
whether or not this complex coherence relation is satisfied. 
Similarly, doxastic reliabilism, as I formulated it in 
Chapter 2, is an externalist theory, because it makes 
epistemic justifiedness exclusively a function of the actual 
reliability of the producing BCP. 
We now have a complete picture of the logical space of 
epistemic justification theories, which we can diagram as 
6Keith Lehrer, "Metaknowledge: 
Justification" (in manuscript). 
Undefeated 
follows: 7 
INTERNALISM 
/ \ 
Doxastic Nondoxastic 
Theories Theories 
EXTERNALISM 
Nondoxastic 
/Theo ies "'-
process doxastic 
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/    \ 'reliabilism reliabilism foundation coherence direct 
theories theories realism' 
probabilism the monster 
theory 
In Chapter 2, I argued that doxastic reliabilism, an 
externalist theory, provides the correct account of doxastic 
justification. From the outset of that chapter, I took it 
as a premise that the correct theory of doxastic 
justification had to be an externalist theory. Now that we 
have before us characterizations of the different kinds of 
epistemic justification theories, we can easily see that 
7Notice that the headings "personal justification" and 
"doxastic justification" do not appear in the diagram. This 
is because personal justification and doxastic justification 
are species of epistemic justification. They are not 
categories of justification theories. Since the diagram 
exhausts the justification theories currently available, we 
must decide, from among these theories, which theory 
provides the correct account of personal justification. vIe 
have already observed that doxastic reliabilism provides the 
correct account of doxastic justification. 
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this premise is true. After all, (DJ') requires that there 
be a probabilistic connection between doxastic justification 
and truth. It should be obvious that no internalist theory, 
doxastic or nondoxastic, can provide such a probabilistic 
truth connection (or any other kind of conceptual conception 
between justification and truth), since, for whatever 
internal states a given internalist theory appeals to, there 
will always be possible v70rlds where an evil demon or a 
malevolent neuroscientist has seen to it that we possess 
those internal states, even though all of our contingent 
beliefs are false. Hence, no internalist theory can provide 
an account of doxastic justification. It follows, 
therefore, that the correct theory of doxastic justification 
(assuming there is one) must be an externalist theory. As 
we have seen, that externalist theory is doxastic 
reliabilism. 
It should be just as obvious that only an internalist 
theory can provide the correct account of personal 
justification. We know from (PJ. ') and (PJ ') that personal J u 
justification evaluations are based on and reflect whether a 
person has been epistemically responsible or epistemically 
irresponsible in deciding to hold a given belief. 
In deciding whether or not to hold a particular belief, a 
person can appeal only to those states of affairs to which 
she has cognitive access. Consequently, it is impossible 
for a person to appeal to external states of affairs, since 
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they are, by definitiDn, states Df affairs to. which Dne 
lacks all cDgnitive access. Assuming that Dught implies can 
in the present cDntext, a persDn cannDt be held respDnsible 
(and/Dr blamed) fDr failing to. take external states Df 
affairs into. accDunt, because it is impDssible fDr her to. do. 
so.. But nDtice, if we were to. adDpt an externalist theDry, 
i.e. any the Dry which makes epistemic justifiedness partly a 
functiDn Df external states Df affairs, as a theDry Df 
persDnal justificatiDn, we wDuld be, in effect, hDlding the 
persDn respDnsible fDr failing to. take into. aCCDunt states 
Df affairs to. which she lacks all cognitive access, i.e. we 
wDuld be hDlding her respDnsible fDr failing to. do. the 
impDssible, which is something she cannDt be held 
respDnsib1e fDr. Thus, externalist theDries are 
self-defeating if taken as theDries Df persDnal 
justificatiDn, which ipso. facto. entails that they cannDt 
prDvide the CDrrect the Dry Df such justificatiDn. As a 
result, we need Dnly consider internalist theDries to. 
determine the CDrrect aCCDunt Df persDnal justificatiDn. 
Since the class Df internalist theDries is exhausted by 
three mutually exclusive epistemic theories, viz. 
fDundatiDnalism, cDherentism, and direct realism, we knDw 
that the CDrrect aCCDunt Df persDnal justificatiDn can Dnly 
be given by Dne Df these theDries. In the next sectiDn, I 
shall present an argument frDm eliminatiDn to. ShDW that the 
CDrrect aCCDunt Df persDnal justificatiDn can Dn1y be given 
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by a coherence theory. 
3. The Argument from Elimination 
Although the three internalist theories are mutually 
exclusive theories, they do have one feature in common. 
They all share the view that justification proceeds in terms 
of reasons. Nevertheless, they disagree over what kinds of 
internal states count as reasons. Foundation theories and 
coherence theories, being doxastic theories, maintain that 
beliefs are the only internal states that can be reasons, 
whereas direct realism, which rejects the doxastic 
assumption, maintains that nondoxastic perceptual states, as 
well as beliefs, can serve as reasons. What is ultimately 
at issue here is whether or not the doxastic assumption is 
true. I contend that with regard to personal justification 
the doxastic assumption is true and that, therefore, direct 
realism is false. To see why the doxastic assumption is 
true, we must consider the kind of reasoning which gives 
rise to personal justification. 
I contend that occurrent reasoning is the only kind of 
reasoning that is capable of conferring personal 
justification. Some philosophers, e.g. Thomas Reid, have 
held that occurrent (or conscious) reasoning is the only 
kind of reasoning that there is. 8 I am sympathetic with 
8Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 
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such . 9 a        However, even if there is such a thing as 
subconscious or unconscious reasoning, it certainly has no 
role to play in a theory of personal justification. After 
all, we have already seen that personal justification 
evaluations are basically evaluations of epistemic praise or 
blame, and surely, we cannot praise or blame a person 
epistemically for her subconscious or unconscious 
reasonings. Intuitively, it seems that occurrent reasoning 
is the only kind of reasoning for which we can hold a person 
directly responsible and hence for which we can praise or 
blame her, and this is why I maintain that occurrent 
reasoning is the only kind of reasoning that can confer 
personal justification. Indeed, the view that occurrent 
reasoning is the only kind of reasoning that can confer 
personal justification seems so obvious that it would hardly 
be worth mentioning, were it not for the fact that most 
epistemologists of late have rejected it. 
Views like the one I am espousing, according to which 
justification proceeds only from occurrent reasoning, have 
ed. Baruch A. Brody (Cambridge, Mass.: The M. I. T. Press, 
1969). 
9I am not          the existence of unconscious 
computational              To the contrary, I think that a 
vast array of unconscious computational processing is going 
on inside us much, if not all, of the time. Nevertheless, I 
think it is a mistake to view these instances of unconscious 
computational processing as instances of reasoning. 
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been lumped together under the heading "Intellectualist 
M d 1 f J . f· . '0 10 o e 0 ustl. l.catl.on·. Currently, the intellectualist 
model of justification has fallen into disrepute. By far 
the most common objection to the intellectualist model has 
been that it rests on a psychologically unrealistic picture 
of reasoning. At first glance, it is not at all clear what 
it is that is supposed to be psychologically unrealistic 
about its depiction of reasoning. Surely, it is not 
psychologically unrealistic to claim that we have a capacity 
for occurrent reasoning which we sometimes employ. To the 
contrary, that we can and do reason occurrently is a 
psychological fact. If the occurrence of occurrent 
reasoning is not itself psychologically unrealistic, what is 
it about the intellectualist model that is psychologically 
unrealistic? It is that the intellectualist model 
supposedly entails that we come to hold most of our beliefs 
(including our perceptual beliefs) as a result of occurrent 
reasoning. That it is psychologically unrealistic to 
10Ernest Sosa coined the term 'Intellectualist Model of 
Justification' in his article "The Raft and the Pyramid: 
Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge", 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, ed. French, Vehling, and 
Wettstein (University of Minnesota: 1980), p. 8. He built 
into this model the view that reasons have to entail that 
for which they are reasons, a view which I rej ect. Since 
its introduction, the term's usage has loosened 
significantly and now it generally refers to any theory 
which requires a person to proceed occurrently through the 
steps of reasoning in order to be justified. 
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maintain that we come to hold most of our beliefs as a 
result of occurrent reasoning cannot be denied, since most 
of our beliefs result from automatic belief-form'ing, 
cognitive processes over which we have little control. 
Therefore, if the intellectualist model does entail that 
most of our beliefs result from occurrent reasoning, then it 
is a psychologically unrealistic model of justification. 
So, let us examine the reductio ad absurdum argument which 
supposedly demonstrates this entailment. 
A. The intellectualist model of 
justification is correct. (assump. ) 
1. If the intellectualist model of 
justification is correct, then we are 
justified in believing that p only if 
we have occurrently reasoned to the 
belief that p. (by def.) 
2. Therefore, we are justified in 
believing that p only if we have 
occurrently reasoned to the belief that 
p. (A, 1) 
3. We know that p only if we are justified 
in believing that p. (assump.) 
4. Therefore, we know that p only if we 
have occurrently reasoned to the belief 
that p. (2,3) 
5. Skepticism is false. (assump.) 
6. If skepticism is false, then we know 
most of our beliefs (including most of 
our perceptual beliefs. (anal.) 
7. Therefore, we know most of our beliefs 
(including most of our perceptual 
beliefs). (5,6) 
8. Therefore, 
reasoned to 
(including 
beliefs). 
we have occurrently 
most of our beliefs 
most of our perceptual 
(4,7) 
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It must be admitted that it is psychologically 
unrealistic to maintain that most of our beliefs 
(particularly our perceptual beliefs) result from occurrent 
reasoning, and therefore, conclusion 8 is false. Since the 
argument is valid, but conclusion 8 is false, either our 
initial assumption that the intellectualist model is correct 
is false, or the argument is unsound. Fortunately for the 
intellectualist model, the argument is unsound, for it rests 
on a false premise, namely, premise 3. 
It would be easy to see that premise 3 is false, were 
it not for the tendency to conflate different kinds of 
epistemic justification, one kind of which is necessary for 
knowledge. But once we realize that premise 3 asserts that 
personal justification is necessary for knowledge, we can 
demonstrate that it is false as follows. First, we know 
from that a person is personally justified in 
believing that p iff she is worthy of epistemic praise for 
holding that belief. Second, we know all sorts of things 
which we do not deserve epistemic praise for believing. For 
example, we know many of our perceptual beliefs, but we very 
rarely reflect on, question, recheck, or amend our 
perceptual beliefs. Instead, we typically stand by 
passively and let our perceptual beliefs happen to us, 
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embracing them without the least bit of reflection into the 
matter, and surely, such unquestioning acceptance does not 
constitute epistemically praiseworthy behavior. Since we 
hold many beliefs which we do, in fact, know, but which we 
do not deserve epistemic praise for holding, it follows that 
we have many beliefs which we know, but which we are not 
personally justified in believing. Hence, personal 
justification is not necessary for knowledge, and therefore, 
premise 3 is false. 
Without premise 3, the purported psychological 
unreality of the intellectualist model vanishes. It is not 
psychologically unrealistic to maintain that a person 
deserves epistemic praise for holding a belief only if she 
has occurrently reasoned to that belief, and this is all 
that an intellectualist model of personal justification 
entails. Such a view not only accords with psychological 
reality, but with epistemological reality, as well. For 
this reason, I submit that the intellectualist model 
provides the correct model for personal justification, at 
least if personal justification is understood in terms of 
(PJ.) and (PJ. I). J J 
The truth of the intellectualist model entails the 
truth of the doxastic assumption which, in turn, entails the 
falsity of direct realism. That the intellectualist model 
entails the doxastic assumption can be seen as follows. 
According to the intellectualist model, a person is 
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personally justified in believi.ng that p only if she has 
occurrently reasoned to the belief that p. When reasoning 
occurrently to the belief that p, one comes to believe that 
p by appealing to information which either entails or 
inductively supports the truth of p. That just is what 
occurrent reasoning is. Moreover, the only information to 
which we can occurrently appeal is information that has been· 
encapsulated in the form of beliefs. This is not to deny 
that we possess information which has not been encapsulated 
in beliefs. To the contrary, it seems obvious that we do 
possess such unencapsulated information, 
uninterpreted sense data. What is at issue 
e.g. crude, 
is whether or 
not such unencapsulated data can play a role in occurrent 
reasoning. I submit that it cannot, for it is difficult, if 
not altogether impossible, to imagine how we could 
occurrently appeal to such nondoxastic data. For example, 
suppose I am in such and such a perceptual state, and 
suppose that in virtue of being in this perceptual state I 
occurrently reason that "Since I am in such and such a 
perceptual state, there must be such and such an object 
before me." For me to reason this way, I must first 
recognize that I am in such and such a perceptual state, but 
in order for me to recognize that I am in such and such a 
perceptual state, I must believe that I am in that 
perceptual state (i.e., recognition entails belief). As a 
result, it appears that the only information capable of 
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playing a role in occurrent reasoning is information in the 
form of beliefs. This observation, together with our 
earlier observation that occurrent reasoning is the only 
reasoning which can give rise to personal justification, 
entails that beliefs are the only internal states with a 
role to play in personal justification, which just is the 
doxastic assumption. Since direct realism denies the 
doxastic assumption and maintains that nondoxastic internal 
states have a role to play in justification, as a theory of 
personal justification it is false. Consequently, the 
correct theory of personal justification (if there is one) 
must be a doxastic theory. 
Foundation theories are doxastic theories which posit 
the existence of an epistemically privileged subclass of 
basic beliefs, beliefs which a person is immediately 
justified in believing. Being doxastic theories, they hold 
promise for providing the correct account of .personal 
justification. Nevertheless, in order for any foundation 
theory to be correct, there must, in fact, be basic beliefs. 
Are there any basic beliefs? One very natural line of 
argumentation suggests that there must be. This aptly named 
"Regress 11 Argument" 
assumptions: 
begins with two 
lIThe earliest formulation of the 
seemingly innocuous 
regress argument is 
AI. S is justified in believing that p iff 
either (1) S is immediately justifIed 
in believing that p or (2) S is 
mediately justified in believing that 
p. 
A2. S is mediately justified in believing 
that p iff S comes to believe that p on 
the basis of some other belief q which 
8 is justified (either mediately or 
immediately) in believing. 
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According to AI, for any belief B1 , if 8 is justified 
in believing B1 , then either (1) B1 is basic or (2) 8 is 
mediately justified in believing B1 . If (1), then obviously 
basic beliefs exist. If (2), then per A2, 8 must believe B1 
on the basis of some other belief B2 which 8 is justified in 
believing. Of course, if 8 is jus tified in believing B2 , 
then either B2 is basic or 8 is mediately justified in 
believing B2 by believing it on the basis of B3 which 8 is 
justified in believing, and so on. 80, given A2, 8 is 
mediately justified in believing B1 only if she believes B1 
on the basis of a chain of reasoning like the one just 
described. As we trace it backwards, SiS chain of reasoning 
due to 8extus Empiricus. For more contemporary formulations 
see: William Alston, "Two Types of Foundationalism", The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXIII, No.7 (April 8, 1970); 
Laurence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a 
Foundation?", American Philoso hical uarterl , Vol. 15, No. 
1 (Januarl' 1 7 ) an Externa ist T         of Empirical 
Knowledge', Midwest 8tudies in Philosophy, ed. French, 
Vehling, and Wettstein (University of Minnesota: 1980); and 
Ernest 80sa, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus 
Foundationalism in the Theory of Knowledge", £E. cit. 
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must ultimately do one of four things: 
(i) 
(ii) 
The chain stops at some arbitrary belief B 
which S is not           in believing. n 
The chain continues backward infinitely, 
each belief-link of which S is mediately 
justified in believing. 
(iii) The chain eventually loops back on itself 
forming a circle. 
(iv) The chain stops at a basic belief which S 
is immediately justified in believing. 
Of these four types of chains, the regress argument 
concludes that only type (iv) chains are genuinely 
justification-conferring. For consider type (i) chains. 
Since S is not justified in believing B , A2 entails that S n 
is not (mediately) justified in believing Bn _1 . Since S is 
not justified in believing B l' S is not justified in n-
believing B 2' and so on for each succeeding belief-link in n-
the chain, including the terminal belief B1 . We might make 
the point as follows. A2 entails that chains of 
reasoning are only justification-transmitting, not 
justification-generating. 12 Since S is not justified in the 
initial belief B , there is no justification for the chain n 
l2Chains of reasoning supposedly transmit justification 
in much the same way that valid arguments preserve truth. 
For an in depth discussion of justification transmission vs. 
justification generation, see James Van Cleve's 
"Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian 
Circle", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 88, No.1 (1979). 
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to transmit, and consequently, S is not justified in 
believing the terminal belief Bl' Therefore, type (i) 
chains cannot justify S in holding the target belief B1 , 
The problem with type (ii) chains is straightforward, 
once we recall that occurrent reasoning is the only kind of 
reasoning capable of conferring personal justification. A 
type (ii) chain cannot justify S in believing Bl for the 
simple reason that it is humanly impossible for S to proceed 
occurrently through infinitely many steps of reasoning, 
Thus, type (ii) chains fail to be justification-conferring, 
as well, 
Type (iii) chains, regardless of their length, fare no 
better as sources of mediate justification, because either 
they fail to be justification-conferring or they are 
unnecessary, We can see this by considering a very short 
type (iii) chain, e.g. B1 , B2 , B3 , B4 , Bl' Such a chain 
justifies S in believing B1 , only if S is already justified 
in believing B1 . For if S is not justified in believing 
initial belief BI , then what we have is essentially a type 
(i) chain with no justification to transmit, and as a 
result, S is not justified in believing B4 nor any other 
belief-link in the chain, including the terminal belief BI . 
On the other hand, if S is already justified (either 
immediately or mediately via some other chain) in believing 
BI , then the circular chain of reasoning is superfluous and 
does no epistemic work. Consequently, type (iii) chains are 
either unnececessary or unsuccessful, 
justification. 
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as sources of 
Unlike the first three types of reasoning chains, type 
(iv) chains appear to be genuinely justification-conferring. 
After all, in a type (iv) chain, the initial belief of the 
chain is a basic belief which S is immediately justified in 
believing. Since chains of reasoning are 
justification-transmitting and since S is justified in 
believing the initial belief of the type (iv) chain, S' s 
justifiedness is transmitted through each belief-link in the 
chain. As a result, S is justified in believing each 
belief-link, including the terminal link Bl . Therefore, of 
the four possible chain-types, only type (iv) chains succeed 
in conferring personal justification. 
The last step of the regress argument is to show that, 
in light of the above considerations, basic beliefs must 
exist. If people are ever justified in believing what they 
do, then, since type (iv) chains are the only reasoning 
chains capable of conferring justification, it follows that 
basic beliefs must exist. To see why, recall our earlier 
observation based on Al that for any belief B1 , if S is 
justified in believing Bl , then either (1) Bl is basic or 
(2) S is mediately justified in believing Bl . Obviously, 
(1) entails that basic beliefs exist. But, since type (iv) 
chains are the only chains which confer mediate 
justification, (2) entails the existence of basic beliefs, 
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as well, because if (2), then it must be the case that 2 
believes B1 , on the -basis of a type (iv) chain, a chain 
whose initial belief is basic. So if either (1) or (2), 
then basic beliefs exist. Therefore, if the regress 
argument is sound, then basic beliefs must exist if personal 
justification is ever to obtain. 
In light of the regress argument, should we conclude, 
as many philosophers have, that foundationalism is correct? 
I do not think we should. For while it is true that the 
regress argument provides the principal motivation for 
foundationalism, it does not, by itself, entail that 
foundationalism is correct. It only entails that basic 
beliefs exist, and although the existence of basic beliefs 
is a necessary condition for the correctness of 
foundationalism, it is not sufficient for such correctness. 
In order to see that the existence of basic beliefs is not 
alone sufficient for foundationalism, we need to examine the 
role which foundation theories assign to basic beliefs. 
According to foundation theories, basic beliefs serve 
as the epistemic foundation or ground needed to justify us 
in holding nonbasic beliefs, a foundation from which all of 
our justification for nonbasic beliefs must ultimately 
derive. In light of the foundational role assigned to basic 
beliefs, two conditions must be satisfied if a foundation 
theory is to work: (A) Basic beliefs must exist, and (B) 
There must be enough basic beliefs to provide us with an 
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adequate foundation for our nonbasic beliefs. 13 Since the 
regress argument only entails (A), it does not entail that a 
foundation theory is correct. So, if we want to determine 
whether a foundation theory is correct, we must look beyond 
the regress argument to the theory itself to see whether it 
provides an adequate number of basic beliefs. 
Whether or not a given foundation theory provides 
enough basic beliefs depends on how it answers the following 
two questions: 
Q1. Which beliefs are basic? 
Q2. What is it about those beliefs that 
makes them basic? 
Two different answers have been given to Q1. Some 
foundation theorists contend that the set of basic beliefs 
is made up of very simple perceptual beliefs about physical 
objects. One such physical object belief is the belief that 
there is a green object in front of me. Supposedly, these 
beliefs are so safe that a person is immediately justified 
in holding them. Other foundation theorists, fearing that 
simple physical object beliefs are not properly suited for 
the role of foundational beliefs, maintain that the only 
beliefs which are actually basic are appearance beliefs, 
13William Alston makes a similar observation in his 
"Two Types of Foundationalism", QE.. cit., p. 166. 
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i.e. beliefs about the way we are being appeared to. The 
belief that I am currently being appeared to as if there 
were a green object in front of me and the belief that I am 
now being appeared to greenly are examples of appearance 
beliefs. In order to decide which of these two proposals 
(if either) is correct, we first need to know the answer to 
Q2. 
An answer to Q2 must tell us what property basic 
beliefs have and nonbasic beliefs lack in virtue of which 
the former are basic. The only plausible answer that has 
been offered is that basic beliefs have the property of 
being incorrigible and it is their incorrigibility which 
makes them basic. What is it for a belief to be 
incorrigible? As Pollock tells us, "A belief is 
incorrigible for a person S iff it is [logically] impossible 
for S to hold the belief and be wrong.,,14 The rationale for 
selecting incorrigibility as the property which makes 
beliefs basic is straightforward. Foundation theories 
require that all our justification for our nonbasic beliefs 
ultimately rests on the epistemic foundation provided by our 
basic beliefs. If this foundation gives way, then our all 
mediate justification collapses with it. If we are, 
l4John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. 
cit., p. 34. 
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therefore, to avoid such justificatory vulnerability, the 
epistemic foundation from which we reason must be absolutely 
unshakeable. A foundation that consists exclusively of 
incorrigible beliefs is entirely unshakeable, because, since 
it is impossible for a person to hold incorrigible beliefs 
and be mistaken, it is ipso facto impossible for any belief 
in a foundation of incorrigible beliefs to be false. Let us 
assume that the incorrigibility account of basicness is 
correct. lS We are now in a position to see that neither of 
the proposed basic belief candidates is satisfactory. 
Two problems beset the simply physical obj ect belief 
proposal. First, we are lacking an account of simplicity 
which tells us when a physical obj ect belief is simple 
enough to be basic. Presumably, the belief that there is a 
green object in front of me is simple enough to qualify as 
basic. But is the belief that there is a green plant a few 
feet in front of me simple enough to be basic? What about 
l5Actually, the incorrigibility account of basicness is 
open to two devastating objections. The standard objection 
concerns necessary truths. Since it is impossible to 
believe a necessary truth and be mistaken, it follows from 
the incorrigibility account that every necessary truth which 
a person happens to believe is basic. This, of course, 
includes complex mathematical truths. But, the obj ection 
continues, surely a person is not immediately justified in 
believing every complex mathematical truth that he happens 
to stumble upon. To the contrary, a person is justified in 
believing such a complex mathematical truth only if he 
derives that truth from the axioms of the system in 
question. Therefore, not every incorrigible belief is 
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the belief that there is a four foot tall Dracaena 
masangeana next to the grand piano? Surely, no foundation 
theorist would want to count this last belief as basic. But 
without an account of simplicity, it is difficult to see how 
such a belief can be ruled out. In short, the foundation 
theorist must provide us with a simplicity account if the 
physical object belief proposal is to be at all tenable. 
Second, even with a simplicity account, the physical 
object belief proposal remains unsatisfactory, since 
physical object beliefs are not o . obI 16            e. For 
basic. 
The second objection is even more devastating, because 
it undercuts the incorrigibility account even if the account 
is limited to contingent truths. Obviously, the average 
person has no idea what an incorrigible belief is, and as a 
result, when Mr. Average holds an incorrigible belief, he 
has absolutely no means of recognizing it as such. What 
this shows is that a person can hold an incorrigible belief 
without realizing that the belief is incorrigible. Suppose 
S holds the incorrigible belief B, but does not realize that 
B is incorrigible. Also suppose that S thinks that B is 
unreasonable, but persists in believing B anyway. According 
to the incorrigibility account, since B is incorrigible, S 
is immediately justified in believing B. However, since S 
thinks B is unreasonable, intuitively S is unjustified in 
believing B. Since the incorrigibility account entails that 
S is justified in believing B, when in fact he is not, as an 
account of basicness it is false. 
I have chosen to ignore these problems in the body of 
the text, because the incorrigibility account, which is the 
only even remotely plausible account of basicness, actually 
serves to undermine foundation theories. 
161 can only think of one physical object belief which might be incorrigible. If some version of the identity 
theory is correct, then the cogito belief that I exist is a 
physical object belief which looks to be incorrigible. 
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example, consider the belief that there is a red object in 
front of me. Since I may believe that there is a red object 
in front of me, when, in fact, there is a white obj ect 
bathed in red light in front of me or when I am 
hallucinating and there is really no object in front of me, 
it is possible for me to hold the belief and be mistaken. 
More generally, the demon hypothesis demonstrates that the 
possibility of error extends to (virtually) all of our 
physical object beliefs. Since it is possible to hold 
physical object beliefs but be mistaken, such beliefs are 
not incorrigib Ie. Since physical obj ect beliefs are not 
incorrigible, they lack the property requisite for 
basicness, and thus, they are not basic. 
At first glance, appearance beliefs look to be much 
more promising basic belief candidates, because unlike 
physical object beliefs, appearance beliefs seem to be 
incorrigible. While it is easy to be mistaken about the way 
things    it is hard to see how we could be mistaken about 
the way it seems to us that things are. If it really is 
impossible to hold appearance beliefs and be w'rong, then 
appearance beliefs are incorrigible, making them natural 
candidates for basic beliefs. 
Despite its prima facie plausibility, the appearance 
However, if this is our only basic belief, then we do not 
have an adequate foundation for our nonbasic beliefs, 
Descartes' meditations to the contrary notwithstanding. 
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belief proposal is open to three devastating obj ections. 
Perhaps the most obvious obj ection is that we rarely have 
appearance beliefs. When we walk outside, for example, we 
form beliefs about cacti, flowers, hummingbirds, clear 
skies, snow capped mountains, and the like. We do not find 
ourselves forming beliefs about our phenomenal states, such 
as the belief that I am being appeared as if there is a 
saguaro in front of me or the belief that I am experiencing 
a sensation of yellow. It is not that we are unable to form 
beliefs of the latter sort. It is just that we usually do 
not. Simply put, appearance beliefs are the exception, not 
the rule. As a result, we have far too few appearance 
b l ' f ' d f d ' 17 e     s to            an a equate oun        
Another problem with the appearance belief proposal is 
that appearance beliefs are incapable of performing the very 
function which foundational beliefs are supposed to perform, 
namely, the function of justifying us in holding nonbasic 
beliefs, including nonbasic beliefs about the world. It 
should be obvious that appearance beliefs alone are 
incapable of justifying us in believing anything about the 
external world. The appearance belief that I am currently 
experiencing a sensation of yellow cannot, by itself, 
17 John Pollock raises this same obj ection in Chapter 
Two of his Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. cit. 
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justify me in believing that there is something yellow 
before me. It can only do so if it is conjoined with the 
belief that things are the way they appear to be. Of 
course, according to foundation theories, I must be 
justified in holding this latter belief, if it is to help 
justify me in believing something else, and since it is not 
basic, I must be mediately justified in believing it. 
However, no amount of appearance beliefs can justify me in 
believing that things are the way they appear to be, and so, 
I am not mediately justified in believing it (for remember, 
appearance beliefs are all I have to go on at this stage). 
But without the belief that things are the way they appear 
to be, appearance beliefs cannot justify me in believing 
anything about the way things are. Thus, a foundation of 
appearance beliefs is totally useless, because no nonbasic 
beliefs can be built up from it. 
Although I regard the previous objection as decisive, 
the appearance belief proposal is open to yet another 
equally devastating obj ection, to wit, appearance beliefs 
are not incorrigible. Recent psychological experiments have 
demonstrated that people do make mistakes concerning how 
they are being appeared to. Paul Churchland describes the 
results of one such experiment as follows: 
An orange-expectant subject fed lime sherbet 
may confidently identify her taste-sensation 
as being the kind normally produced by 
orange sherbet, only to retract the 
identification immediately upon being given 
a (blind) taste of the genuinely oran¥e 
article. Here one corrects one s 
qualitative identification, in flat 
contradiction to the idea that mistakes are 
impossible. Mistakes of this kind are 
called expectation effects, and they are a 
standard 18phenomenon with perception 
generally. 
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Expectation effects can even adversely affect our ability to 
detect color appearances, for, as Pollock tells us, 
A discovery made fairly early by every 
landscape painter is that snmv looks blue 
(particularly the shadows). Most people 
think      looks white to them, but they are 
wrong. 
Presumably, if you ask these people to pay closer attention 
to the way in which they are being appeared to, they will 
realize that the snow appears to have a bluish hue and will 
correct their appearance judgments accordingly. Examples of 
similar mistakes in appearance judgments abound. Just think 
of the last time you accidently touched a cold stove, which 
you expected to be hot. You may have believed that you 
experienced a burning sensation, when in fact you did not. 
These examples demonstrate that a person can hold an 
18paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London, England: The MIT Press, 1984), p. 77. 
19John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. 
cit., p. 70. 
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appearance belief and be mistaken. This, in turn, 
demonstrates that appearance beliefs are not incorrigible 
d h f d l 'f b' 20 an , t ere ore, 0 not qua    y as       
In short, neither simple physical obj ect beliefs nor 
appearance beliefs are properly suited for the role of basic 
beliefs. Simple phyica1 object beliefs are not 
incorrigible, because physical object beliefs in general are 
not incorrigible, thus making them unsuitable as basic 
beliefs. Appearance beliefs are ill-suited for the role of 
basic beliefs in three respects: (1) There are too few of 
them to provide us with an adequate epistemic foundation, 
(2) They are incapable of justifying us in holding nonbasic 
beliefs, and (3) They are not incorrigible. Thus, to date 
the foundation theorist has not been able to furnish us with 
a single basic belief. Moreover, since simple physical 
obj ect beliefs and appearance beliefs are the only even 
remotely plausible candidates for basic beliefs, it is very 
unlikely that the foundation theorist will be able to 
provide us with any basic beliefs in the future. 
If there are no basic beliefs, then foundation theories 
are false. The fact that no foundation theorist has ever 
been able to generate any basic beliefs strongly suggests 
20 John Pollock raises the same objection to appearance 
beliefs in Chapter Two of his Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge, £E. cit. 
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that there are no basic beliefs. But we can go further and 
demonstrate that there are no basic beliefs by showing that 
the very idea of basic beliefs is absurd. Recall that a 
basic belief is a belief which a person is immediately 
justified in believing. Also recall that a person is 
justified in holding a belief iff she deserves epistemic 
praise for holding that belief. Therefore, for a belief B 
to be basic, it must be the case that a person immediately 
deserves epistemic praise for holding B --- though she has 
no reasons or evidence of any kind for B and has not 
consciously reflected on or questioned B at all simply 
in virtue of the fact that she holds B. Once we realize 
that this is what is required for basic beliefs to exist, it 
seems obvious that there are no basic beliefs. How could 
there be? After all, whether or not a person deserves 
epistemic praise for holding a given belief has nothing to 
do with the particular belief she happens to be holding, but 
rather it has to do with her it has to do with whether 
or not she has been epistemically responsible in coming to 
hold the belief. Since a person can be epistemically 
irresponsible in holding any belief whatsoever, it follows 
that there are no beliefs which a person automatically 
deserves epistemic praise for believing, just because she 
happens to believe them. Of course, this entails that there 
are no beliefs which a person is automatically justified in 
believing, just because she believes them. Hence, there are 
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no basic beliefs. 
The fact that there are no basic beliefs entails that 
foundation theories are false. It also entails that the 
regress argument, which has been 
contemporary epistemology, is unsound. 
so influential in 
Although the regress 
argument is unsound, we do not as yet know why. In section 
6, the regress argument will be reexamined, to see if we can 
pinpoint where it goes wrong. Our present task, however, is 
that of providing an account of personal justification. 
We began with the observation that the correct account 
of personal justification could only be given by an 
internalist theory. Nondoxastic internalist theories, like 
direct realism, fell by the wayside because the 
intellectualist model is correct for personal justification. 
That only left us with doxastic theories to consider. We 
have just seen that all foundation theories of personal 
justification are false, because there are no basic beliefs. 
Since the class of doxastic theories is exhausted by 
foundation theories and coherence theories, it follows that 
if there is a correct account of personal justification, 
then it must be given by a coherence theory. 
It is important to note the hypothetical nature of the 
conclusion just reached, so as to avoid the all too common 
mistake of taking an argument to prove more than it does. 
Strictly speaking, the argument from elimination just 
offered only proves that all noncoherence theories are 
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false. It does not, in and of itself, prove that a 
coherence theory of personal justification is correct. It 
is, after all, possible that every coherence theory is 
false, in which case we would be left with a "no account" 
account of personal justification. Since there is no 
a priori way to rule out the "no account" account 
possibility, a positive argument needs to be offered to show 
that a coherence theory of personal justification is 
correct. The next two sections are devoted to presenting 
such an argument. In Section 4, I will discuss both the 
nature of reasons and the linear picture of reasoning. In 
Section 5, I will develop a coherence theory which 
incorporates such linear reasons and will show that the 
personal justification evaluations yielded by this theory 
are intuitively correct. 
coherence theory does 
personal justification. 
This, 
provide 
4. Reasons and Linear Reasoning 
in turn, will show that a 
the correct account of 
Coherence theories are doxastic theories which deny the 
existence of an epistemically privileged subclass of basic 
beliefs. Being doxastic theories, they maintain that 
beliefs are the only internal states that a person can 
appeal to in order to justify her in holding other beliefs. 
In short, coherence theories hold that justification 
proceeds from reasoning, where beliefs are the only internal 
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states capable of being reasons. In order for such a theory 
to be correct, it must provide us with an account of 
reasoning which explains how a person's beliefs function to 
justify her in holding other beliefs, and the account must 
be correct. Traditionally, coherence theories have provided 
us with a holistic account of reasoning, according to which 
a person reasons from her set of beliefs in toto. In what 
is to follow, I shall argue that such an account of 
reasoning is psychologically unrealistic and, hence, 
empirically false and that, therefore, a coherence theory 
must adopt an alternative account of reasoning, if it is to 
provide the correct analysis of personal justification. 
Then, I shall present a linear account of reasoning as the 
required alternative. 
Every coherence theory offered to date has assumed a 
holistic account of reasoning. I shall refer to such 
theories as "holistic coherence theories". 21 One of the 
major difficulties with evaluating holistic coherence 
theories is that most holistic coherence theories have not 
been worked out in much detail. 22 Typically, we are only 
21I borrow this terminology from John Pollock, who 
coins it in Chapter Three of his Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge, £E. cit. 
22A notable exception is Keith Lehrer's theory, which I 
shall consider shortly. See Keith Lehrer, Knowledge, £E. 
cit. 
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given a sketch of a holistic coherence theory, as, say, a 
theory which rests on the Neurath metaphor. Since such 
sketches resist proper evaluation, let us, instead, start by 
examining a generic holistic coherence theory of personal 
justification: 
(GT) S is personally justified in believing 
that p iff S reasons from the set of 
her beliefs in toto to the belief that 
p. 
A special problem arises for (GT) when S already 
believes that p, because then the belief that p belongs to 
the set of S's beliefs, and so, ipso facto the set of SiS 
beliefs entails that p. In such a situation, (GT) seems to 
entail that S could come to be justified in believing that p 
simply by realizing that she already believes that p and 
that, therefore, the set of her beliefs entails that p. I 
shall not pursue the prior belief problem, however, because 
(GT) could probably be reformulated in such a way as to 
avoid the problem and because the resulting reformulation 
would still be open to the next objection. 
Let us consider a case where S, who as yet does not 
believe that p and does not believe any conjunction 
containing p as a conjunct, is considering whether or not to 
believe that p. According to (GT), in order for S to be 
justified in believing that p, she must come to believe that 
p by reasoning from her entire set of beliefs to the belief 
that p. To see the problem with this requirement, recall 
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from section 3 that the intellectualist model, according to 
which occurrent reasoning is the only kind of reasoning 
capable of conferring justification, is correct for personal 
justification. Given the correctness of the intellectualist 
model, we must interpret (GT) as asserting that 8 is 
personally justified in believing that p just in case 8 
comes to believe that p by occurrently reasoning from the 
entire set of her beliefs to the belief that p. But on this 
interpretation, (GT) and its account of reasoning are 
psychologically unrealistic. (GT) is psychologically 
unrealistic as a requirement for personal justification, 
because it is impossible for us to reason occurrently from 
our entire set of beliefs. (GT)'s account of reasoning is 
psychologically unrealistic as a description of how people 
reason, because people never reason from the set of all 
their beliefs. 
turn. 
I will consider each of these problems in 
We can see that (GT) is an unrealistic requirement for 
personal justification in two different ways. First, in 
order for a person to reason occurrently from any set of 
beliefs to some other belief, she must first know what the 
members of that set are. 80, in order for a person to 
occurrently reason from the set of all her beliefs, she 
would have to know what all her beliefs were. Of course, we 
all hold some beliefs which we are unaware of holding, e.g. 
prejudicial beliefs, and thus, we do not know what all our 
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beliefs are. Therefore, we cannot occurrently reason from 
the set of all our beliefs. Second, even if we were to know 
what all our beliefs were (in some dispositional sense), we 
still would not be able to reason occurrently from the set 
of those beliefs, because, as Pollock points out, current 
psychological evidence indicates that people can' hold no 
more than seven occurrent beliefs in the mind at one time 
and the number tends to diminish as the beliefs become more 
complicated. 23 Since we can occurrently reason from beliefs 
only if we occurrently hold those beliefs and since we can 
only occurrently hold seven (or less) beliefs, we can only 
occurrently reason from seven (or less) beliefs. Since the 
set of our beliefs is extremely large, but we can only 
occurrently reason from seven (or less) beliefs, we 
obviously cannot occurrently reason from the set of all our 
beliefs. Therefore, (GT) presents us with an unfulfillable 
and, hence, unrealistic requirement for personal 
justification. 
(GT)'s account of reasoning is equally psychologically 
unrealistic, if it is intended as a description of how we 
do, in fact, reason. This probably seems obvious, since we 
have just seen that it is impossible for us to reason 
23John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. 
cit., p. 53. 
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occurrently from the set of all our beliefs. Nevertheless, 
the present objection does not depend on the impossibility 
of such reasoning, because even if we could occurrently 
reason from all our beliefs, in point of fact we never do 
reason that way. Instead, we reason from individual beliefs 
(or from very small sets of beliefs) to other beliefs. 
Thus, (GT)'s account of reasoning is empirically false. 
Since we never do reason from the set of our beliefs in 
toto, we never satisfy the analysans of (GT). Consequently, 
either we are never personally justified in holding any of 
our beliefs or (GT) is false. Since occasionally some of us 
do deserve epistemic praise for holding some of our beliefs, 
occasionally some of us are personally justified in holding 
some of our beliefs. Thus, it is false that we are never 
personally justified in holding any of our beliefs, and so, 
it follows by disjunctive syllogism that (GT) is false. Of 
course, we probably should have expected as much, since (GT) 
violates the "ought implies can" dictum by requiring us to 
carry out the impossible task of occurrently reasoning from 
all our beliefs. 
The failure of (GT) is instructive. It shows that 
those proposing sketchy holistic coherence theories 
wrong to assume that something like (GT) would work. 
were 
Since 
(GT) does not work, if we are to take the possibility of a 
holistic coherence theory seriously, we must be given more 
than a rough sketch of the theory. We must be given a 
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concrete proposal that has been worked out in careful 
detail.· Lehrer is the only philosopher to have developed 
such a detailed holistic coherence theory. Moreover, his 
theory looks much more promis ing than the generic theory, 
since, at least on one interpretation, it does not require 
us to reason occurrently from the set of all our beliefs and 
also appears to avoid the prior belief problem. Let us, 
therefore, turn to his theory as he presents it in 
Knowledge to see whether it can provide the needed account 
f 1 · t' f' . 24 o persona JUS             
In Knowledge, Lehrer maintains that S is completely 
justified in believing that p iff P coheres with SIS 
corrected doxastic system, where SIS corrected doxastic 
system is a set of statements of the form, S believes that 
q, S believes that r, and so on, which describes what S 
believes for the purposes of gaining truth and avoiding 
error. 25 What is it for a statement p to cohere with such a 
24 Lehrer has since abandoned the theory he formulated 
in Knowledge and has replaced it with the Monster Theory. 
Nevertheless, I am presenting the earlier theory, because it 
is a coherence theory, whereas the Monster Theory is an 
externalist theory. We have already seen that no 
externalist theory (nor any other noncoherence theory) can 
provide the correct account of personal justification. 
Unlike the Monster theory, his earlier theory, being a 
coherence theory, remains a viable candidate for a theory of 
personal justification. 
25For the original presentation of Lehrer's coherence 
theory, see Chapter 8 of Knowledge, £E. cit. 
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system? In order to answer this question, Lehrer introduces 
the notion of a "competitor". Simplifying a bit, p competes 
with q for S iff S believes that q is negatively relevant to 
p, where q is negatively relevant to p iff P is less 
probable on the assumption that q than it is without that 
assumption, i.e. q is negatively relevant to p iff 
prob (pi q) < prob (p). In short, when S believes that q is 
negatively relevant to p, then p competes with q, and hence, 
q is a competitor of p. Armed with this account of 
competitors, Lehrer provides an explication of the 
coherence relation, to wit, p coheres with SIS corrected 
doxastic system iff, within SIS corrected doxastic system, p 
is believed to be more probable than any of its competitors. 
Having explicated the relation of coherence, Lehrer offers 
the following analysis of complete justification: 
(LJ) S is completely justified in believing 
that p if and only if, within the 
corrected doxastic system of S, p is 
believed to have a better chance of 
being true than the denial of p or an¥6 
other statement that competes with p. 
Unfortunately, the analysans of (LJ) is ambiguous. Its 
ambiguity can be captured using the two reformulations of 
(LJ) that follow: 
26Keith Lehrer, Knowledge, £E. cit., p. 198. 
(LJ1) S is completely justified in believing 
that p iff S believes, on the basis of 
her corrected doxastic system, that p 
is more probable than any of its 
competitors. 
(LJ2) S is completely justified in believing 
that p iff for the purposes of 
gaining truth and avoiding error S 
believes that p is more probable than 
any of its competitors, i.e. iff the 
statement ItS believes that p       
probable than any of its competitors" 
is a member of SiS corrected doxastic 
system. 
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(LJ1) fares somewhat better than (GT), since it is 
immune to the prior belief problem. 27 Nevertheless, (LJ1) 
remains open to the other objections facing (GT). That 
(LJ1) is a psychologically unrealistic requirement for 
personal justification can be seen in several ways. First, 
in order for S to base her belief -- that p is more 
probable than any of its competitors -- on her corrected 
27To see that (LJ1) is immune to that prior belief 
problem consider the following: Let p = the chair is red, 
and let q = a red light is shining on the chair. q is 
negatively relevant to p, because the probability that the 
chair is red given that there is a red light shining on the 
chair is less than the probability that the chair is red 
without such an assumption, i.e., prob (p/q) < prob (p). 
Suppose that, for the purposes of gaining truth and avoiding 
error, S believes that p, believes that q, believes that q 
is a competitor of p, and believes that q is more probable 
than p. In the situation just described, S already believes 
that p, but since, relative to SiS corrected doxastic 
system, S does not believe that p is more probable than its 
competitor q, S is not completely justified in believing 
that p. Thus, prior belief does not entail justification. 
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doxastic system, S would have to know what the 
member-statements of her corrected doxastic system were. If 
S is like most people, then she does not even know what a 
corrected doxastic system is, and so, she obviously does not 
know what the member-statements of her corrected doxastic 
system are. However, even if S were an epistemologist and 
did know what a corrected doxastic system is, she still 
would not know the membership of her corrected doxastic 
system, because the set of statements describing what she 
believes (for the purposes of gaining truth and avoiding 
error) is much too large a set for her (or anyone 
else) to comprehend. Since S does not know what the 
member-statements of her corrected doxastic system are, she 
cannot base any beliefs on her corrected doxastic system, 
much less the belief that p is more probable than any of its 
competi tors. Second, even if S were somehow to know the 
membership of her corrected doxastic system, she still could 
not base any beliefs on the entire system, because, given 
human psychological constraints, S can only occurrently 
attend to seven (or less) of the member-statements of her 
corrected doxastic system. At best, S could only base 
beliefs on a small subset of her corrected doxastic system. 
Since (LJl) requires S to base beliefs on her corrected 
doxastic system taken as a whole, it represents an 
unrealistic requirement. 
(LJl) is also unrealistic as a description of how 
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people do, in fact, reason. Even if we could reason from 
our entire corrected doxastic system, as a matter of fact we 
never do. We never even reason from small subsets of our 
corrected doxastic system. We need only introspect to 
realize that we base beliefs on other beliefs, not on 
statements describing what we believe for the purposes of 
gaining truth and avoiding error. I contend that the only 
way such statements can play a role in belief-formation is 
if we believe those statements. If we do not believe those 
statements, then it is not at all clear how they could 
affect our cognitive reflections. If we do believe those 
statements, then it seems that it is our beliefs of those 
statements, rather than those statements per se, which are 
justifying us in holding other beliefs. But even if we take 
(LJ1) to be suggesting that we base beliefs on beliefs of 
statements describing what we believe for the purposes of 
gaining truth and avoiding error, (LJ1) remains unrealistic, 
because people rarely have such meta-beliefs. In short, no 
matter how we take it, (LJ1) rests on an unrealistic picture 
of reasoning. Consequently, the principle of charity 
dictates that we should not saddle Lehrer with the (LJI) 
view, unless it is absolutely necessary. To see whether it 
is necessary, let us consider (LJ2). 
(LJ2) is a more plausible proposal than (LJ1), since it 
avoids all of the objections raised against (GT). We can 
see that (LJ2) is not subject to the prior belief problem by 
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considering Tommy the toddler. Tommy has not yet acquired 
the concept of probability, but he does believe that p. 
Tommy also believes that q, and q is negatively relevant to 
p (though Tommy does not know that it is) and, hence, q is a 
competitor of p. Although Tommy already believes that p, he 
does not believe that p is more probable than q. In this 
situation, (LJ2) entails that Tommy is not completely 
justified in believing that p. Therefore, on the (LJ2) 
view, prior belief does not entail complete justification. 
That (LJ2) is immune to the other two objections facing 
(GT) can be seen as follows: According to (LJ2), for S to 
be completely justified in believing that p, S need only 
believe (for the purposes of gaining truth and avoiding 
error) that p is more probable than any of its competitors. 
S does not need to know what the member-statements of her 
corrected doxastic system are. She does not even need to 
know that she has a corrected doxastic system. And most 
important of all, she does not need to base her belief ---
that p is more probable than any of its competitors --- on 
her corrected doxastic system. The only thing that (LJ2) 
requires of S is that S believe that p is more probable than 
any of its competitors, and this is a requirement she can 
fulfill. Moreover, people do sometimes reason this way. 
For example, it is not uncommon for a scientist to compare 
competing alternatives and decide that one alternative is 
more probable than the others and then come to believe that 
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alternative. Thus, unlike (GT) and (LJ1), (LJ2) requires us 
to reason in a way in which people do in fact sometimes 
reason. 
In light of the foregoing, I submit that (LJ2) is the 
most plausible holistic coherency theory going. 
Nevertheless, it too is ultimately unsatisfactory, for while 
people do occasionally compare alternatives and believe that 
which they take to be most probable, they do not do so very 
often. To the contrary, we rarely have bel'iefs of the form 
that p is more probable than each of its competitors. 28 
When we do have such beliefs, they may, in fact, justify us 
in believing that p, but just because we lack such a belief 
does not entail that we are not justified in believing that 
p. In short, while (LJ2) may provide us with a sufficient 
condition for personal justification, it does not provide us 
with a necessary one, because there are more ways for a 
person to be epistemically responsible than just ruling out 
competitors. Consequently, we must look elsewhere for a 
complete account of personal justification. That elsewhere 
starts with the linear picture of reasoning which I shall 
now detail. 
My account of linear reasoning draws heavily from 
28John Pollock raises the same objection to Lehrer's 
theory in Chapter Three of his Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge, £E. cit., p. 89. 
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Pollock, who has formulated a detailed account of reasoning 
in Chapter Two of his Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. 
While I do not agree with his account entirely, I find much 
of it to be correct. For this reason, I "dll begin by 
presenting his account of linear reasoning. 
modify his account somewhat. 
I will then 
Since occurrent reasoning proceeds in terms of reasons, 
we need to know precisely what a reason is. Pollock tells 
us, "A belief P is a reason for a person S to believe Q iff 
it is logically possible for S to become justified in 
believing Q by believing it on the basis of p".29 There are 
two kinds of reasons, conclusive reasons and nonconclusive 
reasons. A conclusive reason is a reason which entails that 
for which it is a reason. Nonconclusive reasons rationally 
support, but do not entail, that for which they are reasons. 
Pollock contends that "The most important characteristic of 
nonconclusive reasons is that they are defeasible. ,,30 A 
reason is defeasible if the evidence it provides for its 
conclusion can be defeated by certain other evidential 
considerations. For example, if every mammal that we have 
examined has had hair, this provides us with a reason for 
thinking that all mammals have hair. However, if we later 
29John Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. 
cit., p. 41. 
30 Ibid., p. 42. 
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discover a mammal with no hair, this new information defeats 
our earlier reason for thinking that all mammals have hair 
and, thus, constitutes a defeater for that earlier reason. 
Pollock defines a defeater as follows: "If P is a reason 
for S to believe Q, R is a defeater for this reason iff R is 
logically consistent with P and (P&R) is not a reason for S 
to believe Q.,,3l Pollock calls a reason for which there can 
be defeaters a "prima facie reason". 
Pollock indentifies two kinds of defeaters for prima 
facie reasons, to wit, rebutting defeaters and undercutting 
defeaters. He defines the former as "If P is a prima facie 
reason for S to believe Q, R is a rebutting defeater for 
this reason iff R is logically consistent with P and R is a 
reason for S to believe '" Q. ,,32 Thus, a rebutting defeater 
is a reason for denying the conclusion supported by the 
prima facie reason. In the mammal example, discovering a 
mammal with no hair is a rebutting defeater, since it is a 
reason for thinking that it is false that all mammals have 
hair. 
Whereas rebutting defeaters attack the conclusion of 
the prima facie reason, undercutting defeaters 
attack the connection between the prima facie reason and its 
3l Ibid . 
32Ibid ., p. 43. 
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conclusion. For an example of an undercutting defeater, 
consider the following: Suppose the boxer Killer Queen has 
won all of his previous 57 fights. This gives us a reason 
for thinking Killer Queen will win his next fight. If, 
however, we discover that all of his previous fights were 
ten rounders and his next fight is a scheduled fifteen 
rounder, this information undercuts our earlier prima facie 
reason, because what a fighter can do in ten rounds is not 
an accurate indicator of what he can do in fifteen rounds. 
Notice this new information does not give us a reason for 
thinking Killer Queen will lose. It just gives us a reason 
for denying that he would not have won all of his previous 
fights unless he were a good enough fighter to win his next 
fight. Pollock defines such a defeater as follows: "If P 
is a prima facie reason for S to believe Q, R is an 
undercutting defeater for this reason iff R is logically 
consistent with P and R is a reason for S to deny that P 
wouldn't be true unless Q were true.,,33 
Since defeaters are themselves reasons, they may be 
subj ect to defeaters, as well. If a defeater R is itself 
defeated, this blocks its action as a defeater and, thus, 
reinstates the prima facie reason P for which R is a 
defeater (unless, of course, R's defeater is defeated, in 
33Ibid . 
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which case R is reinstated, thereby redefeating P). In 
short, there can be defeater defeaters and defeater defeater 
defeaters, and so on. 
Given this account of reasons and defeaters, a linear 
picture of reasoning naturally emerges. In order for S to 
be justified in believing that q, S must base his belief 
that q on a chain of reasons. He may, for example, base his 
belief that q on reason P3 which he based on P2 which was 
based on Pl. If S reasons in this way, he instantiates the 
following chain of reasoning: 
In virtue of having proceeded through such a chain of 
reasoning, S is presumably justified in believing that q, 
unless, of course, S believes an undefeated defeater for one 
of the reasons leading to q. 
I think that this linear picture of reasoning 
accurately depicts how we do in fact reason. 34 Even so, 
Pollock's account needs to be modified somewhat. Pollock 
maintains that nonconclusive reasons are the only reasons 
capable of being defeated. I, on the other hand, contend 
that all reasons are subject to being defeated by evidential 
34 In fact, Lehrer's coherence theory, on the (LJ2) reading, 
looks to be an isolated instance of this more general 
theory, because deciding that q is more probable than all of 
its competitors is just one way of ruling out potential 
defeaters. 
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considerations. To defend this contention, I must introduce 
a third kind of defeater, which does not satisfy Pollock's 
definition of defeaters per se. Suppose that PI in the 
chain above is a conclusive reason for S to believe P2. In 
such a situation, it still might be the case that S believes 
that r 1 , where r 1 is a reason for               and although 
r 1 is not logically consistent with PI' it certainly seems 
to defeat PI as a reason for P2. We might call this kind of 
defeater a "negating defeater" and define negating defeaters 
as follows: If P is a reason (either conclusive or 
nonconclusive) for S to believe that q, r is a negating 
defeater for p iff r is a reason for thinking that P is 
false. While only nonconclusive reasons are subject to 
undercutting and rebutting defeaters, all reasons are 
subject to negating defeaters, and so, Pollock is wrong to 
claim that only nonconclusive reasons are capable of being 
defeated. Like other defeaters, negating defeaters are 
themselves subject to defeaters which can nullify their 
effect as defeaters. Hence, the linear picture of reasoning 
extends to negating defeaters, as well. Now that we have a 
linear account of reasoning before us, we can use it to 
formulate a linear coherence theory which correctly analyzes 
personal justification. 
5. An Account of Personal Justification 
a. A Tripartite Distinction 
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Before presenting my account of personal justification, 
I need to digress briefly to discuss the sorts of personal 
justification evaluations which can be made. Traditionally, 
personal justification evaluations have been made in an all 
or nothing fashion. As a result, on the traditional view, 
if S believes that p, then either S is justified in 
believing that p or S is unjustified in believing that p. 
I think that the traditional view presents us with a 
false dichotomy. To see why, recall from Chapter 2 that to 
say that S is justified in believing that p is to say that S 
deserves epistemic praise for believing that p and to say 
that S is unjustified in believing that p is to say that S 
deserves epistemic blame for believing that p. 
Incorporating this observation into the traditional view 
yields the following result: If S believes that p, then 
either S deserves epistemic praise for believing that p or S 
deserves epistemic blame for believing that p. Such a 
result is clearly mistaken. Very often we hold beliefs for 
which we deserve neither praise nor blame. Perceptual 
beliefs (at least most of the time) are a case in point. 
Typically, our perceptual beliefs come to us as a result of 
automatic belief-forming cognitive processes over which we 
have little control. We certainly are not doing anything 
epistemically reprehensible in holding such beliefs, and so, 
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we are free from epistemic blame for holding them. On 
the other hand, since we generally do not reflect on our 
perceptual beliefs or carry out any kind of reasoning 
procedure to ensure that they are true, we do not deserve 
epistemic praise for holding them either. Therefore, 
properly speaking, we are neither justified nor unjustified 
in holding most of our perceptual beliefs, but rather are 
           ajustified in holding them. 
The same point can be noted by reconsidering (PJ.') and J 
According to and personal 
justification is concerned with whether a person has been 
epistemically responsible or epistemically irresponsible in 
coming to hold a given belief. Consequently, when a person 
is neither epistemically responsible nor epistemically 
irresponsible in holding a particular belief, she falls 
outside the scope of personal justification. But for a 
person to fall outside the scope of personal justification 
just is for that person to be personally ajustified. 
What this shows is that, when assessing a person's 
justificatory status, three evaluations are possible. The 
person may be personally justified in holding a certain 
belief. She may be personally unjustified in holding that 
belief. Or she may be personally ajustified in holding the 
belief. The failure to recognize this third possibility has 
led philosophers to create theories of justification which 
count persons as being justified, when in fact they are not. 
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In short, if we want to provide the correct account of 
personal justification, we must recognize this tripartite 
distinction of personal justification evaluations, 
especially since, if I am right, we are ajustified in 
holding most of our beliefs. In the next subsection, I 
shall offer an analysis of personal justification which 
takes these three evaluative possibilities into account. 
b. A Linear Coherence Theory of Personal 
Justification 
In section 4 of the present chapter, I presented 
a slightly modified version of Pollock's account of linear 
reasoning. According to Pollock's account, a person S is 
justified in believing that q only if S bases her belief 
that q on an ultimately undefeated chain of reasoning of the 
form: 
where a chain of reasoning is ultimately undefeated for S 
iff either (1) there is no belief-link in the chain for 
which S believes a defeater or (2) there are some 
belief-links for which S believes defeaters, but these 
defeaters are themselves defeated by defeater defeaters 
which S believes. Of course, this only provides us with a 
necessary condition for personal justification. To get an 
analysis which is both necessary and sufficient for personal 
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justification, we must look further. Pollock thinks that in 
order for an ultimately undefeated chain of reasoning to 
justify 8 in believing its conclusion, 8 must be justified 
in believing each belief-link of the chain. Thus, Pollock 
concludes that 8 is jusitifed in believing that q iff 8 
bases her belief that q on an ultimately undefeated chain of 
reasoning, each belief-link of which 8 is justified in 
believing. 35 
At this point, I part company with Pollock, since on a 
view such as his we must embrace basic beliefs in order to 
prevent an infinite regress of reasons. We have already 
seen in section 3 that there are no basic beliefs. 80, we 
must look to a different theory, if we want to provide the 
correct account of personal justification. I will now set 
the stage for that different theory. 
When we reason, we reason from our beliefs in general. 
We do not first partition our beliefs into those which we 
are justified in believing and those 'Vlhich we are not, and 
35In Chapter Two of his               Theories of 
Knowledge, £E. cit., Pollock formulates t is conditon as liS 
is justified            P iff 8 instantiates an ultimately 
undefeated argument supporting pIt (p. 53), where an argument 
is "a finite sequence of propositions ordered in such a way 
that for each proposition P in the sequence, either (1) P is 
epistemologically basic or (2) there is a proposition (or 
set of propositions) earlier in the sequence that is a 
reason for pil (p. 51) and where "A person instantiates an 
argument iff he believes the propositions comprising the 
argument and he believes each nonbasic proposition in it on 
the basis of reasons for it that occur earlier in the 
argument" (p. 51). 
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then reason only from the former. To think that we do 
partition our beliefs in this way is unreali.stic, since for 
the most part we do not even know which of our beliefs we 
are justified in believing and which of them we are not 
justified in believing. Instead, when we reason, we take 
our beliefs for granted and proceed from there. If you have 
doubts about this, consider the last time you occurrently 
reasoned to some conclusion q on the basis of some chain 
Pl ... Pn. Did you stop to ask yourself if you were justified 
in believing each belief-link of the reasoning chain? I 
suspect that you did not. This just is not the way we 
usually reason. Rather, once a belief gets into our 
doxastic corpus, we simply regard it as belief-worthy and 
reason from it. We never even consider whether we are 
justified in believing it, unless some counterevidence to it 
comes to the fore. 
In this regard, private reasoning is very much like 
public reasoning. When publically reasoning to (or arguing 
for) a conclusion, we simply state our premises. \ole do not 
attempt to prove our premises, unless someone calls them 
into question. If someone does call our premises into 
question, we offer other premises in support of our initial 
premises, which we do not attempt to prove unless they too 
are called into question. Similarly, when privately 
reasoning, we reason from our beliefs (our internalized 
premises). We do not question whether we are justified in 
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holding these beliefs, unless some counterevidence to them 
arises. If such counterevidence does arise, we look to 
other beliefs to justify us in continuing to hold those 
earlier beliefs (looking for defeater defeaters is one way 
of doing this), and we do not question whether we are 
justified in holding these other beliefs, unless 
counterevidence surfaces which makes them suspect, as well. 
Once we realize that personal justification is a 
function of our beliefs and not a function exclusively of 
the beliefs we are justified in holding p a linear coherence 
theory becomes extremely plausible. Our chains of reasoning 
do not need to start with basic beliefs which we are in some 
mysterious way immediately justified in believing, as 
foundation theorists maintain, because our chains of 
reasoning do not need to start with beliefs which we are 
justified in believing. Instead, as coherence theorists 
rightly maintain, all of our beliefs are on equal epistemic 
footing, at least in the sense of being able to provide us 
with reasons for other beliefs, and so, constitute 
legitimate starting points from which to reason. 
We are now in a position to formulate a linear 
coherence theory of personal justification. We have just 
seen that all of our beliefs are capable of providing us 
with reasons for other beliefs and, hence, can initiate 
justification-conferring chains of reasoning. This 
observation, together with our earlier observation that the 
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intellectualist model is correct for personal justification, 
suggests that a person is justified in holding a given 
belief just in case she comes to hold that belief by 
occurrently reasoning through an ultimately undefeated chain 
of reasoning which supports it, each belief-link of which 
she believes. Unfortunately, this suggestion is not quite 
right. Very often we find ourselves holding beliefs which 
were not the result of occurrent reasoning. On any adequate 
theory of personal justification, it must be possible for us 
to come to be justified in holding these beliefs, as well. 
Consequently, in order to provide the correct account of 
personal justification, we must modify the above suggestion 
in such a way that it satisfies this adequacy constraint. I 
submit that the following modification provides us with the 
correct analysis of personal justifiedness. 
(PJ.*) 
J 
S is personally justified in be-
lieving that p iff either 
(l)(a) S comes         that p by 
occurrently reasoning through 
an ultimately undefeated 
chain of reasoning which 
supports p, and 
(b) S believes each belief-link 
of Cj or 
(2)(a) S comes to believe that p via 
a BCP other than occurrent 
reasoning, 
(b) S occurrently notices an 
ultimately undefeated chain 
.of reasoning which supports 
p, and 
(c) S           each belief-link 
of C. 
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In short, (PJ.*) asserts that a person is justified in 
J 
holding a belief iff she has occurrent1y noticed that she 
has evidence (in the form of other beliefs) for that 
belief. 37 On this view, a person's evidence (or reasons) 
for p need not play a causal role in the genesis (or 
sustenance) of her belief that p in order for her to be 
justified in believing that p. 
Lehrer has argued that the reasons which justify a 
person in holding a belief need not be causally responsible 
36Where , modifying Pollock's definition, a chain of 
reasoning is ultimately undefeated for S iff either (1) 
there is no belief-link in the chain for whicblS is aware of 
having a defeater or (2) for each belief-link in the chain 
for which S is aware of having a defeater D, S is also aware 
of having a defeater defeater for D. This modification is 
necessary, because if S believes a defeater D for reason R, 
but is not aware that D is a defeater for R, then D does not 
defeat R for S. 
37 It might be objected that, since noticing that one 
has evidence E for p entails knowing that one has evidence E 
for p, (PJ. *) threatens to start us on a vicious regress, 
because fot S to know that she has evidence E, S must be 
justified in believing that she has evidence E, but for S to 
be justified in believing that she has evidence E, S must 
know that she has evidence E' for the belief that she has 
evidence E, which entails that S is justified in believing 
that she has evidence E' for the belief that she has 
evidence E, and so on. Such an obj ection is misguided, 
however, because personal justification is not necessary for 
knowledge. Consequently, there is nothing objectionable 
about requiring S to know that she has evidence (in the form 
of an ultimately undefeated chain of reasoning) for p in 
order for her to be personally justified in believing that 
p. 
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for her holding that belief. 38 He has us consider a lawyer 
whose client is accused of committing eight murders. There 
is conclusive evidence that his client committed the first 
seven murders. The lawyer, like everyone else, believes 
that his client is guilty of the eighth murder, as well, 
since it has exactly the same modus operandi. However, the 
lawyer is a gypsy who believes that the cards never lie. 
After consulting the cards, which repeatedly say that his 
client is innocent, he comes to believe that his client did 
not commit the eighth murder. This causes him to dig deeper 
into the case, whereupon he discovers evidence of his 
client's innocence, to wit, his client could not have 
obtained the eighth murder weapon. This newfound evidence 
justifies the lawyer in believing that his client did not 
commit the eighth murder, but it does not in any way cause 
him to hold this belief. Instead, his belief is caused by 
his trust in the cards, for if he did not believe the cards, 
the evidence he uncovered would no longer convince him of 
his client's innocence. Thus, we are told, the reasons 
which justify the lawyer in holding his belief are not 
causally responsible for his holding it. 
38Keith Lehrer, "How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or 
The Case of the Gypsy Lawyer", The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. LXVIII, No. 10 (May 20, 1971), pp. 311-313. 
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Unfortunately, Lehrer's example breaks down upon closer 
inspection, at least if (PJ.*) is correct. His example is J 
supposed to show that the reasons which justify a person in 
holding a belief need not cause that belief. All that his 
example actually shows (if (PJj*) is correct) is that a 
person can have additional reasons for some belief that p 
which play no causal role in her believing that p. Given 
(PJ.*), the lawyer is justified in believing that his client J 
is innocent, before he discovers that his client could not 
have obtained the eighth weapon. After all, he has based 
his belief about his client's innocence on his beliefs that 
the cards never lie and that the cards say his client is 
innocent. From what we have been told about the lawyer, 
these latter two beliefs provide him with an ultimately 
undefeated chain of reasoning for his client's innocence. 
It is this chain of reasoning which justifies him in his 
belief about his client's innocence, and, of course, this 
chain of reasoning is also what causes him to hold the 
belief. Thus, we have not been given a case where the 
reasons which justify a person in holding a belief do not 
cause that belief. In a moment, I will present a case which 
does illustrate that a person can be justified in holding a 
belief on the basis of reasons which do not cause him to 
have that belief, but first I want to consider a potential 
objection to (PJ.*). J 
In obj ecting to Lehrer's example, I claimed that the 
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lawyer is justified in believing that his client is 
innocent, given (PJ.*), because he has based this belief on J 
his beliefs that the cards never lie and that the cards say 
that his client is innocent. I claimed this, even though I 
believe, as I expect you do, that basing beliefs on tarot 
predictions is a terribly unreliable way to form beliefs. 
But if we assume that the tarots are unreliable indicators, 
then how can they justify our gypsy lawyer in his belief 
about his client's innocence? The answer, which reveals the 
coherence theoretic implications of (PJ.*), 
J 
is 
straightforward. The lawyer does not believe that the 
tarots are unreliable. Unlike us, he believes that they are 
perfectly reliable guides to truth. Given what he believes, 
namely, that the tarots are reliable and that they say his 
client is innocent, it is entirely reasonable of him to 
believe that his client is innocent. 39 Although our gypsy 
lawyer is fundamentally misguided in some of his beliefs, 
given these beliefs, it is not profoundly irrational of him 
to conclude that his client is innocent. It is a virtue of 
the coherence theory that it allows us to recognize this 
391 am assuming that he does not believe any undefeated counterevidence to either of his reasons. If he were to 
believe some undefeated counterevidence to either of these 
reasons, then his chain of reasoning would not be ultimately 
undefeated, and so, according to (PJ. *), he would not be 
personally justified in believing ihat his client is 
innocent. 
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difference. 
Let us now return to the task of illustrating that the 
reasons which justify a person in holding a given belief 
need not be the cause of his having that belief. Consider 
the case of the paranoid husband: Max the millionaire is an 
extreme paranoiac who, throughout his twenty years of 
marriage, has lived with the unfounded, paranoiac belief 
that his wife is planning to kill him off for his millions. 
Fearing that his wife and the butler have been having an 
affair, he starts to eavesdrop on their conversations. One 
day, to his dismay, he overhears his wife tell the butler of 
her plans to get rid of her husband once and for all by 
inj ecting a lethal dose of air into his veins while he is 
sleeping. Hearing this, Max heads to the medicine cabinet, 
where he finds a brand new syringe, complete with hypodermic 
needle, which was not there two days ago. His beliefs about 
the presence of the syringe and about what his wife has said 
provide him with reasons which justify him in believing that 
his wife is planning to kill him, but they are not what 
causes him to hold this belief. His belief that his wife is 
planning to kill him is entirely the result of his paranoia. 
After all, had he not acquired the new evidence, he would 
have still believed out of paranoia that his wife is 
planning to kill him. Moreover, had he not been paranoid, 
he would have dismissed his wife's remarks and the presence 
of the syringe as nothing more than a somewhat morbid 
188 
practical joke. Given the above scenario, Max is justified 
in his belief about his wife's homocidal intentions, but the 
reasons in virtue of which he is justified are in no way 
causally responsible for his belief. 
It is not uncommon for theories of justification to 
maintain that a person is justified in believing that p only 
if her reasons for p are what cause her to believe that p.40 
Such theories are unable to handle the case of the paranoid 
husband, since they entail that Max is not justified in 
believing that his wife is planning to kill him, when 
intuitively he is justified in this belief. Unlike these 
theories, the linear coherence theory suggested by (PJ. *) J 
correctly evaluates Max as being justified in his belief 
about his wife's deadly plans, and so, once again (PJ .      J 
yields the right result. 
Presently, our account of personal justification is 
incomplete. (PJ.*) only tells us when a person is J 
personally justified in holding a belief. It does not tell 
us when a person is personally unjustified in holding a 
belief. Therefore, in order to complete our account of 
personal justificaton, we need to provide an analysis of 
personal unjustifiedness. We already know from (PJ ) that S u 
40 John Pollock's theory is one such theory. See his 
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, £E. cit., p. 41, where 
he asserts that the basing relation is at least partly a 
causal relation. 
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is personally unjustified in believing that p iff S is being 
epistemically irresponsible in believing that p. Epistemic 
irresponsibility is a function of knowingly making 
illegitimate epistemic moves, e.g. consciously ignoring 
counterevidence. Consequently, S is personally unjustified 
in believing that p just in case S knowingly makes 
epistemically illegitimate moves in coming to (or continuing 
to) believe that p. It is with this conception of personal 
unjustifiedness in mind that I offer the following analysis: 
S is personally unjustified in 
believing that p iff either 
(1) S comes to DeTieve that p by 
occurrently reasoning to p from 
an ultimately defeated chain of 
reasoning C, where a chain of 
reasoning C is ultimately 
defeated for S iff C is not 
ultimately undefeated for S 
(i.e. to say, iff S is aware of 
an undefeated aeIeater for at 
least one of the belief-links of 
C); or 
(2)(a) S comes to believe that p 
via a BCP other than 
occurrent reasoning, 
(b) S is occurrently aware 
ultimately undefeated 
of reasoning C 
supports tV p, and 
of an 
chain 
which 
(c) S believes each belief-link 
of C. 
It might be obj ected that (PJu *) 's analysans is so 
strong that no person will ever satisfy it and that, 
therefore, given the (PJ *) analysis, no person will ever u 
turn out to be personally unjustified in any of her beliefs. 
I think such an objection is simply mistaken. People rise 
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to the level of irrationality required by (PJu*) all to 
often. For example, cancer patients often persist in 
believing that they do not have cancer, despite their having 
been told by various medical authorities that they do have 
cancer. Parents of paralyzed children often continue to 
believe that their child will walk again, despite being 
inundated with conclusive evidence that their child's 
condition is permanent. Violent alcoholics frequently 
persist in believing that they can control their drinking, 
while knowing that they have repeatedly beaten their wives 
and children when intoxicated. Many a cigarette smoker 
believes that smoking is not harmful to one's health, in the 
face of warning labels, recommendations by the AMA, and 
reports by the surgeon general. And the lis t goes on. 
Unfortunately, there is no doubt that people can achieve the 
level of irrationality needed to satisfy the analysans of 
(PJu*), and when they do, they are personally unjustified in 
their beliefs. 
Given (PJ. i'') and (PJ *), the only thing needed to round J u 
out our account of personal justification is an analysis of 
personal ajustifiedness. We can formulate such an analysis 
quite simply as follows: 
(PJ *) a S is personally ajustified in believing that p iff 
(1) S believes that      
(2) S is neither personally 
justified nor personally 
unjustified in believing that p. 
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(PJ *) yields the result that we are personally ajustified a 
in holding most of our perceptual beliefs, since (1) we 
rarely occurrently notice chains of reasoning which support 
our perceptual beliefs and, so, usually are not personally 
justified in believing them, and (2) we rarely consciously 
ignore                  to our perceptual beliefs and, hence, 
generally are not personally unjustified in believing them, 
either. I submit that this is precisely the right result, 
since typically we deserve neither epistemic praise nor 
epistemic blame for our perceptual beliefs. 
Taken together,. (PJj*)' (PJu*)' and (PJa*) provide us 
with a sophisticated linear coherence theory.4l This 
theory, unlike the other theories of justification currently 
offered, allows us to make all three of the needed types of 
personal justification evaluations. For this reason alone, 
it is theoretically superior to these other theories. In 
light of its theoretical superiority and its ability to 
provide the intuitively correct personal justification 
evaluations, I submit that the linear coherence theory 
developed herein provides us with the correct account of 
personal justification. 
6. Laying the Regress Argument to Rest 
With the linear coherence theory of personal 
41To my knowledge, this is the first linear coherence 
theory to be offered in print. 
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justification now before us, we can easily see where the 
regress argument goes awry. The regress argument is 
unsound, because one of its starting assumptions, viz. A2, 
is false. A2 asserts: 
S is mediately justified in believing that p 
iff S comes to believe that p on the basis 
or-some other belief q which S is justified 
(either mediately or immediately) in 
believing. 
We considered such an assumption in section 5, subsection b, 
and rejected it on the grounds that it fails to take into 
account the way in .which we actually reason. When we 
reason, we reason from our beliefs in general, not just from 
the beliefs we are justified in believing. As a result, we 
concluded that personal justification is a function of our 
beliefs, not just a function of the beliefs we are justified 
in believing. Put another way, personal justification 
results via reasoning from our beliefs, not via reasoning 
exclusively from beliefs we are justified in holding, and 
therefore, A2 is false. Obviously, the falsity of A2 
undermines the regress argument. 
There is one other point worth mentioning, while we are 
reconsidering the regress argument. On the basis of the 
regress argument, it has been thought that coherence 
theories (especially linear coherence theories) must embrace 
circular chains of reasoning, i.e. type (iii) chains. This 
view has led many philosophers to dismiss coherence theories 
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as being unsatisfactory outright. Such an objection is 
misguided, however, since a linear coherence theory need not 
be committed to type (iii) chains. Instead, as we saw in 
section 5, a linear coherence theory can embrace type (i) 
chains, and type (i) chains are genuinely justification-
conferring, the regress argument to the contrary 
notwithstanding. I submit that a properly understood linear 
coherence theory, complete with type (i) chains, is much 
more plausible than its foundational rivals, since, unlike 
these rivals, it does not posit the existence of those 
mysterious unmoved epistemic movers known as "basic 
beliefs". 
7. Looking Ahead 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I claimed that personal 
justification has a crucial role to play in the theory of 
knowledge. However, in the present chapter, I have claimed 
repeatedly that personal justification is not necessary for 
knowledge. I still stand by both of these seemingly 
incongruous claims. Personal justification is not necessary 
for knowledge, because a person can know that p without 
deserving epistemic praise for believing that p. To think 
otherwise would be to over-intellectualize our ordinary 
notion of knowledge. Thus, it is true that personal 
justification has no positive role to play in the theory of 
knowledge. This, of course, is consistent with its having 
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some other kind of role to play in the theory. In the next 
chapter, we shall see that personal justification does have 
a crucial, albeit negative, role to play in an account of 
knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A PARTIAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE 
1. Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 were devoted to providing accounts of 
doxastic justification and personal justification. The 
present chapter is devoted to delineating the roles which 
these two types of justification play in the theory of 
knowledge. In order to specify their respective roles, I 
shall present a partial analysis of knowledge, an analysis 
consisting of necessary conditions for S to know that p. 1 
Ultimately, I argue that, of these two types of 
justification, only doxastic justification is necessary for 
knowledge. Nevertheless, personal justification is not 
irrelevant to knowledge. To the contrary, it plays a 
negative, undermining role in the theory of knowledge. 
The chapter proceeds in four stages. In section 2, I 
reconsider the knowledge conception of epistemic 
justification discussed in Chapter 1 and argue that the kind 
of justification needed for knowledge turns out to be 
doxastic justification. In section 3, I propose an analysis 
of "s knows that p" which takes into account doxastic 
II leave it an open question as to whether or not these 
necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for S to know 
that p. 
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justification's necessity. In section 4, I demonstrate that 
the analysis of knowledge offered in section 3 
satisfactorily handles some of the miriad of Gettier 
examples currently afloat. The chapter concludes with 
section 5, wherein I explore an alternative analysis of 
knowledge which is considerably stronger than the analysis 
proffered in section 3. The alternative analysis, unlike 
the weaker analysis of section 3, is found to be 
unsatisfactory as an analysis of our ordinary notion of 
knowledge. 
2. The Knowledge Conception of Epistemic Justification 
Revisited 
In Chapter 1, I identified three distinct conceptions 
of epistemic justification, viz. the doxastic conception, 
the personal conception, and the knowledge conception. I 
subsequently provided accounts for the kinds of epistemic 
justification associated with the former two conceptions. 
Since the goal of the present chapter is to provide an 
acceptable (if not complete) account of knowledge, it is 
only fitting that we return to the knowledge conception of 
epistemic justification and examine it more closely. Let us 
start with a brief review. 
According to the knowledge conception, epistemic 
justification is that which must be added to true belief (in 
non-Gettier situations) to get knowledge. Of course, we 
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get knowledge only when a particular kind of epistemic 
justification is added to true belief. That kind of 
epistemic justification can be characterized as follows: 
(KC) Epistemic justification is 
normative notion of positive 
appraisal that bears an 
internal connection with 
certain degree of which is 
for knowledge. 
a graded 
epistemic 
essential 
truth, a 
necessary 
Quite clearly, truth-connectedness is the essential feature 
of epistemic justification so-conceived. Thus, in a 
nutshell, (KC) tells us that the kind of epistemic 
justification needed for knowledge must be in some way 
conceptually connected with truth, i.e. it must possess a 
truth connection. 
In light of (KC), we can demonstrate that personal 
justification is not the kind of justification necessary for 
knowledge in the following 2 way: Given (KC), personal 
justification can be the kind of justification necessary for 
knowledge only if it has a truth connection. Personal 
justification has a truth connection iff for every possible 
world W, if conditions C make S personally justified in 
2The argument to be advanced is predicated on the 
assumption that only one kind of justification is necessary 
for knowledge. Were this assumption incorrect, the argument 
would only show that personal justification is not the kind 
of justification characterized by (KC). 
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believing that p in W, then conditions C make it probable 
that p is true in W. For personal justifiedness, the 
relevant conditions C are specified by the analysans of 
(PJ.*). 
J Simplifying (PJ.7(') J somewhat, S is personally 
justified in believing that p just in case the following 
condition is satisfied: 
(Cl) S has occurrently noticed an ultimately 
undefeated chain of reasoning        
supports p. 
Obviously, there are possible worlds W such that satisfying 
(Cl) in W does not make it probable that p is true in W. 
The demon world is a case in point. There, the demon sees 
to it that for every contingent proposition p, if S 
occurrently notices an ultimately undefeated chain of 
reasoning which supports p, then p is false. In addition, 
the demon sees to it that for every necessary proposition p, 
if S believes that p on the basis of some occurrently 
noticed chain of reasoning R, then S also occurrently 
notices an undefeated defeater for R. In such a world, 
whenever (Cl) is satisfied, p is false. Consequently, the 
conditions (C1), which make S personally justified in 
believing that p in the demon world, make it probable that p 
is false in that world. Since there is a possible world W 
where the conditions which make S personally justified in 
believing that p in W do not make it probable that p is true 
in W, personal justification lacks a truth connection. 
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Therefore, it follows that personal justification is not the 
kind of justification necessary for knowledge. 3 
We are now in a position to see that doxastic 
justification as analyzed by doxastic reliabilism is the 
kind of justification required for knowledge. We know from 
(KC) that the kind of justification needed for knowledge 
must have a truth connection. That doxastic justification 
possesses the requisite truth connection can be demonstrated 
as follows: 4 Doxastic justification has a truth connection 
iff for every possible world W, if conditions C make S' s 
belief that p doxastically justified in W, then conditions C 
make it probable that p is true in W. S's belief that p is 
doxastical1y justified in W iff the following condition is 
satisfied: 
(C2) S's belief that p is produced by a BCP 
that is actually reliable in W. 
A BCP is actually reliable in W just in case the indefinite 
probability of beliefs produced by it in W being true 
3An analogous argument can be advanced for any type of 
justification for which the conditions of justifiedness are 
formulated exclusively in terms of states internal to the 
cognizer. Hence, no brand of internalist justification can 
be the kind of justification necessary for knowledge. 
4A similar argument was advanced in Chapter 2 to illustrate that process reliabilism successfully affixes a 
probabilistic connection between justification and truth. 
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beliefs in W is high. Thus, for any possible world W, 
whenever (C2) is satisfied in W, it is highly probable that 
SIS belief that p belongs to the class of true beliefs in W, 
and so, it is highly probable that SIS belief that p is true 
in W (because members of the class of true beliefs in Ware 
true in W). Consequently, for every possible world W, the 
condition which makes SIS belief that p doxastically 
justified in W, viz. (C2), makes it probable that p is true 
in W. Therefore, it follows that doxastic justification has 
h . 5 a trut connectLon. 
We have just seen that doxastic justification is 
conceptually connected with truth. Since doxastic 
justification is conceptually truth-connected, it possesses 
the essential feature of the kind of justification necessary 
for knowledge. This observation, when combined with the 
general truth that if f is the essential feature of y and if 
x possesses f, then x is y, entails that doxastic 
justification is the kind of epistemic justification 
necessary for knowledge. 6 
SThat doxastic justification has a probabilistic truth 
connection can also be demonstrated as follows: Doxastic 
reliabilism identifies doxastically justified beliefs in W 
with reliably produced beliefs in W. Since, by definition, 
reliably produced beliefs in W have a high probability of 
belonging to the class of true beliefs in W, it follows that 
doxastically justified beliefs in W have a high probability 
of belonging to the class of true beliefs in Wand, hence, 
are probably true in W. 
6In Chapter 1, I claimed that the kind of epistemic 
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We have just found doxastic justification to be the 
kind of epistemic justification necessary for knowledge. 
Given this finding, it follows that any acceptable account 
of knowledge will have a doxastic justification component. 
The burden of the next section is to provide such an account 
of knowledge. 
3. Analyzing "S knows that p." 
My aim in the present section is to provide an account 
of knowledge which speci.fies several conditions necessary 
for S to know that p. It may turn out that these conditions 
are jointly sufficient for S to know that p, as well. 
However, for the purposes of the present discussion, I am 
only committed to their necessity. 7 So much by way of 
disclamatory preamble. 
justification needed for knowledge is analyzable and that in 
order to provide the required truth connection its analysis 
must be given by an externalist theory. We are now in a 
position to see that both claims are correct. Since 
doxastic reliabi1ism provides the correct analysis of 
doxastic justification and since doxastic justification is 
the kind of epistemic justification needed for knowledge, it 
follows that doxastic reliabilism is the correct analysis of 
the kind of epistemic justification needed for knowledge. 
We know from Chapter 3 that doxastic reliabi1ism is an 
externalist theory. Moreover, we saw in Chapter 3 that no 
internalist theory is capable of providing any kind of 
conceptual connection between justification and truth. 
71 do contend that the analysis to be offered is 
Most 
necessary 
epistemologists 
for knowledge. 8 
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agree that true belief is 
In fact, the traditional, 
knowledge conception of epistemic justification, according 
to which epistemic justification is that which must be added 
to true belief (in non-Gettier situations) to get knowledge, 
is predicated on the assumption that true belief is 
necessary for knowledge. In light of its nearly universal 
acceptance, the assumption that true belief is necessary for 
knowledge shall be taken as a starting assumption without 
argument. We can capture this starting assumption with the 
following partial analysis of knowledge: 
sufficient in non-Gettier situations for S to know that p. 
In fact, £rl the next section, I go even further and 
demonstrate that this analysis does handle some Gettier 
cases. Even so, in the face of increasingly complex Gettier 
examples, I am unwilling to commit to its sufficiency per 
see 
8 See, e.g. Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 
second ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:                 Inc., 
1977); Keith Lehrer, Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University 
Pres s , 1974); Marshall Swain, "Knowledge, Causality, and 
Justification", Essa s on Knowled e and Justification, ed. 
Pappas and Swain It aca, NY: Corne             Press, 
1978); Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing", Essays 
on            and Justification, £E. cit., and Epistemologa and            ( Cambridge, Mass, ana London: Harvar 
University Press, 1986); Robert Nozick, Philosophical 
Explanations (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1981); and John Pollock, Contemporary 
Theories of          (in manuscript). 
(AK) S knows that p      if 
(1) p is true, an 
(2) S believes that p. 
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Thus, our task is to specify additional conditions which, 
when conjoined with (AK)'s analysans, yield an illuminating 
account of knowledge capable of handling all non-Gettier 
situations. 
According to what is sometimes called the "traditional 
analysis" of knowledge, 9 in addition to truth and belief, 
some kind of epistemic justification is necessary for 
10 knowledge. In the previous section, we concluded that the 
kind of            justification needed for knowledge is 
doxastic justification, from which it follows that the 
correct account of knowledge must have a doxastic 
justification requirement. In order to provide this 
requirement, we need to modify (AK) in the following way: 
(AK') S knows that p only if 
(1) p is true, 
(2) S believes that p, and 
(3) SIS belief that p is doxastically 
justified. 
9George Pappas and Marshall Swain, "Introduction", 
Essays on Knowledge and Justification, £E. cit., p. 1. 
lOIn Chapter 1, we saw that some kind of epistemic 
justification is needed to rule out lucky guesses as 
instances of knowledge and that in order to do so, that kind 
of epistemic justification must have a truth connection. 
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While conditions (1) (3), as specified by (AK')' s 
analysans, are individually necessary for S to know that 
p,ll they are not alone sufficient for S to know that p, not 
even in non-Gettier situations. (AK')'s analysans is 
insufficient for knowledge, because there can be situations 
where it is subjectively irrational for a person to believe 
that p, even though, unbeknownst to him, conditions (1)-
(3) are satisfied, and in such situations, if the person 
continues to believe that p, his subj ective irrationality 
prevents him from knowing that p. An example will 
illustrate the point. Consider once again the case of 
12 Jones, whom we met in Chapter 2. This case, as you may 
recall, goes roughly as follows: Jones has been told that 
certain of his memory beliefs are completely erroneous. His 
parents, whose testi.mony is usually quite reliable, have 
fabricated an entirely false story to the effect that Jones 
suffered amnesia when he was seven, but later developed 
pseudo-memories of that period. Having no reason to doubt 
his parents, Jones believes what they have said. 
Nevertheless, he persists in believing the ostensible 
memories from his seven-year-old past. Since his memory 
11Conditions (1) and (2) are taken to be necessary by 
assumption. Condition (3) is necessary to rule out merely 
lucky guesses as instances of knowledge. 
12 See Chapter 2, p. 45. 
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beliefs result from genuine memory and original perceptions, 
which in the case at hand are actually reliable BCP' s, 
doxastic reliabilism says that his memory beliefs are 
d '11' 'f' d 13           y           . 
In the case just described, (AK')'s conditions (1) -
(3) are all satisfied. Jones' memory beliefs are 
doxastically justified, since they result from actually 
reliable memory, and so, condition (3) is satisfied. Since 
Jones continues to hold these memory beliefs, condition (2) 
is satisfied. Moreover, his memory beliefs are true, his 
parents testimony to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence, 
condition (1) is also satisfied. Nevertheless, Jones does 
not know that which he believes about his seven-year-old 
past. After all, Jones has compelling counterevidence for 
these memory beliefs, in light of which it is subjectively 
irrational of him to continue to hold them. Ironically, if 
Jones were to stop ignoring this counterevidence, he would 
13The case is due to Alvin Goldman and appears in his 
"What Is Justified Belief?", Justification and Knowledge, 
ed. George Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1979), p. 18. Goldman presents the case as a counterexample 
to reliabilist theories like doxastic reliabilism. In 
Chapter 2, I argued that Goldman is mistaken to regard it as 
a counterexample, since the fault lies with Jones, not with 
his memory beliefs. There, it was concluded that Jones' 
memory beliefs are doxastically justified, just as doxastic 
reliabilism asserts, but that Jones, given his 
counterevidence, is personally unjustified in believing 
them. 
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worsen his epistemic situation by giving up many true 
beliefs. But this ironic wrinkle hardly exculpates Jones, 
since it could only do so, if Jones himself were aware of 
the wrinkle, which he is not. From his own internal 
standpoint, Jones is continuing to hold beliefs that he has 
good reason to think are false and, thus, is being 
epistemically irresponsible in continuing to hold them. 
There is, I submit, an overriding intuition that 
epistemically irresponsible behavior cannot yield knowledge, 
not even in cases where it does accidentally yield 
doxastically justified true belief. Thus, we must conclude 
that Jones lacks knowledge about his seven-year-old past, 
even though his beliefs in this regard are doxastically 
justified true beliefs. Consequently, (AK')'s analysans is 
not sufficient for knowledge. 
We have just observed that doxastically justified true 
belief is not sufficient for knowledge, because it can be 
undermined by epistemically irresponsible behavior on the 
part of the would-be knower. Thus, in order to provide an 
adequate account of knowledge, a further condition must be 
added to (AK')'s analysans. Appealing to the Jones case can 
help us determine what this further condition should be. 
We concluded that Jones lacks knowledge of certain of 
his memory beliefs, because 
irresponsible of him to continue 
it is epistemically 
to hold those beliefs. 
However, this diagnosis of Jones' lack of knowledge, despite 
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its intuitiveness, is somewhat superficial. What ultimately 
prevents Jones from knowing certain of his memory beliefs is 
that which makes it epistemically irresponsible of him to 
continue to hold those beliefs. What makes it epistemically 
irresponsible of him to continue to hold his memory beliefs 
is the fact that he is aware of undefeated counterevidence 
in the form of rebutting defeaters for these beliefs. This 
suggests that in order for 8 to know that p, 8 must not be 
aware of any defeaters for p or for the chain of reasoning 
which supports p (assuming there is such a chain) . 
But notice, this requirement is equivalent to the 
requirement that 8 not be personally unjustified in 
believing that p. It is, I submit, this latter requirement 
which should be built into our account of knowledge. 80 
supplementing (AK'), we get: 
(AK*) 8 knows that p only if 
( 1 ) p is true, 
(2) S believes that p, 
(3) 8's belief that p is doxasti-
cally justified, and 
(4) 8 is not personally unjustified 
in believing that p. 
I contend that (AK*) provides us with an analysis of 
knowledge which adequately accounts for most (if not all) of 
our knowledge. In the next section, I shall show that (AK*) 
is even capable of handling some Gettierized cases. 
However, before turning to the Gettier problem, I want to 
point out two virtues of the (M<*) account. 
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Perhaps the most impressive virtue of the (AK*) theory 
is the unique way in which it accounts for our perceptual 
knowledge. (AK*) accounts for our perceptual knowledge in 
the following way: Usually, our perceptual beliefs result 
14 from actually reliable perceptual processes and, hence, 
are doxastically justified, just as, usually, we are 
personally ajustified in believing our perceptual beliefs 
and, thus, are not personally unjustified in believing them. 
When, as is often the case, we are personally ajustified in 
believing our doxastically justified perceptual beliefs and 
they happen to be true, then we have perceptual knowledge. 
Thus, our theory asserts that we can and typically do have 
perceptual knowledge without being personally justified in 
our perceptual beliefs. That this is a virtue of the theory 
can be seen by contrasting it with those theories that do 
require personal justification for knowledge. Theories that 
do require personal justification for knowledge are forced 
to embrace ad hoc theories of personal justification, which 
say that we are personally justified in believing most of 
our perceptual beliefs, so that they can yield the result 
141 am assuming that the actual world is not a demon 
world. If, however, the actual world is a demon world (or 
some other kind of manipulated world) such that our 
perceptual processes are not actually' reliable, then (AKi'c') 
rightly entails that we have no perceptual knowledge. 
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that we do have perceptual knowledge .15 The problem with 
such theories is that once they embrace their ad hoc 
theories of personal justification, they no longer possess 
the theoretical means to distinguish the person who actively 
uncovers reasons for her perceptual beliefs from the person 
who simply holds her perceptual beliefs willy-nilly. After 
all, since both persons have perceptual knowledge, these 
theories are forced to assume that both persons are 
personally justified in their perceptual beliefs. Our 
theory avoids this unhappy result, because it allows us to 
maintain that while both persons have perceptual knowledge, 
only the former is personally justified in her perceptual 
beliefs. 
A second and related virtue of (AK*) is that it does 
not require any grandiose intellection on the part of the 
would-be knower. As a result, it allows us to account for 
the knowledge had by young children and even for the 
knowledge had by non-humanoid animals. I take it to be an 
adequacy constraint on a theory of (ordinary) knowledge that 
it be able to account for children and non-humanoid animal 
knowledge, especially since a theory which is unable to 
ls If they do not embrace a theory of personal 
justification, according to which we are personally 
justified in most of our perceptual beliefs, then they yield 
skepticism with regard to our perceptual beliefs. 
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account for such knowledge probably cannot account for the 
man-in-the-street's knowledge, either. That our theory 
(AK*) satisfies this constraint lends further credence to 
its being a correct (if not complete) analysis of knowledge. 
In light of these virtues, I submit that (AK*) provides 
us with a very plausible account of knowledge. Let us now 
turn to see how (AK*) fares in the wake of Gettier examples. 
4. The Gettier Problem 
a. (AK*) and Two Easy Cases 
In his article 
Knowledge?",16 Edmund Gettier 
"Is Justified 
single-handedly 
True Belief 
altered the 
course of contemporary epistemology by conclusively 
demonstrating that justified true belief is not sufficient 
for knowledge. To set the stage for his counterexamples to 
the justified true belief analysis, Gettier avers that 
in the sense of 'justified' in which S' s 
being justified in believing P is a 
necessary condition of S' s knowing that P, 
it is possible for a person to be justified 
in belfrving a proposition that is in fact 
false. 
16Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?", Analysis, Vol. xxiii (1963), pp. 121-123. 
17 Ibid ., p. 121. Interestingly enough, here Gettier is 
employing personal justification without realizing it. As 
we shall soon see, distinguishing personal and doxastic 
justification provides us with the means needed to solve at 
least some of the Gettier problems that have been raised. 
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Having so avowed his fallibilism, Gettier presents us with a 
case where Smith has strong evidence for the proposition: 
(p) Jones owns a Ford. 
As far back as Smith can remember, Jones has always owned a 
Ford. Moreover, Jones has just offered Smith a ride while 
driving a Ford. 18 Smith realizes that (p) entails the 
following proposition: 
(q) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona. 
Al though Smith has no evidence as to his friend Brown's 
whereabouts, having seen the connection between (p) and (q), 
he believes (q) on the basis of (p) and this recognized 
entailment, and so, he is justified in believing that (q). 
Now here is the rub. Unbeknownst to Smith, Jones has sold 
his Ford and is now driving a rental car. But, as luck 
would have it, Brown happens to be in Barcelona. Thus, (q) 
is true, Smith believes that (q), and Smith is justified in 
believing that (q). Nevertheless, Smith does not know that 
(q), since from his vantage point, it is simply a matter of 
18 If need be, the case can be strengthened by assuming 
that Smith was with Jones a few months earlier when he 
purchased a Ford exactly like the one he was driving when he 
offered Smith a ride. 
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I k h () . 19 uc t at q LS true. 
This original Gettier case is easily accommodated by 
our theory (AK*). Since (q) is true, Smith believes that 
(q), and Smith is personally justified in believing that 
(q),20 conditions (1), (2), and (4) of (AK*)'s analysans are 
all sa.tisfied. Nevertheless, (AK*) , s condition (3) is not 
satisfied. The process that gives rise to Smith's belief 
that (q) is reasoning from rep) and (p) entails (q)] to (q). 
But notice, the process of reasoning from [(p) and (p) 
entails (q)] to (q) is a conditionally reliable process. 
Moreover, we know from Chapter 2, that a conditionally 
reliable process is actually reliable just in case its input 
beliefs are true. Since (p) is false, the process of 
reasoning from rep) and (p) entail (q)] to (q) is not 
actually reliable. Furthermore, since a belief is 
19To stress the lucky nature of Smith's justified true 
belief that (q), Gettier tells us that Smith also believes 
the following propositions: 
(n) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Boston. 
(s) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Brest-Litovak. 
Smith has exactly the same evidence for (q), (n), and (s), 
namely, (p) which he is justified in believing and (p) 
entails the propositions (q), (n), and (s), which he is also 
justified in believing. Surely, that (q) turns out to be 
true is a matter of luck from Smith's standpoint. 
20(PJ.*) entails that Smith is personally justified in 
believing ihat (q). 
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doxastically justified iff it results from an actually 
reliable BCP, Smith's belief that (q) is not doxastically 
justified, for it results from a conditionally reliable BCP 
with a false input belief. Since Smith's belief that (q) is 
not doxastically justified, condition (3) of (AK*)'s 
analysans is not satisfied. Therefore, (AK*) yields the 
right result, namely, that Smith does not know that (q).2l 
Let us now consider another counterexample to the justified 
true belief analysis of knowledge, which, for reasons that 
will soon become apparent, it seems inappropriate to call a 
"Gettier example". 
It cannot be denied that Gettier deserves much credit 
for convincing the epistemological community that justified 
true belief is insufficient for knowledge. Even so, nearly 
a century earlier, Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) presented his 
own decisive counterexample to the justified true belief 
analysis of knowledge, a counterexample which went largely 
unnoticed by the philosophical community. Meinong's 
counterexample goes roughly as follows: A man walks into a 
lecture hall and, wanting to know the time, checks the clock 
on the wall, which says that it is twelve o'clock. 
21Gettier's second example can be dealt with in exactly 
the same fashion and, thus, poses no problem for (AK*). 
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Naturally, the man believes that it is twelve o'clock, and 
he is justified in holding this belief on the basis of what 
the clock says. After all, clocks justify us in temporal 
beliefs all the time. Moreover, it really is twelve 
0' clock, and so, his belief is true. Thus, the man is 
justified in believing. his true belief that it is twelve 
o'clock. But, the story continues, the man does not know 
that it is twelve o'clock, because, unbeknownst to him, the 
clock stopped at twelve midnight the night before. Had he 
looked at the clock, say, an hour earlier, he still would 
have believed it to be twelve o'clock. Since it is just a 
lucky coincidence that he looked at the clock when he did, 
he does not know that it is twelve o'clock. 
Our theory handles Meinong's example, as well. In his 
example, it is true that it is twelve o'clock, the man 
believes that it is twelve 0' clock, and he is personally 
justified in this belief (since the clock gives him good 
reason to think that it is twelve o'clock). Thus, 
conditions (1), (2), and (4) of (AK*)'s analysans are 
satisfied. However, once again, condition (3) is 
unsatisfied. The process that gives rise to the man's 
temporal belief, to wit, inferring the time from a stopped 
clock, is an actually unreliable BCP, for it tends to 
produce false beliefs. Since the man's belief results from 
an actually unreliable BCP, it is not doxastically 
justified. Since his belief is not doxastically justified, 
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(AK*)'s condition (3) does not obtain. Consequently, (AK*) 
entails that the man does not know that it is twelve 
0' clock, and thus, once again, (AK*) yields the correct 
result. 
In this subsection, we have seen that (AK*) possesses 
the theoretical means needed to handle not only Gettier' s 
original examples, but also the original "Gettier example'" 
raised by Meinong, and this sugges ts that (AK''() may be 
sufficient for knowledge, after all. However, the examples 
considered so far are, admittedly, some of the easier 
Gettier examples to deal with, and so, it would be premature 
to conclude that (AK*) is sufficient for knowledge. In the 
next subsection, I shall examine two much more difficul t 
Gettier cases, which, if correct, do seem to undermine 
(AK*)'s sufficiency. 
b. The Harman Cases and Reflective Equilibrium 
22 In his book Thought, Gilbert Harman presents 
three Gettierized cases which threaten to undermine (AK*) as 
a sufficient condition for knowledge. Each of these cases 
presents us with a person who is personally justified in 
believing some doxastically justified true belief that p, 
22Gilbert Harman, Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1973). 
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but who supposedly does not know that p because there exists 
readily available misleading evidence, which the person does 
not yet possess. It should be noted that if Harman is right 
in his assumption that a person so situated lacks knowledge, 
then his cases do provide counterexamples to (AK*)'s 
sufficiency. I shall present two of these purported 
counterexamples, but before doing so, a few methodological 
remarks are in order. 
At the outset of this chapter, I disavowed any 
commitment to (AK*)'s sufficiency for knowledge. That 
disavowal still stands and should be taken as the context 
for these methodological remarks. I have already admitted 
that if Harman's examples are intuitively correct, then they 
do constitute legitimate counterexamples to (AK*)'s 
sufficiency. With that said, I must also admit that I, for 
one, do not share Harman's intuitions regarding these 
cases. 23 More importantly, I have discussed Harman's cases 
with numerous persons, epistemologists and 
non-epistemologists alike, and their intuitions are split 
23Two comments are in order. First, I am not just claiming to have contrary intuitions in order to save 
(AK*)'s sufficiency, since I genuinely am not committed to 
its sufficiency at this time. I am claiming contrary 
intuitions, because my intuitions really do conflict with 
Harman's. Second, my intuitions regarding Harman's cases 
conflicted with his, long before I ever conceived of (AK*). 
217 
along three lines. Some agree with Harman that the persons 
in his examples do not possess knowledge. Others think 
Harman is mistaken and maintain that the persons in question 
do have knowledge. Still others admit that they have no 
clear intuitions one way or the other. In such a situation, 
one seems ill-advised to abandon or modify one's theory in 
immediate response to the counterexamples. Instead, one 
should proceed with caution, keeping the following 
legitimate, methodological principle in mind: 
(MP) One need not abandon or modify a 
philosophical theory in response to a 
purported counterexample unless 
(1) the counterexample rests on clear 
intuitions shared by the bulk of 
the philosophical community, 
(2) the counterexample is taken to a 
be a genuine counterexample by the 
bulk of said community, and 
(3) one cannot show said community to 
be          regarding (1) and/or 
(2) • 
I realize, however, that if a person strongly shares 
Harman's intuitions, then she will, more than likely, think 
(AK*) in need of modification. Her thinking this is not 
directly at odds with (MP). (MP) simply asserts that it is 
not incumbent upon one to make such modifications, unless 
241 want to thank Ann Levey for suggesting such a 
principle to me. The current version of (MP) , however, is 
entirely my own, as are any mistakes that may have been made 
in its formulation. 
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conditions (1)-(3) are satisfied. When conditions (1)-(3) 
remain unsatisfied, as they do for the Harman examples, one 
is free to exercise discretion concerning .whether or not to 
modify the theory. We may, for instance, find it more 
reasonable to modify (or abandon) the intuitions than to 
modify the theory. Fortunately, there is a rational 
procedure for deciding whether we should modify the theory 
or modify the intuitions, instead. That procedure is to 
seek a Rawlsean/Goodmanesque state of "reflective 
equilibrium,,25 between theory and intuition. 
The method of reflective equilibrium was firs t 
propounded by Nelson Goodman in his "The New Riddle of 
Induction".26 There, he is concerned with explaining how we 
determine the correctness of general rules of inference and 
of the particular inferences they yield. He tells us that 
the correctness of rules and of particular inferences is 
established by bringing the rules and particular inferences 
into agreement with each other in the following way: 
25 John Rawls coined the term I reflective equilibrium I 
in his A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). For a shorter 
presentation, see "A Theory of Justice", excerpted and 
reprinted in Justice and Economic Distribution, ed. Arthur 
and Shaw (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978), 
pp. 23-26. 
26Nelson Goodman, "The New Riddle of Induction", Fact, 
Fiction, and Forecast, fourth ed. (Cambridge, Mass. and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 59-83. 
A rule is amended if it yields an inference 
we are unwilling to accept; an inference is 
rejected if it           a rule we are 
unwilling to amend. 
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By so proceeding, we eventually reach (or at least approach) 
a state of reflective equilibrium where the rules we accept 
only yield inferences we accept and the inferences we make 
accord with rules we accept. At this point, we are 
justified in taking both the rules and the inferences they 
yield to be correct. 
I submit that we can (and should) use a similar process 
of mutual adjustment to help us decide when to modify our 
theory of knowledge to fit our intuitions and when to modify 
our intuitions to fit our theory of knowledge. In order to 
describe this process, I shall define a clear case as a case 
where we share very clear intuitions concerning whether or 
not the person in question knows, an unclear case as a case 
where we have unclear or divided intuitions as to whether or 
not the person in question knows, and a clear theory as a 
theory capable of accommodating all the clear cases. In 
order to bring our theory of knowledge and our intuitions 
into agreement, we should proceed as follows: Our theory of 
knowledge is to be modified (or abandoned) if it cannot 
accommodate the clear cases. Once we arrive at a clear 
27 Ib i d., p. 64. 
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theory of knowledge, i. e. a theory which does account for 
the clear cases, our intuitions in unclear cases are to be 
adjusted so as to accord with the dictates of our clear 
theory. Simply put, clear cases take precedence over any 
theory of knowledge, and a clear theory of knowledge takes 
precedence over unclear cases. By proceeding in this way, 
we should gradually reach (or approach) a point where our 
theory of knowledge accommodates our intuitions and where 
our intuitions accord with our theory of knowledge, a point 
of epistemic equilibrium as it were. This concludes my 
methodological remarks. I shall now present two of Harman's 
purported counterexamples to (AK*)'s sufficiency. 
In one example your friend Donald has gone off to Italy 
for the summer. He told you that he was going to Italy, and 
you saw him off at the airport. As a practical joke, Donald 
decides to fool you into believing that he is in California, 
rather than Italy. So, he writes several letters saying 
that he has gone to San Francisco for the surruner, and he 
sends them to someone he knows there, who, in turn, sends 
them to you with San Francisco postmarks, one at a time. 
Having been out of town a week yourself, you have not as yet 
read any of the letters. You are now about to open your 
mail from the past week, which includes two of the phony 
letters. Just then a mutual friend calls and asks you if 
you know where Donald is. You reply, "Yes, I know that he 
is in Italy." As Harman sees it, 
You are right about where Donald is and it 
would seem that your justification for 
believing that Donald is in Italy makes no 
reference to letters from San Francisco. 
But you do not know that Donald is in Italy. 
Your knowledge is            by evidence you 
do not as yet possess. 
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In another example, we are to imagine the following 
scenario: 
A political leader is assassinated. His 
associates, fearing a coup, decide to 
pretend that the bullet hit someone else. 
On Nationwide television they announce that 
an assassination attempt has failed to kill 
the leader but has killed a secret service 
man by mistake. However, before the 
announcement is made, an enterprising 
reporter on the scene telephones the real 
s tory to his newspaper, which has included 
the story in its final edition. Jill buys a 
copy of that paper and reads the story of 
the assassination. What she reads is true 
and so are her assumptions         how the 
story came to be in the paper. 
Harman concludes that even though Jill has justified true 
belief, she does not know that the political leader has been 
assassinated, because of the undermining television evidence 
30 she does not possess. Let us now examine each of these 
examples in turn, keeping in mind our goal of epistemic 
28Gilbert Harman, Thought, £E. cit., p. 143. 
29 Ibid ., pp. 143-144. 
30 Ibid., p. 144. 
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equilibrium. 
In the first example, it is true that Donald is in 
Italy, and you believe that Donald is in Italy. Moreover, 
since your belief that Donald is in Italy is based on 
Donald's testimony and on your belief that you saw him board 
a plane bound Italy, which confirms his testimony, and since 
you have no reason to think that Donald was lying, you are 
personally justified in believing that he is in Italy. 
Hence, we have another case where          s conditions (1), 
(2), and (4) are satisfied. However, in this case it also 
looks as if condition (3) is satisfied, because your belief 
that Donald is in Italy is the result of inference based on 
testimony, which presumably is an actually reliable 
31 process. Since (AK*)'s analysans is satisfied, it follows 
that either you do know that Donald is in Italy or else 
(AK*)'s analysans is not sufficient for knowledge. Since, 
at least among the people I have consulted, intuitions are 
genuinely divided concerning whether or not you know that 
Donald is in Italy, the Donald case is an unclear case. 
Therefore, since (AK*) has been able to handle the clear 
cases so far examined, our method of seeking epistemic 
equilibrium dictates that we bring our intuitions in line 
31Thomas Reid observed, and I think rightly so, that 
people have a natural propensity towards honesty, and as a 
result, their testimony tends to be true. See his Inquiry 
and Essays, ed. Lehrer and Beanblossom (Indianapolis, IN: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1975), pp. 93-95. 
223 
with (AK*) and assume that you do know Donald's whereabouts. 
While I do believe that this is the most rational way to 
deal with unclear 
. b . 32           eggLng. 
cases, it may strike some as 
It would, at any rate, be more 
satisfying intellectually, if we could explain away Harman's 
contrary intuitions to the effect that you do not know. 
Harman does not actually explain why he thinks that you 
lack knowledge of Donald's whereabouts, except that there is 
undermining evidence which you do not possess. 
Nevertheless, he presumably has something like the following 
in mind. You hang up the phone and start opening your mail 
from the past week. A few minutes pass, and sure enough, 
you stumble upon and read one of Donald's phony letters. 
Then, you find the second letter, as well. On the basis of 
these letters, you come to believe that Donald is in San 
Francisco. Thus, one thing is clear: You do not now know 
that Donald is in Italy. Moreover, you now think you know 
that you did not know that Donald is in Italy, after all. 
But notice, your thinking this is consistent with your 
having actually known that Donald is in Italy. After all, 
32Actually, such question-beggingness seems to be built 
into the method of seeking epistemic equilibrium (or any 
other kind of reflective equilibrium for that matter). In 
short, just as we beg the question in favor of clear cases, 
so too we beg the question in favor of clear theories over 
unclear cases. 
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knmving that you didn't know is tricky business, just as 
tricky, I dare say, as knowing that you know. 33 Since you 
could easily be mistaken in thinking that you now know that 
you didn't know that Donald is in Italy, your thinking this 
hardly constitutes good evidence that you did not know. So, 
Harman must have had something else in mind. Perhaps, he 
thinks that since you do not now know that Donald is in 
Italy, you could not have known that Donald is in Italy ten 
minutes earlier before you read the letters. But this would 
only be true, if the following principle were true: 
(P '" K) If S does not know that p at t, then 
S did not know that p at t-l. 
But this principle is false. S might know that p at t-l and 
then forget that p at t and, so, not know that p at t. Once 
again, we are left without a good reason for thinking that 
you did not know that Donald is in Italy. 
On the other hand, (AK*) , offers a natural suggestion 
for why you do know that Donald is in Italy, before you read 
33In order for you to know that you didn't know, you 
would have to believe that you didn't know, this belief 
would have to be doxastically justified, you would have to 
not be personally unjustified in believing it, and most 
important of all, it would have to be true that you didn't 
know, which is the very thing in question. Thus, assuming 
that you know you didn't know equally begs the question. 
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the letters. Your belief that Donald is in Italy is 
reliably produced and ipso facto doxastic justified, thereby 
giving it a high probability of being true. Moreover, you 
are personally justified (and hence, not personally 
unjustified) in believing that Donald is in Italy. Given 
your situation, it would have been epistemica11y irrational 
of you not to believe that Donald is in Italy. That you are 
being epistemica11y rational in holding the belief, a belief 
which has been reliably produced, makes it at least 
plausible to think that you do know that Donald is in Italy. 
In short, in the absence of any good reason for thinking you 
don't know Donald's whereabouts, it is at least as 
reasonable (if not more so) to think that you do possess 
such knowledge. This being the case, sticking with our 
theory (AK*) , as epistemic equilibrium requires, is 
certainly a reasonable thing to do. Now, let us turn to the 
Jill example. 
Regarding this example, Harman does offer an 
explanation for why Jill lacks knowledge, despite having 
justified true belief. His explanation is as follows: 
[Jill] does not know that the political 
leader has been assassinated. For everyone 
else has heard about the televised 
announcement. They may also have seen the 
story in the paper and, perhaps, do not know 
what to believe; and it is highly 
im 1ausib1e that Jill should know sim 1 
eVL ence everyone e se 
Her knowledge is 
she does not 
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34 possess (emphasis added). 
Is it really so implausible that Jill should know just 
because she lacks evidence everyone else has? I do not 
think so. After all, it is not at all implausible that a 
person should know just because he is in a different 
evidential situation than everyone else. In fact, this 
happens all the time. Admittedly, the normal case is when 
the person has more evidence than everyone else and, thus, 
knows, where everyone else lacks knowledge. But not always. 
Sometimes a person knows, where everyone else lacks 
knowledge, not because he has more evidence, but because he 
has different evidence. This suggests, and I think rightly 
so, that whether or not a person knows is more a function of 
the quality of his evidence than the quantity of his 
evidence. Jill has less evidence than everyone else, but 
she has good evidence. After all, reputable newspapers are 
reliable sources of information. Is it implausible to think 
that Jill knows just because she has good evidence in the 
form of a reputable newspaper's column? Of course not. And 
this description of Jill's situation is just as fair and 
accurate a description as Harman's description that she 
knows "just because she lacks evidence that everyone else 
has". It is, I submit, a mistake on Harman's part to focus 
34Gilbert Harman, Thought, £E. cit., p. 144. 
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on the quantity, rather than the quality, of Jill's 
evidence. 
Jill bases her belief about the political leader's 
assassination on good evidence, for which she has no 
defeaters, and so, she is personally justified in believing 
that the political leader has been assassinated. Moreover, 
since inferr.ing beliefs from reputable newspapers is a 
reliable way to form beliefs, her belief is doxastically 
justified, as well. And since her belief is also true, it 
seems quite reasonable to maintain that she knows whereof 
she believes. True, if she learns of the televised 
announcement, then she will not know; but, and here lies the 
crux of the biscuit, this is not the evidential situation 
that she currently is in. In her current situation, where 
she has no defeaters for her evidence, it is plausible to 
think that she knows. Thus, unless we are given a better 
explanation of Jill's purported lack of knowledge, an 
explanation which converts this unclear case into a clear 
case, we should seek epistemic equilibrium by agreeing with 
       's assessment that Jill does, in fact, know that the 
political leader has been assassinated. 
It might be objected that my discussion of Jill's 
situation has overlooked the most important feature of the 
Jill example, namely, that Jill is extremely lucky to be in 
the evidential situation she is in, and since knowledge is 
not a matter of luck, Jill does not know that the political 
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leader has been assassinated. Such an obj ection is 
misguided, however, because there is more than one way for 
a person to be lucky and not all of these are incompatible 
wi th knowledge. There is, I submit, an epistemologically 
relevant difference between the person who is lucky because, 
given her evidential situation, it is a matter of luck that 
her belief turns out to be true, and the person who is lucky 
to be in the evidential situation she is in, but that, once 
in this situation, it is not a matter of luck that her 
belief is true. Let us say the former person is 1uckYl and 
the latter person is lucky 2. Examples of persons who are 
1uckYl include the person who holds a true belief by merely 
guessing and the person in typical Gettier cases whose 
justification (i.e. what justifies her) in holding a belief 
has nothing to do with that belief's being true. 35 Jill, on 
the other hand, is 1uckY2' since she is lucky to be in the 
evidential situation she is in vis-a-vis the political 
leader's assassination, but, given that she is in this 
evidential situation and has a reliably produced belief, it 
is not a matter of luck that her belief is true. Clearly, 
35For example, in Gettier's example, Smith's evidence 
that Jones owns a Ford, which justifies him in believing 
that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, has 
nothing to do with the latter belief's being true, since it 
is true because Brown is in Barcelona and not because Jones 
owns a Ford. 
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'the person who is luckYl lacks knowledge. Should we 
likewise conclude that people like Jill who are luckY2 lack 
knowledge? I do not think we should. To see why, consider 
the following case: Joe now knows that it is storming 
outside, because he sees the rain and wind whipping around 
outside his study's window. Surely, this is a typical case 
of perceptual knowledge. Even though Joe knows that it is 
storming, he could have just as easily not known this, since 
he could have been working in his windowless carrel in the 
bowels of the library, instead of in his study. Moreover, 
since Joe works in his carrel at least as often as he works 
in his study, it is largely a matter of luck that he is in 
his present evidential situation vis-a-vis the storm, rather 
than the evidential situation he would have been in, had he 
been in his carrel. While it is true that Joe is lucky to 
be in his present evidential situation (for he could have 
easily been in a much less fortuitous evidential situation 
vis-a-vis the storm), surely, we do not want to deny that he 
knows that it is storming, when he sees the wind and rain 
whipping around outside his window, for what could be a more 
standard case of perceptual knowledge? 
Of course, once we admit that Joe knows that it is 
storming, despite the luck involved in his being in a 
evidential situation appropriate for such knowledge, i. e. 
despite his being luckY2' we should, by parity of reason, 
also admit that Jill knows that the political leader has 
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been assassinated, despite her being luckY2' Since Jill's 
being lucky 2 does not prevent her from knowing that the 
political leader has been assassinated, we are once again 
left with no good reason for thinking that she lacks such 
knowledge. Without a clearly intuitive reason for thinking 
that Jill does not know, our method of seeking epistemic 
equilibrium dictates that we should side with (AK*) and 
maintain that she does, in fact, have knowledge of the 
political leader's assassination. 
We began, in subsection a, by considering two fairly 
typical Gettier-type cases where the persons in question 
were luckYl and, hence, lacked knowledge, and we saw that 
(AK*) concurred and, thus, correctly handled both of these 
clear cases. In the present subsection, we have just 
examined two extremely controversial cases, due to Harman, 
both of which threatened to undermine (AK*)'s sufficiency. 
However, since both of these examples were found to rest on 
widely disputed intuitions, both failed to offer convincing 
proof of (AK*) , s insufficiency. Thus, I submit that, in 
light of our method of epistemic equilibrium, since (AK*) 
does accurately account for the clear cases so far examined, 
we are justified in regarding (AK*) , s analysans as both 
necessary and sufficient, at least until a clear 
counterexample to its sufficiency is presented. 36 Let us, 
36 1 remain open to the possibility that such a 
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therefore, agree that (AK*) provides us with a prima facie 
correct theory of knowledge. 
5. Ordinary versus Intellectual Knowledge 
In section 3 of the present chapter, I claimed that a 
theory of ordinary knowledge is adequate only if it is able 
to account for the knowledge had by young children and 
non-humanoid animals. I then suggested that it is a virtue 
of (AK*) that it satisfies this adequacy constraint. Some 
philosophers would disagree. For example, Lehrer and Cohen 
would deny that the constraint I proposed is really an 
adequacy constraint on a theory of knowledge, since they do 
not think that young children and non-humanoid animals have 
knowledge, and would, therefore, deny that (AK*)'s 
satisfying such a constraint constitutes a virtue. 
Regarding the question of young children and non-humanoid 
animal knowledge, they tell us, 
Here we must, of course, be wary of the 
sympathetic fallacy. The charm of very 
small children and animals naturally 
disposes us to attribute cognitive 
accomplishments to them of which they are 
entirely incapable. We prefer to say that 
such beir:¥f have information but lack 
knowledge. 
counterexample does exist, and for this reason, I am not 
fully committed to (AK*)'s sufficiency. 
37Keith Lehrer and Stewart Cohen, "Justification, 
Truth, and Coherence", Synthese, Vol. 55 (1983), p. 200. 
They then suggest, 
To avoid a verbal impasse, however, one 
might choose to speak of such beings as 
having a primitive form of knowledge which 
lacks the usual justification that is a 
constituen58 of a more advanced form of 
knowledge. 
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Their theory is offered as an analysis of advanced 
knowledge, rather than its more "primitive" counterpart. 
That they have identified different conceptions of knowledge 
and have chosen to analyze their favored conception is 
unobjectionable. If, however, they mean to imply that 
advanced knowledge is the kind of knowledge that adult human 
b 0 dO 01 h 39 h h 0 O. f 1        or       y ave, t en t                      ar ess 
benign, for whether or not non-humanoid animals have the 
same kind of knowledge as that ordinarily had by adult human 
beings is precisely what is in question. Just as Lehrer and 
Cohen have cautioned us not to commit the sympathetic 
fallacy in answering this question, so too should we caution 
them, when answering this question, not to commit the 
superiority fallacy, the fallacy human beings are wont to 
make of taking themselves to have cognitive capabilities 
38 Ibid. 
39 It looks as if they do mean to        this, given the 
pejorative nature of "primitive knowledge'. 
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radically superior (even to the extent of being radically 
different in kind) to those had by other animals, despite 
the fact that we recently evolved from such animals and 
'11 . .. f' b 1 "1" 40 stl. retal.n Sl.gnl. l.cant cere ra Sl.ml. arl.tl.es. In 
attempting to avoid both of these fallacies, it seems that, 
on the one hand, we must admit that human beings are clearly 
capable of some cognitive achievements that other animals 
      not capable of, while, on the other hand, we must also 
admit that perceptual knowledge is not one of these 
exclusively human cognitive achievements. Thus, we can 
agree that complex mathematics is limited to humans (and 
only some humans at that), while also agreeing that the 
perceptual belief that there is a threatening dog chasing me 
can be known by humans and non-humanoid animals alike. 
Moreover, I think we should agree that 't'1hen such a 
perceptual belief is known, it tends to be known in the same 
way, regardless whether it is known by a human or some other 
animal. Hence, a less disparaging, and I think more 
accurate, way of making the distinction that Lehrer and 
40There is even reason to think that many humans employ 
the superiority fallacy to justify their mistreatment and 
exploitation of other animals, and that it is only fairly 
recently that the fallacy has started being limited to 
non-humanoid animals. In the antebellum era, for instance, 
some Southern whites used their belief that blacks were 
cognitive1y inferior animals to justify the mistreatment and 
exploitation of their slaves. Perhaps, this is still going 
on in apartheid South Africa. 
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Cohen were driving at is to distinguish between intellectual 
knowledge, such as complex mathematical knowledge, and 
ordinary knowledge, such as standard perceptual knowledge. 
Once we make the distinction in this way, it becomes 
clear that the adequacy constraint r suggested in section 3 
really is an adequacy constraint on a theory of ordinary 
knowledge. Moreover, since (AK*) satisfies this constraint 
and has so far been immune to counterexamples, it is 
reasonable to think that (AK*) provides the correct analysis 
of ordinary knowledge. What, then, is the correct analysis 
of intellectual knowledge? r contend that the correct 
account of intellectual knowledge can also be formulated in 
terms of doxastic and personal justification as follows: 
S intellectually knows that p only if 
(1) p is true, 
(2) S believes that p, 
(3) SIS belief that p is doxasti-
cally justified, and 
(4) S is personallY4l justified in 
believing that p. 
rt might be objected that since (AKr ) , unlike (AK*) , 
requires personal justification, it threatens to start us on 
a vicious regress in a way that (AK*) safely avoids. After 
all, according to (AKr) , in order for a person to know that 
p, she must be personally justified in believing that p. 
41Again, r leave it open as to whether (AKr)'s 
analysans is sufficient for intellectual knowledge. 
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But, according to (PJ.*), J in order for a person to be 
personally justified in believing that p, she must 
occurrently notice and, hence, know that she has evidence E 
for p. Of course, according to (AKr) , in order for her to 
know that she has evidence E for p, she must be personally 
justified in believing that she has evidence E for p; and in 
order for her to be personally justified in believing that 
she has evidence E for p, she must occurrently notice and, 
hence, know that she has evidence E' for believing that she 
has evidence E for p; and so on ad infinitum. 
Fortunately, such an obj ection is easy to forestall. 
The kind of knowledge which personal justification requires 
is ordinary knowledge. Thus, in order for a person to be 
personally justified in believing that p, she must 
occurrently notice and, hence, know in the ordinary sense - --
that she has evidence E for p. Of course, she can know in 
the ordinary sense that she has evidence E for p, without 
being personally justified in believing that she has 
evidence E' for believing that she has evidence E for p, 
because personal justification is not necessary for ordinary 
knowledge. As a result, (AKr) does not start us on a 
vicious regress. does require a person to be 
personally justified in believing that p, in order to know 
in the intellectual sense that p, and so, indirectly 
requires the person to know in the ordinary sense that she 
has evidence E for p. But, (PJ.*) does not require the J 
236 
person to know (in either sense) anything else, in order to 
be personally justified in believing that p, and therefore, 
the regress stops here. 
Our response to the regress obj ection is instructive 
because it shows that (AKr) is parasitic on (AK*). Such 
parasitism should probably come as no surprise, since all 
throughout history those epistemologists who have embraced 
overly intellectual accounts of knowledge have, in turn, 
been forced to acknowledge some other kind of 
non-inferential immediate knowledge to stay the impending 
42 regress of reasons for one's reasons. Their mistake is 
that they have traditionally tried to account for this 
non-inferential immediate knowledge in terms of their 
intellectual account of knowledge. To this end, they have 
been compelled to embrace basic beliefs, which the knower is 
somehow immediately justified in believing, but have never 
been able to give an adequate account of how basic beliefs 
are possible nor of which beliefs are basic. Thus, their 
accounts of intellectual knowledge have remained 
unsatisfactory. However, once we realize that there exists 
a considerably less intellectual, more fundamental kind of 
42Descartes, for example, is forced to distinguish 
between that which is known directly and immediately, our 
sensations and ideas, from that which is only known 
indirectly and problematically on the basis of these 
sensations and ideas, e.g. external objects. 
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knowledge --- the kind of knowledge we ordinarily have ---
we can, then, easily construct an account of intellectual 
knowledge upon it. This is precisely what (AKI ) does and is 
the reason for its success in avoiding spurious circles and 
repugnant regresses. 
While (AKI ) is interesting in its own right and does 
provide us with a philosophically satisfying account of 
intellectual knowledge, it yields the result that much of 
which we ordinarily know we do not intellectually know. For 
example, given (AKI ), we lack intellectual knowledge of most 
of our perceptual beliefs, of the external world in general, 
and of the existence of other minds, all of which are things 
we ordinarily know. On the other hand, we are not entirely 
without intellectual knowledge, either, and some of us 
possess a great deal of intellectual knowledge. For 
example, scientists frequently have intellectual knowledge 
in their respective domains, as do other specialists, such 
as economists, mathematicians, logicians, physicians, 
philosophers, engineers, etc. Intellectual knowledge is not 
limited to the intellectual elite, however, for we even 
occasionally have intellectual knowledge of beliefs 
concerning day to day things, when we base those beliefs on 
ultimately undefeated chains of reasoning. Even so, it must 
be stressed that most of what we know we do not 
intellectually know, since we do not usually take occurrent 
note of our reasons. Thus, while (AKI ) analyzes a kind of 
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knowledge worthy of striving for, it does not analyze the 
kind of knowledge we ordinarily have. This latter kind of 
knowledge is analyzed by (AK*) , ins tead. One more 
observation and this chapter is finished. 
The goal of this chapter was to provide an analysis of 
knowledge. In the end, we provided two such analyses: 
(AK*) , as an analysis of ordinary knowledge, and (AKI ) , as 
an analysis of intellectual knowledge. In closing, we 
should note that neither of these analyses could have been 
formulated without the aid 
justification distinction. 
of the personal/ doxas tic 
Hence, once again, the 
personal/doxastic justification distinction proves 
indispensable for making progress in epistemology. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REHARKS 
1. A Look at the Internalist/Externalist Controversy 
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The controversy over whether internalism or externalism 
provides the correct account of epistemic justification has 
been and continues to be one of the most heavily discussed 
topics in recent contemporary epistemology. Unfortunately, 
this discussion, which largely consists of advocates for one 
of the two positions extolling the virtues of their favored 
position, while citing the shortcomings of their opponents' 
.. 1 h            as done little, if anything to resolve the 
controversy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, I contend that much 
of the confusion surrounding the internalist/externa1ist 
controversy is directly traceable to the failure to 
distinguish personal and doxastic justification. It is now 
time to defend this contention. 
In Chapter 1, I noted that the justification 
requirement for knowledge is usually formulated in one of 
the following two ways: 
(JR1) S knows that p only if S is epistemi-
cally justified in believing that p. 
1A notable exception is Alvin 
resolve the controversy in his 
Justification" (in manuscript). 
Goldman's 
"Strong 
attempt to 
and Weak 
(JR2) S knows that p only if S's belief that 
p is epistemically justified. 
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I then observed that most epistemologists regard (JRl) and 
(JR2) to be synonymous, stylistic variants of the 
justification requirement, and in so doing, tacitly embrace 
the equivalency thesis, to wit, 
(ET) S is epistemically justified in 
believing that p iff S's belief that p 
is epistemically justified. 
But notice, one can embrace (ET) and yet consistently 
maintain that epistemic justification's primary domain of 
evaluation is persons. Likewise, one can embrace (ET) and 
consistently maintain that epistemic justification's proper 
domain of evaluation is beliefs. I submit that, without 
realizing it, internalists have done the former, and 
externalists have done the latter. After all, we know from 
Chapter 1 that internalists, like Lehrer and Pollock, have 
gravitated towards the (JRl) formulation of the 
jus tification requirement, whereas externalists, like 
Goldman, have opted for the (JR2) formulation. And we know 
from Chapter 2 that, when faced with demon world examples, 
internalists focus on the justificatory status of the 
demon-world inhabitant himself, while externalists focus on 
the justificatory status of his beliefs. Thus, it seems 
clear that internalists have been primarily concerned with 
personal justification and that externalists have, instead, 
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been interested in doxastic justification. However, since 
both internalists and externalists have embraced (ET), which 
conflates personal and doxastic justification, both have 
failed to realize that they have been talking about 
different kinds of epistemic justification. Interestingly 
enough, once we do realize that internalists have been 
interested in personal justification and that externalists 
have been interested in doxastic justification, we can see 
that both have been right all along, for, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, the correct account of personal justification can 
only be given by an internalist theory and the correct 
account of doxastic justification can only be given by an 
externalist theory. Thus, the internalist/externalist 
controversy resolves in both of their favors. 
Despite their mutual correctness, however, the 
externalist ultimately wins out in the following way. Both 
the internalist and the externalist take themselves to be 
talking about the kind of epistemic justification necessary 
for knowledge. In this regard, only the externalist is 
correct, because, as we know from (AI<*) , only doxastic 
justification is necessary for knowledge. 
2. Summary of the Dissertation: A Vindication of the 
Personal/Doxastic Justification Distinction 
I began this dissertation by demonstrating that there 
is no single, unitary notion of epistemic justification, but 
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rather a family of notions that are currently batted around 
under the single heading "epistemic justification". I then 
suggested that we could isolate out two very important kinds 
of epistemic justification in terms of their respective 
domains of evaluation, to wit, doxastic justification which 
takes beliefs as its domain of evaluation and personal 
justification which has persons as its domain of evaluation. 
The remainder of the dissertation was devoted to analyzing 
these two types of epistemic justification and to tracing 
out their ramifications for epistemology. 
In Chapter 2, I formulated an externalist account of 
doxastic justification, namely, doxastic reliabilism. In 
the course of defending this account, it was discovered that 
the personal/doxastic justification distinction provides us 
with the theoretical means needed to account for the 
divergent intuitions that regularly arise regarding 
justificatory evaluations in demon world contexts. This, in 
turn was seen to secure the distinction. 
In Chapter 3, the logical geography of justification 
theories was mapped out. Then, using this geography as the 
basis for an argument from elimination, I demonstrated that 
the correct account of personal justification can only be 
given by a coherence theory. And then I formulated and 
defended a linear coherence theory of personal 
justification. 
Having thus provided accounts of both personal and 
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doxastic justification, I proceeded to offer an analysis of 
knowledge in terms of these two kinds of justification. It 
was argued that only doxastic justification is necessary for 
ordinary knowledge, but that personal justification, 
nevertheless, has a negative, undermining role to play in 
such knowledge. I . then illustrated that the 4 
personal/doxastic justification distinction helps us to 
account for typical Gettier cases. Finally, I presented an 
even stronger analysis of knowledge which requires both 
personal and doxastic justification. This latter analysis, 
while interesting in its own right, proved too strong for an 
analysis of ordinary knowledge. 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, I argued that the 
failure, on the part of most epistemologists, to distinguish 
personal justification from 
directly responsible 
doxastic 
for 
justification is 
the current 
internalist/externalist controversy in contemporary 
epistemology, and that once this distinction is brought to 
bear on the controversy, the controversy itself simply 
dissolves. 
Thus, in the course of the present dissertation alone, 
the personal/ doxastic justification distinction has proved 
indispensable in at least four ways. It has proved 
indispensable: (1) for explaining away the conflicting 
intuitions in demon world examples, (2) for providing the 
correct account of ordinary knowledge, (3) for allowing us 
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to account for at least some of the Gettier examples 
currently afloat, and (4) for leading to the dissolution of 
the internalist/externalist controversy. Given its 
indispensability in these respects, I submit that if we want 
to make progress in epistemology, we must keep an eye toward 
the personal/doxastic justification distinction and tailor 
our theorizing and criticism accordingly. 
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